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ABSTRACT 
 
Societies seeking sustainability are transitioning from fossil fuels to clean, 
renewable energy sources to mitigate dangerous climate change. Energy transitions 
involve ethically controversial decisions that affect current and future generations’ well-
being. As energy systems in the United States transition towards renewable energy, 
American Indian reservations with abundant energy sources are some of the most 
significantly impacted communities. Strikingly, energy ethicists have not yet developed a 
systematic approach for prescribing ethical action within the context of energy decisions. 
This dissertation reinvents energy ethics as a distinct sub-discipline of applied ethics, 
integrating virtue ethics, deontology, and consequentialism with Sioux, Navajo, and Hopi 
ethical perspectives. On this new account, applied energy ethics is the analysis of 
questions of right and wrong using a framework for prescribing action and proper 
policies within private and public energy decisions. To demonstrate the usefulness of 
applied energy ethics, this dissertation analyzes two case studies situated on American 
Indian reservations: the Dakota Access Pipeline and the Navajo Generating Station.   
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CHAPTER 1 
ENERGY TRANSITIONS AND ENERGY ETHICS 
Energy in Transition 
 As societies transition to more sustainable energy systems, many important 
decisions arise with significant impacts on quality of life. Often coupled with uncertainty, 
social, environmental, and technoeconomic dimensions can be difficult to manage 
without a research guide, since they must take into account a plurality of interests, 
capabilities, values, governance structures, cultures, knowledge, resources, and histories. 
This dissertation begins to address this need by investigating one salient aspect of such a 
transition – energy ethics, and applies it to a discrete group of underrepresented people 
who already experience its consequences – indigenous communities. 
Proponents of sustainability tend to view sustainable ways of life as ethical and 
unsustainable ways of life as unethical. Although sustainability researchers often promote 
new ways of living, they infrequently make explicit the philosophical foundations 
supporting the ethical merits of their sustainability initiatives. As one researcher notes, 
because “practitioners are continually involved in actions that embody ethical 
suppositions,” “there is a compelling need for guiding concepts that can facilitate more 
systematic and reflective practice” (Graffy 2012, 504). As policymaking tends toward an 
industrialist, value-neutral perspective, underlying ethical principles are seldom 
scrutinized (if ever made explicit), and whether current ethical principles are sufficient 
for good governance or it is “ethically necessary to shop around for alternatives” remains 
unanswered (Graffy 2012, 505). Furthermore, “sustainability definitions are neither 
virtue-oriented nor consequence-oriented: they neither tell us what we ‘ought’ to do nor 
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help us understand very well the cause and effect of practice,” and some simply fail to 
offer actionable guidance, binding decision criteria, or specific action-guiding choices 
(Graffy 2012, 521-522). Sustainability research could benefit from integrating ethics. 
The transition from fossil fuel to clean, renewable energy sources is arguably the 
most significant change required to mitigate the harmful consequences of climate change 
for more sustainable societies. Without such changes, we risk flooding of coastal cities, 
extreme heat, storms, and other weather-related events, loss of agriculture, and, according 
to at least one estimate, extinction for up to 54% of today’s organisms, possibly including 
humans (Sherwood and Huber 2010; Levermann et al. 2013; Urban 2015; Friedlingstein 
et al. 2014). As a result, the future of the energy sector brings about some of the most 
ethically significant decisions we face, including: which energy sources should be used to 
generate electricity; what should be used to power transportation of goods and people; 
what should be the proper mix of public and private transportation; is wasted energy 
unethical; and how do people derive energy from food systems in ways that are least 
harmful to others? 
Electricity generation and energy consumption across all sectors release 
approximately 78% of global greenhouse gas emissions (US Environmental Protection 
Agency 2016; Friedrich, Ge, and Damassa 2015). Renewable energy sources, such as 
wind and solar, produce much lower emissions than fossil fuels. Wind energy and solar 
photovoltaics are estimated to emit 34 and 41 gCO2/kWh, respectively, over their 
lifecycles, while natural gas, oil, and coal emissions range from 443 to 1,050 gCO2/kWh 
(Nugent and Sovacool 2014). Considering that 81% of energy worldwide was generated 
from fossil fuels in 2017, there is substantial room for improvement through emissions 
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reductions (Enerdata 2019). So far, 59 countries, 63 regions or states, 72 cities, 9 utilities, 
21 institutions, and many corporations have shifted to, or are committed within the next 
few decades to shifting to, 100% renewable energy in at least one sector (e.g., electricity, 
transportation, heating and cooling) (Renewables 100 Policy Institute 2018). These 
transitions encourage us to reflect on the contributions of energy systems (i.e., 
technologies, infrastructures, and markets that supply energy) on our livelihoods and 
offer an opportunity to improve energy systems for reduced negative impacts on human 
lives and the environment. Yet, choosing unethical options within energy decisions 
threatens life and the planet as we know it. 
Because of the impact of energy decisions on the lives of individuals other than 
the agent, energy decisions are almost always ethical in nature because ethics concerns 
actions that affect others. Decisions which only impact the person performing the action 
are prudential. For example, any flick of a light switch connected to the grid consumes 
energy, which the energy provider monitors to balance supply. This act also affects 
others: It uses energy that someone else cannot use; it required a fuel source or generating 
equipment that provided jobs upstream; and it brought about employment decisions and 
utilized resources that had impacts across the greater economy. These ripple effects 
accumulate from trivial effects at small scale but become very significant at a global-
scale, particularly in climate influences. 
 Ethically controversial actions within energy transitions threaten job loss, 
relocation, dispossession of rights and influence, economic downturn, increased 
inequality between winners and losers, and environmental impacts. Treating an energy 
transition as a merely technical matter (as often occurs in traditional energy research) 
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ignores these social and environmental disruptions which can be much more detrimental 
to human and nonhuman livelihoods, impacting well-being in ways that range from 
whether someone is momentarily pleased to whether someone lives or dies. Many energy 
decisions are highly manageable, are within control of some decisionmaker, with 
alternatives from which to select, and typically without severe short-term effects. These 
decisions receive more scrutiny as people are generally becoming more aware of energy 
systems operations and their impacts. Recently, some scholars have argued for further 
integration of socially-oriented studies in the traditionally technically-focused research of 
energy (Miller 2014; Sovacool 2014a, 2014b; Spreng 2014; Ryan, Hebdon, and Dafoe 
2014; Rochlin 2014; Sovacool et al. 2015; Schubert, Thuß, and Möst 2015; Stern 2017; 
Pellegrino and Musy 2017). 
Social and environmental harms elicit ethical scrutiny of actions within energy 
systems. Examples of ethically controversial situations include: fracking operations that 
sometimes contaminate drinking water; the lack of energy access for billions of people 
around the world; oil spills, such as the Deepwater Horizon accident, one of the worst oil 
spills in history; and pollutant emissions from energy consumption, which contribute to 
climate change. These and similar problems conjure questions of whether our existing 
energy systems are ethical, just, sustainable, and contribute positively to people’s well-
being. These questions then naturally extend to consideration of energy systems that 
might come into being. As many regions of the world transition from fossil fuel-intensive 
energy systems to renewable energy sources, we must be sure that these changes are 
actually better, not just in terms of practical performance metrics, but also in terms of 
ethical merit, so that technology does not outpace our consciences. 
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Ethics is the field of philosophy that “involves systematizing, defending, and 
recommending concepts of right and wrong behavior” (Fieser 2018). It is typically 
concerned with actions that are voluntary and impact others since if the acting agent 
could not have done otherwise or impacts no one else, it is trivial to criticize the action. 
Three major ethical theories are mostly accredited to the work of four philosophers: 
Aristotle (virtue ethics), Immanuel Kant (deontological theory), and Jeremy Bentham and 
John Stuart Mill (consequentialism) (Aristotle 1984; Kant 1785; Bentham 1789; Mill 
1861). In brief, virtue ethics analyzes the character demonstrated by the targeted action, 
and actions enhancing human flourishing are ethical. Deontology is also called duty-
based ethics, due to understanding ethics as an obligation, rather than merely permissible 
as probabilism or satisficing theories claim (Hill 2009). These obligations are associated 
with good intentions, actions that can be performed by anyone universally, and show 
respect for all participants. Consequentialism bases ethical judgment on the consequences 
of the targeted action and seeks more positive than negative consequences. 
Because character, intentions, respect, and consequences are essentially universal 
notions that span all cultures (even if sometimes defined in slightly different ways), these 
ethical theories are universally applicable and foundational to more specific perspectives 
which might vary from one culture to the next. The conventional view of philosophy, 
called ‘universalism,’ sees these cultural differences primarily as differences of 
perception; the underlying principles do not change across cultures. The opposing view 
‘ethical relativism,’ generally rejected by philosophers, understands ethics as differing 
across cultures (Rachels 1999). Though there are only three major theories, a diverse set 
of ethical views may result because each theory can be detailed in many ways, and there 
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are variations in the interpretation of the original philosophers’ works. So, not only is 
there potential for an evaluator’s choice of ethical theory to differ, but there could be 
countless reasons provided within evaluators’ arguments that would conform to each of 
these theories. Not all ethical theories must be used in any given analysis, and it is not 
likely that someone would ever identify all reasons for or against any action. Yet, it is 
beneficial for researchers interested in the ethical merit of an action to use as many 
ethical theories and to identify as many applicable reasons as is practical within the time 
available because typically having more reasons can provide more evidence for the 
evaluator’s decision. 
To leverage the expertise of energy researchers in motivating changes to more 
ethical and sustainable energy systems, this dissertation focuses on energy decisions 
within transitions from fossil fuel energy systems to renewable energy systems and their 
ethical impacts. I use the proverbial “we” (or “we of invitation”) used by Bernard 
Williams and Julia Annas to invite anyone interested to join the conversation since nearly 
everyone is a user of electricity or fuels and since even the smallest energy decisions 
from flipping a light switch to deliberating construction of a new power plant have ripple 
effects across energy systems and beyond (Williams 1985; Annas 2015). In this way, this 
dissertation can be useful for researchers interested in the social impacts of energy 
systems. 
 
Specifics of US Transitions - Indian Country Energy Belt 
As energy systems in the US transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy 
sources, American Indian reservations with abundant energy resources are some of the 
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most significantly impacted communities. They sometimes have both the most to gain 
and the most to lose because of the prevalence of both new and old energy types on their 
land. That is, some reservations have abundant coal, uranium, and oil, which are being 
phased out, while others can have some of the highest solar and wind energy potentials 
across the nation, which are increasingly being adopted. This abundance has led to the 
creation of the moniker “Indian Country Energy Belt” to refer to the reservations in the 
Western US from Arizona to North Dakota (Figure 1). It is estimated that American 
Indian reservations contain 55% of the nation’s uranium, 30% of its coal, and 3% of its 
petroleum and natural gas (Allison 2015, 145). Although reservations only cover 2% of 
US land, they contain 5% of the US renewable energy potential, with estimates including 
over 300 GW of wind energy and over 6000 GW of solar energy potential (US 
Department of Energy 2012; Driscoll 2018; Open EI 2018). Along with natural gas in 
shale pockets, some reservations also have natural resources for staple energy types such 
as hydroelectricity, geothermal energy, and various biofuels. However, although energy 
transitions typically involve job displacement, they present a window of opportunity for 
reflection concerning whether the best energy systems are being put in place. Mindful of 
the significance these transitions can have on energy workers’ livelihoods, energy 
decisionmakers can use ethical reasoning to manage impacts and protect personal and 
environmental well-being during these transitions. Since the US emits the second-highest 
amount of greenhouse gas (approximately 15% of global emissions) after China, it is vital 
that US energy systems transition to forms of energy that are better able to mitigate 
climate change across the globe (US Environmental Protection Agency 2017). Therefore, 
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cooperation with Native Americans during the US energy transition is paramount to 
addressing anthropogenic climate change. 
 
 
Figure 1: Illustrated Map of Indian Country Energy Belt  
(modified from http://flashmedia.glynn.k12.ga.us/webpages/kadams/photos/24850/map-30-03.jpg) 
 
 To investigate controversial cases of great significance within the US energy 
transition, I have selected two communities impacted by energy decisions within the 
Indian County Energy Belt. I preview the cases here and provide further details in 
subsequent chapters. In the first case, the Dakota Access Pipeline was constructed from 
2016-2017. Oil spills threaten contamination of the drinking water supply of the Great 
Sioux Nation at Standing Rock, SD, among others (Camp of the Sacred Stones 2016). 
While the Great Plains have some of the highest wind energy potential in the US, the 
decision to continue to enable fossil fuel exploitation in this region remains highly 
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contested. Media coverage assured that this case is well-recognized. Of relevance to this 
thesis, this case illustrates an unethical energy decision, where previous reflection could 
have influenced Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. (ETP), the corporation constructing the 
pipeline, to act differently to avoid significant ethical objections. While the threatened 
communities oppose ETP’s enabling of the oil industry, they also fear for their health due 
to the water contamination threat. Considering the impact on communities, how ought the 
ethical merits of the construction of a pipeline be evaluated? 
In the second case, the pending closures of Navajo Generating Station (NGS) in 
Page, AZ, a coal power plant serving the Southwestern US, and the Kayenta Coal Mine, 
which exclusively provides NGS with fuel, threaten to displace approximately 700 
workers. Besides providing the most significant jobs to the local economy in an isolated 
region, these closures could end land lease payments that are vital to the Navajo and Hopi 
tribes. After the executive board voted to close the power plant in early 2017, an 
extension of operations is keeping the plant open until December 2019. In response, 
Navajo and Hopi tribes decided to transition from a coal-intensive economy to solar 
photovoltaic installations as a replacement revenue source. How should the ethical merits 
of an energy transition be evaluated? Of relevance to this thesis, this case illustrates an 
energy transition that is positive for the environment but difficult for a community that 
has suffered historical hardships. With issues of tribal sovereignty often associated with 
these types of societal decisions, it could be the case that the decision to pursue solar 
energy is not entirely voluntary. The ramifications for the future of the tribes could rest 
on this decision. 
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While these cases take place in American Indian communities, they represent 
similar decisions made across the US but involve additional ethical considerations from 
various perspectives from the local tribes. Though, tribes are not homogenous, just as 
nontribal communities often are not. For example, members of the Great Sioux Nation 
who extract oil upstream support the pipeline, while tribal members downstream are 
opposed. Similarly, while some Navajos favor NGS’ closure for environmental reasons, 
the Navajo Nation had considered purchasing the power plant and mine in order to avoid 
closures, and hundreds of members have marched in protest of the closure at the Arizona 
state capitol. The challenge is in how to address these multiple interests simultaneously. 
 
Summary of Chapters 
 Topics in the field of energy ethics span many energy types, phases of the fuel 
chain, governance and markets, and more, but the field is not yet well-established. The 
objective of this dissertation is to standardize the methods of applied ethics in the energy 
sector to strengthen energy ethics as a field of research that could influence energy 
decisions, including policymaking. Chapter 2 reviews the energy ethics literature and 
exposes the lack of a guiding document that could serve as a foundational reference tool 
for energy ethicists. While research that could be called ‘energy morality,’ ‘energy 
justice,’ or ‘energy metaphysics’ sometimes takes the name ‘energy ethics,’ these studies 
do not produce action prescriptions in most cases, as applied ethics does. I argue that 
convoluting these terms under the general moniker of ‘energy ethics’ disguises that 
different methods of analysis are being conducted. This conflation of concepts can 
confuse researchers not trained in applied ethics and would not be useful as a guide for 
  11 
action as more direct, critical evaluation can provide. I do not claim that these other 
research perspectives are not useful; I only suggest that applied ethics is more action-
oriented, rather than strictly theoretical or otherwise abstract, as some research can be. 
Although foundational work has been created by energy ethicists which defines energy 
ethics and begins to demonstrate the methods of applied ethics, the definition and 
frameworks provided do not conform to conventions in the broader field of (general) 
ethics (i.e., Frigo 2017; Sovacool and Dworkin 2014). To strengthen these foundations, I 
reinvent energy ethics with a new definition and more comprehensive ethical 
frameworks, using the same classic ethical theories – virtue ethics, deontology, and 
consequentialism – that are then demonstrated through case studies in subsequent 
chapters. 
 Chapter 3 evaluates whether the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline was 
ethical. I use the applied energy ethics frameworks of the three major ethical theories 
described in Chapter 2 as well as a framework derived from Lakota Sioux ethics. The 
analysis more strongly opposes the pipeline’s construction due to a lack of spill 
prevention and response plans, disrespect of concerns of tribal members and temporary 
workers, and impacts of dangerous climate change due to oil combustion emissions it 
facilitates. These aspects need to be addressed in order to qualify the construction as 
ethical, and until then, the pipeline arguably ought to be kept from operating. While the 
reasons provided in the case are not novel, the process of ethical evaluation that reveal 
the reasons that justify the competing stances (for and against construction) is different 
from how scholars have framed their research of the case. I derive the relevant action 
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prescription for the case by pointing out the aspects necessary to change in order to make 
the pipeline construction ethical. 
 Chapter 4 evaluates whether the Navajo Nation’s transition to a solar economy is 
ethical. I use the three major ethical theories and additional frameworks derived from 
Navajo and Hopi ethics. While the analysis favors the transition to solar due to providing 
for tribal members’ needs, respecting autonomy by asking permission to build on tribal 
members’ land, and for a moderate pace that avoids bankruptcy, there are also caveats. 
Care should be taken in selecting photovoltaics with reduced human and environmental 
health impacts, and planning for end of product life would decrease intergenerational 
concerns, since these conditions could qualify the action as unethical. Again, it is not 
necessarily the case that the reasons within the arguments for and against the transition to 
a solar economy are novel. However, through this evaluation, not only are these reasons 
made explicit, but the justification from various ethical theories and indigenous 
perspectives that explains why and how those reasons constitute ethically salient aspects 
of the case is the novelty of the applied energy ethics analysis. 
Chapter 5 concludes with a summary that might serve as a foundation for future 
energy transition studies. I offer new directions for research to expand energy ethics to 
new case studies and look forward to how ethical analysis might be incorporated into 
decision-making and policymaking. The dissertation is part of my series of projects 
working to improve energy systems with the greater purpose of making lives better 
through more ethical and sustainable decisions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REINVENTING ENERGY ETHICS 
Introduction 
 The field of energy ethics does not yet have a systematic approach for prescribing 
actions in the energy sector, and without it, this research has less potential to be impactful 
than it might have. To make their work more useful for decisionmakers and to have their 
action prescriptions adopted in energy decisions, energy ethicists’ research (e.g., Geerts 
2017; Sovacool and Dworkin 2014; Frigo 2018; and others) should engage action 
decisions directly and explicitly and should formally evaluate the merits of those actions. 
In this chapter, I reinvent energy ethics as a distinct subdiscipline of applied ethics 
to strengthen the reasoning used in energy decision-making and to increase the possibility 
of making ethical choices. After a brief summary of my argument and the motivation for 
it, the chapter has three main sections in which I review challenges and propose a new 
approach for addressing them. In the first section, I review the energy ethics literature and 
positive examples of applied ethics which serve as a starting point for understanding 
ethical analysis in the energy sector. In the second section, I argue that the literature is 
missing a guide for applied ethics, which is the need I begin to address in this 
dissertation. In the third section, I redefine energy ethics and present a structured 
approach for applied energy ethics, using ethical principles, such as those of the three 
major, classical categories of ethical theory—virtue ethics, deontological theory, and 
consequentialism. These frameworks provide a basis for applied energy ethics that 
overcomes the objections I raise to the existing definitions and frameworks. I explain the 
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challenges presented by energy ethics today and propose a different way of analyzing 
ethics through applied principles to respond to those challenges. 
 
A Call for Action 
To sharpen the arguments presented in the field of energy ethics to the crux of 
their conflicts and to strengthen action prescriptions into ethical obligations, we need a 
standardized methodology for making ethical analysis explicit. No devoted journal or 
citations among authors organize insights from one author or case to another. It is 
difficult to locate the literature for this reason. Some energy researchers might use 
normative words, like ‘rights,’ ‘fair,’ ‘wrong,’ ‘harm,’ ‘benefit,’ ‘should,’ ‘ought,’ 
‘must,’ etc., colloquially without providing the principled analysis that constitutes applied 
ethics. To serve my overall thesis related to strengthening ethical reasoning in the energy 
sector, I argue that energy ethics does not have a standardized way of determining 
prescriptions for ethical action. While energy morality, energy metaphysics, or energy 
justice are often subsumed under the moniker of ‘energy ethics,’ these studies are not 
usually equipped to provide action prescriptions. I distinguish my work from other 
energy ethicists through distinct terminology and methods with distinct analytical tasks 
(i.e., Frigo 2017; Sovacool and Dworkin 2014). The more distinct terminology I use 
highlights those differences. With this new definition, standardized ethical frameworks, 
and new cases in subsequent chapters of this dissertation, I begin to work toward the goal 
of providing the field with a guide to improved ethical analysis. 
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Energy Ethics Today 
 To survey the field, I review three prominent aspects that characterize energy 
ethics research, including: its diversity of topics, its focus on the impacts of energy 
consumption on our lives, and its underlying ubiquity that sometimes goes unnoticed but 
at other times is what relates all of nature and provides the meaning of life. 
 
Diversity of Topics 
A diverse collection of articles addresses ethical issues in the energy sector (i.e., 
Kasperson et al. 1980; Kermisch and Taebi 2017). While ethical issues are commonly 
discussed across energy research in many disciplines, only a few dozen authors use the 
term ‘energy ethics.’ However, the field is much broader because many authors wrestle 
with social issues in the context of energy research, using ethical terminology and notions 
loosely, implicitly, or in colloquial senses (e.g., Cottrell 1955; Cook 1976; Vale 1986; 
Guy and Shove 2001; Nader 2010; Verbong and Loorbach 2012; Miller et al. 2015; 
Pasqualetti et al. 2016). Energy ethics spans all types of energy and fuels, the entire 
supply chain from extraction to wastes, various infrastructures, technologies, storage 
alternatives, energy markets and services, and more. It is a growing field of research, with 
recent special journal issues including Energy Research and Social Science (2017, 
Volume 30) and Relations: Beyond Anthropocentrism (2018, Volume 6). Energy ethics 
has not been limited to the work of philosophers, as anthropologists, religious scholars 
(e.g., Rasmussen et al. 2011; Peppard et al. 2016; Biviano 2018), and journalists 
frequently study these issues. The literature includes case studies throughout developed 
and developing countries across the world and their many cultures. A recent literature 
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review summarizes the field in a similar way to the way I discuss it here (i.e., Frigo 
2018).  
Nuclear energy ethics was frequently studied in the 1970s, and this topic of 
research is once again gaining attention because of an earthquake and subsequent tsunami 
that caused nuclear reactor meltdowns Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan 
on March 6, 2011. The disaster spurred public outcry against nuclear power plants as 
people generally viewed this outcome as unacceptable, thereby condemning this energy 
source as unethical. This disapproval contributed to a campaign in Germany to eliminate 
nuclear power from the national portfolio, which is currently halfway to its goal. The 
disapproval led to a global downturn in the market, causing Westinghouse Electric 
Company, a leading nuclear energy company, to file for bankruptcy in 2017 and other 
nuclear power plants to be decommissioned rather than renewed. At least two new 
constructions in the US were recently abandoned rather than completed (Kennedy 2017; 
Legere 2018; Plumer 2017). In the wake of this sudden shift in the nuclear energy 
market, some authors have renewed debates over nuclear energy’s ethical merits (Dieck-
Assad 2012; Löfquist 2013; Hillerbrand and Peterson 2014; Andrianov et al. 2015; Kyne 
and Bolin 2016; Kermisch and Taebi 2017). 
Authors often portray nuclear energy as ethical in some regards, with benefits of 
providing abundant, clean energy, but unethical due to risks associated with radioactive 
waste and the possibility of accidental disasters (Löfquist 2013; Hillerbrand and Peterson 
2014; Kermisch and Taebi 2017). For instance, some scholars weigh these risks against 
the capabilities or freedoms provided by the energy that is generated (such as mobility or 
extra time granted due to the convenience of electric appliances), using Amartya Sen and 
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Martha Nussbaum’s ‘capabilities approach’ (see Robeyns 2011) (Hillerbrand and 
Peterson 2014; Kermisch and Taeibi 2017). Sen and Nussbaum discuss well-being as 
capabilities available to an individual (Robeyns 2011). As these authors view it, more 
freedom of opportunity signifies a comparatively better life and a comparatively better 
energy source, and thereby a more ethical choice. Another nuclear energy ethicist 
cautions against making ethical assumptions based on probabilities of risk that rely 
exclusively on scientific models, especially regarding energy matters involving high 
uncertainty, because such reliance presumes that the scientific assumptions are 
reasonable, though they might not be (Brett-Crowther 1980). Instead of scientific models, 
surveys of potentially impacted stakeholders can also be used to gauge risk. Just as the 
science is sometimes uncertain, the related ethics might also be disputable. For this 
reason, some scholars recommend following a precautionary principle, which entails 
planning for a worst-case scenario (Rasmussen et al. 2011). As the nuclear energy topic 
demonstrates, a variety of ethical considerations can be taken into account within energy 
ethics’ analyses. 
Fracking, wind energy, and waste-to-energy are energy sources that provoke 
ethical controversy but have received less attention than nuclear or oil. Some of the 
arguments related to these energy types are reviewed here. One ethicist describes 
fracking as eco-blackmail because the allure of short-term revenue gains disguise long-
term, negative impacts on public health (Cotton 2017). Another scholar supports fracking 
using “just war theory,” using metaphors of a “justified continued use of force” (self-
defense to protect one’s livelihood), of “just cause” associated with selling natural gas to 
poor countries (“intervening to save a neighbor”), and of “proportional response” to harm 
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(e.g., poverty, oppressive governments, and impacts of climate change) (Peppard et al. 
2016). As we can see, the reasoning of these two authors is very different. 
In wind energy ethics, mistakenly assuming that national views on renewable 
energy coincide with local views hides a power discrepancy, and these underlying 
tensions can derail wind energy construction planning (Howe 2014). This ethicist 
condemns the paternalistic energy infrastructure construction as disrespectful, even if the 
idea is well-intentioned, since it imposes an energy source on a population without 
consent. Locals might protest such installations due to disagreeing with who is in power, 
a lack of ownership, share of profits, benefits, or inclusion in decision-making, or 
disruption of culturally-important locations. With similar implications concerning 
paternalism, an author surveyed Germans regarding waste-to-energy alternatives and 
found a public preference for scenarios including high-adoption of waste-to-energy 
infrastructure. However, these scenarios seem unrealistic due to political opposition. 
Now, the community must determine whether it can be ethical to settle with a second-
best option (Renn 2003). 
In a special journal issue on energy ethics, in Relations: Beyond 
Anthropocentrism (2018, Volume 6), scholars use principles from Braai, Ubuntu, and 
Annang (African philosophies), vitalism (a philosophy valuing all life), and Catholic 
ethics, presenting an eclectic mix (Ibanga 2018; Bethem 2018; Biviano 2018). Energy 
ethicists discuss a multitude of energy topics and support their views from a variety of 
ethical perspectives. 
 
  19 
Impacts of Energy on Livelihood 
Energy ethicists frequently discuss energy consumption as a significant 
determinant of our livelihood (the actions we do) and its impacts on well-being (how our 
lives are going) as an ethical matter (e.g., Forde 2017; Geerts 2017, 2018; Kesselring 
2017; Mitcham and Rolston 2013; Tidwell and Smith 2015). Scholars distinguish two 
types of energy ethicists. Type I values energy production “as a virtue” and assumes 
coupled growth between consumption and well-being (Mitcham and Rolston 2013, 316). 
This perspective implies that “human beings have a categorical obligation to maximize 
energy production” (Mitcham and Rolston 2013, 316). Type II questions that linear 
relationship, contending that “equity and energy can grow concurrently only to a point. 
[…] Above this threshold, energy grows at the expense of equity” (Mitcham and Rolson 
2013, 318). To Type II energy ethicists, “energy is argued to be at most a qualified rather 
than an unqualified good,” since “after crossing a certain threshold, increasing energy 
production and use reduces the quality of life” (Mitcham and Rolston 2013, 318). Type I 
energy ethicists conform to a traditional view in the energy sector, while Type II is 
critical of historical norms. Because of these two different accounts, energy consumption 
and its impact on well-being are controversial, and because our consumption impacts 
others, this controversy is an ethical one. 
Energy security is also ethically controversial. For instance, while 78% of 
households in Zambia have “green” energy (solar and bio-based fuels), the remaining 
22% of households lack energy access altogether (Kesselring 2017). Although 94% of 
Zambia’s national energy is generated from hydropower, more than 50% of the nation’s 
energy is designated to be used for copper mining rather than residential use (Kesselring 
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2017). The discrepancy between those who have clean power (including both residential 
and commercial users) and those who have none is a justice issue; the determination of 
whether the government has an obligation to provide energy access is an ethical issue. 
However, some scholars question the ethical merit of providing energy access while also 
questioning whether energy security is necessary and attainable (Tidwell and Smith 
2015). Just as greater energy consumption is not necessarily better, increased energy 
access might also be questionable. Some scholars report that people living off-grid in 
Wales have had to find ways to “cope with abundance”; in practice, they use all of the 
energy they generate (Forde 2017, 91). Their condition creates questions of whether 
overproducing energy or wasting energy is unethical (Forde 2017, 91). 
As more refined data have been collected, scholars find that “the form and amount 
of energy consumption in modern society may inhibit rather than enable human 
flourishing” (Geerts 2017, 521). In one example of overefficiency – when performance 
gains involve tradeoffs – overefficient heating which only heats rooms in use lowers the 
quality of life in the unheated rooms (Geerts 2017, 533). In another example, thinner 
bicycle tires are more aerodynamic but can inhibit riding in certain places or for long 
distances (Geerts 2017, 533). These examples question whether technological progress is 
always coupled with improved well-being. Furthermore, energy ethicists oppose the 
dichotomy between boundless consumerism and ecofrugality with a third option—
qualitative abundance (Geerts 2018). That is, consumers need not feel torn between ever-
increasing energy use and sacrificing for the sake of conservation, since lives can be 
improved by employing smart energy efficiency initiatives and with clean energy 
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generation from renewables. Ethicists are no longer taking it for granted that any amount 
of energy produced or consumed is necessarily good and are scrutinizing energy use. 
 
Ubiquity of Energy Unites Us 
While energy ethicists recognize that energy is the capacity to do work, they 
sometimes discuss energy in an abstract, theoretical sense. Energy is so central to our 
lives that it is more than just a tool (e.g., Chatti et al. 2017; Groves et al. 2017; 
Rasmussen et al. 2011; Surorov and Suvorova 2015); it is a source of meaning or 
purpose. Energy is given a spiritual, metaphysical, omni-present, and existential 
importance (e.g., Chatti et al. 2017; Surorov and Suvorova 2015). Energy is within all 
living organisms and enables our actions. Not only does energy animate us, some 
ethicists say that energy is us—all living beings and all matter are forms of energy. So, 
not only are energy decisions fundamental determinants of a good life in practical terms, 
energy researchers consider these decisions as affecting the way the universe shapes us 
and the way we shape the universe. While some might consider these ideas radical, they 
reflect some Eastern perspectives (such as some forms of Taoism) and other popular 
views in environmental ethics. Applied ethicists in other fields also try to contextualize 
their research. 
Energy ethicists find meaning and interconnection through energy. Some discuss 
energy efficiency as a compelling imperative for a “personal lifecourse transition” (i.e., a 
lifestyle change) beyond the practical concerns of avoiding wastefulness (Groves et al. 
2017, 72). They hope that the study of ethics helps students to articulate their values and 
to discover or make opportunities to operationalize their goals (Groves et al. 2017, 72). 
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Some ethicists see energy decisions related to mitigating climate change as the most 
important way to spend our time and boldly exclaim, “If you’re not spending every 
waking hour working on this, you’re probably not spending enough time on it” 
(Rasmussen et al. 2011, 879). Other ethicists present an abstract reductionist view, called 
“the energy-informational viewpoint,” which holds that “the general substance 
underlying the existence and development of the Universe and Man is energy; energy is 
the unique and universal nature of all being; everything is reduced to the amount and 
quality of energy;” furthermore, as they see it, “the main mission of humans in [the] 
Cosmos is generating high-quality harmonised energy; all human activity should be 
subordinated to solving this strategic problem” (Surorov and Suvorova 2015, 149, 157). 
In this view, “high-quality harmonised energy” refers to such things as love and peace, 
referring to the feelings or “good vibes” of these states as an admirable aim. Scholars see 
a shift from descriptions of energy as “produced and utilized by living organisms” and as 
“vital energy, life force,” to “energy contained in living or recently living biological 
organisms” (emphasis added) (Chatti et al. 2017, 32-33), which expresses a shift from a 
metaphysical unity with energy to treating energy as an external instrument. They assert 
that “bioenergy can be less a force of life and more a threat to life” (Chatti et al. 2017, 
32-33), and they would rather see a return to a sense of greater unity with nature through 
energy systems that help life to flourish. In these ways, energy ethicists portray a 
motivation to not only change perspectives, but also actions and structures within energy 
systems. 
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No Guidebook for Applied Energy Ethics Exists 
 Historically, ethicists have only inconsistently engaged with energy decisions; so, 
the notion of integrating applied ethics into energy decision-making may seem foreign or 
even superfluous. Also, no foundational document exists to provide a common thread to 
the diverse subjects analyzed. There are no conventional standards and no traditions or 
precedents from which to draw. While one author has defined energy ethics and others 
provide an example of applied classical ethical theory in a way that could provide a 
benchmark, I criticize both of these attempts for what I see as significant weaknesses 
(i.e., Frigo 2017; Sovacool and Dworkin 2014). In this section, I explain that there is no 
standardized method for creating action prescriptions in the field of energy ethics in three 
ways. First, I explain the disorganization of the field, in order to help organize it. Second, 
I recognize that much of energy ethics is not applied ethics and uses different analytical 
methods. Third, I distinguish energy ethics and energy justice because the two are 
commonly conflated. Distinguishing between the two addresses a counterargument to my 
claim that energy ethics has no formal framework because the energy justice framework 
might be argued as a tool for applied ethics (i.e., Sovacool et al. 2017). I strive to improve 
the existing foundational work in the field by providing a new definition and 
standardized, classical ethical frameworks that can help reduce ambiguity in the 
literature. With these refined tools, I hope to make energy ethics a distinct field of 
research that may be used by researchers and decisionmakers alike. 
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Energy Ethics Is Disorganized 
 I criticize energy ethics as a disorganized field of research for three reasons, 
including: a lack of rules for choosing principles and cases, abstraction, and lack of 
definition. 
 Energy ethics is characterized by a plethora of topics. The diversity of topics and 
the principles used to analyze cases signifies growth of this young field, but also 
contributes to a sense of discontinuity across the literature. With such a vast span of 
topics and so many reasons used to support an argument, it can be difficult to compare 
one article to another. It is uncommon for energy ethicists to cite one another. In addition, 
authors do not typically use shared reasoning, which makes it difficult to determine 
whether they agree. So, with the variety of their case selection and evaluation 
methodology, it is difficult to identify the commonalities in their research beyond the 
recognitions that they are all speaking of energy and ethics in some manner. Speaking in 
one voice and collaborating on the most controversial topics can help to strengthen 
ethical reasoning in energy decisions. This diversity is not necessarily bad; it expands the 
field to new areas of study that had not been previously addressed. So, I am not 
advocating for eliminating diversity, but there ought to be conventions regarding which 
issues to address, how to address them, and how we should prioritize them. 
Without standardization, unconventional principles may be used to justify a 
preconceived stance, rather than performing an unbiased analysis to determine ethical 
merit (e.g., Battistutta 2018; Delorme 2018; Feltrin 2018). Using unconventional 
principles requires justification and can potentially turn away readers who refute the 
relevance of those principles. Standardized principles might become perceived as 
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repetitive or perhaps boring, but they help to organize the field. Standardization also 
helps instructors who do not have to restart each case by teaching new principles. 
Sometimes, ethicists exclude counterarguments altogether which gives the misleading 
impression that the subject is not controversial (e.g., Delorme 2018; Feltrin 2018; Kass 
2016; Meyer 2015). In addition, managing the variety of ethical content can be difficult 
for energy ethicists. Adding standardization helps to unite the field. 
Energy ethicists are sometimes too abstract to be practical, which is typical of 
abstract philosophy (e.g., Szeman and Boyer 2017) but unlike discussions of energy 
systems or energy service which include decisions, actions, and impacts (e.g., Forde 
2017; Geerts 2017, 2018; Kesselring 2017; Tidwell and Smith 2015). Theorizing at a 
global level and criticizing human energy consumption at large is too abstract but 
characterizes how some energy ethicists discuss the Anthropocene (e.g., Colebrook 2017; 
Jamieson 2017). The ‘Anthropocene’ identifies the era since the 1950s in which human 
society has become a dominant, geological force influencing the climate, surface, oceans, 
species, nutrient cycles, and other aspects of the environment (Crutzen and Schwägerl 
2011). Although energy systems deserve much of the blame for the degraded state of the 
environment, they also have a significant role in sustaining healthy lives. Philosophers 
sometimes speak so generally that the fact that some forms of energy generation and 
consumption have more ethical merit than others does not arise. While not all energy 
ethicists have ambitions to influence energy decisions, for those that do, this abstraction 
is impractical since energy decisions are not made at a global level and since there is no 
single energy plan for the entire world. Furthermore, there is not one single energy 
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system, but a collection of many electrical, fuel, market, and technological systems that 
sometimes overlap. 
One scholar has begun to organize the field by providing a foundational definition 
for ‘energy ethics’; however, the author creates two definitions that are difficult to 
distinguish (i.e., Frigo 2017). While this work is an important step to grounding the 
literature in a common terminology, the definitions do not clarify whether energy ethics 
is a descriptive or critical endeavor (e.g., Frigo 2017). One definition of “energy ethics” 
suggests it is descriptive: “an open space of discussion about the moral dimensions of 
energy before the prescription of any normative framework” and “is not an exercise in 
which scholars impose their own moral views onto those we study” (Frigo 2017, 10; 
Smith and Mette 2017, 4). A second definition of “ethics of energy” refers to a 
prescriptive, action-guiding inquiry (Frigo 2017). Along with these definitions, the author 
proceeds to describe both terms as relative to a group’s culture, which problematically 
ignores that most ethicists reject cultural relativism (e.g., Rachels 1999) (Frigo 2017). 
Defining ‘ethics of energy’ (but not ‘energy ethics’) as prescriptive also neglects the 
precedent set by the prescriptive fields of environmental ethics, business ethics, medical 
ethics, and media ethics (Frigo 2017, 9). Further elaboration provided for these terms 
conflates ‘ethics,’ ‘morals,’ ‘morality,’ and ‘justice,’ which can be confusing if these 
terms are separate and distinct. Since the problems of whether energy ethics is descriptive 
or critical, whether its principles are universal or relative, and whether they are distinct 
from morality or justice interfere with trying to make the terms ‘energy ethics’ and 
‘ethics of energy’ distinct and since the solution the author provides that uses similar 
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sounding phrases does not make the distinction clear, it seems easier to treat these two 
terms as synonyms. 
There is an important distinction to be made between ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’; 
while the terms are often used interchangeably, they represent two different research 
perspectives. This distinction seems to be the motivation behind the attempt to 
distinguish ‘energy ethics’ and ‘ethics of energy,’ and using different words makes the 
contrast easier to recognize and follows conventions for distinguishing descriptive and 
analytical methods (e.g., Frigo 2017). ‘Morals’ and ‘morality’ are descriptive accounts of 
a group’s views or beliefs, while ‘moral theory’ is the normative study of those beliefs 
(Gert and Gert 2016). ‘Ethics’ refers to principles that apply universally, and ‘ethical 
theory’ refers to the critical study of such principles (Gert and Gert 2016). ‘Morality of 
energy,’ ‘energy morality,’ or ‘energy morals’ would name descriptive anthropological 
research assuming cultural relativism, and ‘energy moral theory’ or ‘moral theory in the 
energy sector’ would classify research that is normatively critical and assumes relativism. 
‘Energy ethics,’ ‘ethics of energy,’ and ‘ethical theory in the energy sector’ refer to the 
normative philosophical research which uses a critical and universal perspective. 
The distinction between ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ is important because descriptive 
ethics and critical ethics are different in objectives and results. Descriptive accounts 
recall the normative reasoning of a group, asking which considerations influenced a 
decision (taking the action for granted) and illuminating them more explicitly. Critical 
ethics research performs a judgment of an action, or the reasons used to justify 
performing it, by asking which features should influence the decision or whether the 
action was appropriate. To produce an action prescription, it is not enough to merely 
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acknowledge the reasons for decisions (as with a merely descriptive account) when the 
status quo is unacceptable (such as the energy sector’s emissions’ contributions to global 
warming) because the judgment that the status quo is unacceptable would not appear in a 
merely descriptive account. The author of merely descriptive research would only tell 
what happened (or is happening), not what should happen. In merely descriptive research, 
the judgment is left out, while in critical research, the author provides the judgment and 
ought to also include the criteria for judging. 
While I am not saying that a researcher could never do both descriptive and 
critical research simultaneously or that either descriptive ethics or critical ethics is better, 
I argue that merely descriptive research approaches are inherently different than critical 
approaches and produce a different result. Problems arise when authors do not state 
whether their work is descriptive or prescriptive because it may appear that an author 
supports an action, but is actually giving no judgment about it. For instance, a detailed 
description of the Holocaust without acknowledgement of its atrocity could leave a 
question as to whether the author supports it. 
Using the term ‘energy morality’ for descriptive research and ‘energy ethics’ for 
critical research standardizes terminology and clarifies their meaning. To further 
eliminate ambiguity, we can use ‘energy ethics’ to identify the field at large and ‘applied 
energy ethics’ to identify the particular approach using case studies and ethical theory 
that mirrors applied ethics work in other research areas (e.g., applied business ethics, 
applied bioethics, etc.). This proposed change conforms to the precedent used to help 
clarify similar ambiguities in medical ethics and could help to organize the field of 
energy ethics (i.e., Sulmasy and Sugarman 2010). 
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Energy Ethics Is Not Always Ethics 
 My second justification of the claim that energy ethics lacks a standardized 
guidebook for creating ethical prescriptions for action is that much of the ‘energy ethics 
research’ is not ethics and does not prescribe actions. Most energy ethics research is 
technoscientific, metaphysical, anthropological, or justice-oriented. These fields seldom, 
if ever, produce action prescriptions; they can be even more distinguished from ethics 
than morality was in the previous section. Sometimes energy ethics research is 
standardized, but the standard is not for ethical analysis but for another research 
discipline. As in the previous section, I do not claim that there is no place or use for these 
alternative methods of analysis, only that standardizing the terminology can clarify the 
type of analysis being performed to strengthen action prescriptions in the energy sector. 
Energy scholars and philosophers rarely cross fields. Few energy researchers 
mention ethics, and even fewer philosophers discuss energy (Sovacool 2014, 15; 
Mitcham and Rolston, 315-316). A scientific perspective may be criticized for ‘ignoring 
the human element’ when it is too focused on technical matters, but human factors are 
crucial to ethics. While a scientific understanding can be important for determining which 
energy alternatives are available or which outcomes can be expected, scientists are not 
usually trained in ethics, and scientific conclusions are not usually action prescriptions. 
The methods of science are not usually applied to create judgments about whether actions 
are right or wrong. 
 The more abstract energy ethics literature that discusses energy as omnipresent 
and as a source of meaning and purpose is not ethics, but metaphysics. Like science, 
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metaphysics does not typically judge behavior. While the metaphysical perspective can 
help to provide context to energy ethics, it is different from practical decision-making. 
 Anthropologists contribute to the field of energy ethics nearly as frequently as 
philosophers do and have an entire special journal issue devoted to this line of research 
(i.e., Energy Research and Social Science 2017, Volume 30). However, energy ethicists 
note that “anthropologists do talk about ethics, just not as philosophers do” (Frigo 2018). 
Anthropology uses ethnography, which typically assumes ethical relativism (that 
justificatory principles can change across cultures), and does not rely exclusively on 
ethical principles for justification (for instance, cultural considerations such as language 
and ritual could be more significant). Furthermore, until recently, anthropologists studied 
the past and present with little to no interest in societies that are invented in an imaginary 
way (Frigo 2018). In contrast, philosophy is not as physically engaged with cultures 
(tending to be more theoretical), assumes ethical universalism (that justificatory 
principles hold true across all cultures), relies almost exclusively on ethical principles for 
justification, and frequently imagines other possible worlds in thought experiments. 
Anthropological research is more descriptive, whereas philosophy is more critical. While 
the line between the two disciplines is blurring as interdisciplinary studies share research 
methods, anthropologists do not usually engage in universal judgments of behavior. 
The special issue on energy ethics published by Energy Research and Social 
Science (2017, Volume 30) illustrates changes in the field of anthropology, in some ways 
becoming more critical. It reflects a “third generation of anthropology’s engagement of 
energy” (Boyer 2014, 310). The first generation, Leslie White’s “Energy and the 
Evolution of Culture” (1943), was one of the first studies of energy’s integral role in 
  31 
society. The second generation concerned impacts on indigenous rights during nuclear 
and oil crises in the 1970s and 1980s. Laura Nader’s research regarding energy policy, 
politics, and “the culture of energy experts” serves as a notable exemplar during this era 
(Nader 1980). In this current generation, anthropology is typified by an “anti-
anthropocentric” view, critical of how consequences of energy use and management 
impact human vitality (Boyer 2014, 316). Within this era, the ‘Anthropocene,’ 
anthropologists explore how energy decisions dictate lifestyles. Because of energy’s 
ubiquity, daily choices are dependent upon energy services available or upon the 
externalities of energy systems, such as smog, water pollution, or altered landscapes. So, 
while anthropology is more traditionally descriptive, some anthropologists in the energy 
sector today take a critical perspective (e.g., Lennon 2017). 
Yet, anthropologists’ work does not utilize ethical principles and is not conducted 
assuming universalism, as applied ethics does. Anthropological energy ethics is better 
categorized as ‘energy morality.’ While I maintain that neither the methods of 
anthropology or philosophy are better, I only stress that anthropological methods are not 
as likely to produce action prescriptions. Therefore, anthropological research is 
unsuitable for the type of guide I argue is missing from the literature or for creating 
action prescriptions, since this way of thinking is not in the nature of their study. 
The last distinction that I make is between energy ethics and energy justice, which 
is important because energy justice has a framework that might be confused as a guide 
for energy ethics. Though there are similarities, many elements distinguish the two. 
Ethics “involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and 
wrong behavior,” and justice is generally defined as “what we owe to each other” or 
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rendering to each person what is due (Fieser 2018; Miller 2017). Although there are times 
when actions are determined by asking what is owed to others and which types of actions 
would provide it, there are also times when reasons other than desert are used to 
deliberate action choices. Ethicists and justice scholars identify their problems 
differently, have different criteria for selecting solutions, and come to different 
conclusions about a case. This point is significant because energy researchers sometimes 
confuse energy justice with energy ethics. 
An action can be just without being ethical or ethical without being just, 
depending on which principles are used to justify those claims. For instance, a proponent 
of justice might support the death penalty as just for a serial killer, but an ethicist might 
find it problematic to say that the execution of a murderer is ethical, since they are the 
same action. To give an example from the energy sector, while it might be ethical to give 
everyone access to free, clean, renewable energy through public funding, it could be 
considered unjust since some people already paid for solar photovoltaic systems to 
generate their own energy. Since ‘just’ does not imply ‘ethical,’ and ‘ethical’ does not 
imply ‘just,’ these notions should be kept distinct. 
Appeals to ethics are often considered stronger than appeals to justice. While both 
terms are inherently normative and have political and mobilizing power, “justice gives 
way to other values” during collective decision-making, but ethical imperatives are 
commonly treated as obligatory and are not easily overruled by other values (Miller 
2017; Fainstein 2010). For instance, judging an action as ‘unjust’ implies that it might be 
agreeable if performed differently, but an unethical action is often wrong no matter how 
it is done. For example, an unjust distribution may be fixed by providing resources in 
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different proportions than originally proposed, but the label ‘unjust’ does not necessarily 
imply that it is wrong to distribute such resources. Another difference is demonstrated in 
that justice principles tend to be contextual, but ethics principles tend to apply in the same 
way across all cases. For instance, a random lottery may be a just way to distribute food 
when there is not enough for everyone in a room, but not an appropriate way to distribute 
paychecks. 
Scholars are increasingly urged to incorporate more ethics into energy research to 
lead decisionmakers into revealing their previously unstated normative views (Miller 
2014; Sovacool 2014). I contend that it is imperative to keep energy justice and energy 
ethics conceptually distinct to encourage proponents of arguments about ethics or justice 
to more specifically elaborate on the reasoning that supports their conclusions. More 
explicit arguments improve decision-making by clarifying expressed judgments. I am not 
proposing that researchers or decisionmakers avoid integrating ethics and justice, and I 
acknowledge that scholars working in ethics and in justice often seek similar goals, such 
that their work can be complementary. I argue that since the concepts are different, the 
reasoning that supports some conclusion as either ethical or just should also be kept 
distinct. Since reasoning that something is ethical does not always support that it is also 
just, these arguments can produce conflicting conclusions. 
Conflating energy ethics and energy justice can hide an underlying mismatch of 
principles. For instance, someone might mistakenly infer from justice principles that an 
action, say decommissioning a power plant, is ‘unethical.’ This judgment implies that 
decommissioning is wrong. However, this person might instead mean that the 
decommissioning is ‘unfair’ (unjust) but must be done (is the right thing to do). In other 
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words, while the action is viewed favorably, perhaps the specific strategy chosen for 
decommissioning is undesirable, or perhaps, the person is merely disappointed and 
wishes that the decommissioning was not necessary, for prudential or other reasons. Yet, 
when presenting an argument using a framework of certain theories or using labels 
‘(un)just’ or ‘(un)ethical,’ normative cues are invariably conveyed to the audience, and 
these cues might misrepresent the presenter’s position. 
This type of situation can be demonstrated through the closure of the Navajo 
Generating Station (NGS). Someone might believe that NGS should not close because of 
the hardships the Navajo employees could face in relocating, giving this evaluator the 
perception of unfairness. However, at the same time and for different reasons, that same 
evaluator might perceive the closure as the right thing to do (ethical) because of 
considerations of climate impacts caused by emissions. 
Not only is justice sometimes confused with ethics, but sometimes different 
ethical theories are confused for one another. For instance, deontology is sometimes 
confused with consequentialism. Deontology emphasizes intentions as the salient criteria, 
while consequentialism emphasizes the consequences of actions. Consider energy 
negotiations. If the negotiators are unclear about the premises on which their positions are 
based, their conclusions will be faulty. This problem has been described in international 
climate conference negotiations in which one party inadvertently neglects effects and 
overemphasizes motivations, while the other party is hung-up on effects and neglects 
motivations (Ikeme 2003). In these cases, these debaters are talking past one another. 
While energy justice is sometimes labeled ‘energy ethics,’ ethics and justice 
might be used to evaluate cases by asking different questions and to come to different 
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conclusions. When we conflate energy ethics and energy justice, we overlook the values 
and principles that (sometimes implicitly or unconsciously) guide decision-making. 
Energy researchers are beginning to notice the inherent differences between justice and 
ethics. 
Energy justice and energy ethics are often conflated, and some of the rising 
popularity of energy ethics is due to the growing prominence of energy justice research. 
However, the framework of energy justice created by researchers in the United Kingdom  
(Table 1) is not a standard guide for applied energy ethics due to the differences in these 
fields such as the criteria used to determine ethical and justice conclusions, as well as the 
verdicts themselves (see Sovacool et al. 2017; Jenkins, Sovacool, and McCauley 2018; 
Jenkins, McCauley, and Warren 2017; Jenkins, McCauley, and Forman 2017; Jenkins 
2016; Jenkins, Heffron, and McCauley 2016; Jenkins, McCauley, Heffron, Stephan, and 
Rehner 2015; Jenkins, McCauley, Heffron, and Stephan 2014; Heffron, Johnston, 
McCauley, and Jenkins 2013; McCauley, Heffron, Stephan, and Jenkins 2013). While 
there is a larger energy justice literature beyond these researchers, this framework is 
becoming the standard of its field, and even when not used in its entirety, elements of it 
are used by other authors. This energy justice framework provides principles and 
categories of justice to determine how problems are identified and solutions are 
evaluated. The framework draws heavily from environmental justice as the 10 principles 
for energy justice are an adaptation of the 17 principles of the environmental justice 
movement (Table 2) (LaBelle 2017; McCauley and Heffron 2018; Jenkins 2018). 
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Table 1: Conceptual Overlap Between Principles of Energy Justice and the 
Environmental Justice Movement 
Energy Justice Description 
Corresponding 
Environmental 
Justice 
Principle 
1. Availability People deserve sufficient energy resources of high quality 
(suitable to meet their end uses) 
12, 17 
2. Affordability All people, including the poor, should pay no more than 
10% of their income for energy services 
12, 17 
3. Due process Countries should respect due process and human rights in 
their production and use of energy 
5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 
13, 15, 16 
4. Transparency and 
accountability 
All people should have access to high quality information 
about energy and the environment and fair, transparent, 
and accountable forms of energy decision-making 
5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 
13, 14, 15 
5. Sustainability Energy resources should be depleted with consideration 
for savings, community development, and precaution 
3, 4, 6, 9, 14, 
15, 17 
6. Intragenerational 
equity 
All people have a right to fairly access energy services 2, 12, 16 
7. Intergenerational 
equity 
Future generations have a right to enjoy a good life 
undisturbed by the damage our energy systems inflict on 
the world today 
2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 11, 
13, 15, 16 
8. Responsibility All actors have a responsibility to protect the natural 
environment and minimize energy-related environmental 
threats 
1, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 
13, 14, 15, 17 
9. Resistance Energy injustices must be actively, deliberately opposed 9, 10, 14, 15, 
17 
10. Intersectionality Expanding the idea of recognitional justice to encapsulate 
new and evolving identities in modern societies, as well as 
acknowledging how the realization of energy justice is 
linked to other forms of justice e.g. socio-economic, 
political and environmental 
1, 2, 11, 13, 16 
(Information for this table retrieved from Sovacool et al. 2017) 
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Table 2: Principles of the Environmental Justice Movement 
1. Protecting 
earth and all 
species 
Environmental justice affirms the sacredness of Mother Earth, ecological unity and the 
interdependence of all species, and the right to be free from ecological destruction. 
2. Anti-
discrimination 
Environmental justice demands that public policy be based on mutual respect and justice 
for all peoples, free from any form of discrimination or bias. 
3. Sustainable 
resource use 
Environmental justice mandates the right to ethical, balanced and responsible uses of land 
and renewable resources in the interest of a sustainable planet for humans and other living 
things. 
4. Safe nuclear 
development 
Environmental justice calls for universal protection from nuclear testing, extraction, 
production and disposal of toxic/hazardous wastes and poisons and nuclear testing that 
threaten the fundamental right to clean air, land, water, and food. 
5. Self-
determination 
Environmental justice affirms the fundamental right to political, economic, cultural and 
environmental self-determination of all peoples. 
6. 
Accountability 
Environmental justice demands the cessation of the production of all toxins, hazardous 
wastes, and radioactive materials, and that all past and current producers be held strictly 
accountable to the people for detoxification and the containment at the point of production. 
7. Equal 
participation 
Environmental justice demands the right to participate as equal partners at every level of 
decision-making including needs assessment, planning, implementation, enforcement and 
evaluation. 
8. Safe working 
environment 
Environmental justice affirms the right of all workers to a safe and healthy work 
environment, without being forced to choose between an unsafe livelihood and 
unemployment. It also affirms the right of those who work at home to be free from 
environmental hazards. 
9. Victim 
compensation 
Environmental justice protects the right of victims of environmental injustice to receive 
full compensation and reparations for damages as well as quality health care. 
10. Government 
violations 
Environmental justice considers governmental acts of environmental injustice a violation 
of international law, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and the United Nations 
Convention on Genocide. 
11. Indigenous 
rights 
Environmental justice must recognize a special legal and natural relationship of Native 
Peoples to the U.S. government through treaties, agreements, compacts, and covenants 
affirming sovereignty and self-determination. 
12. Restoration 
and fair access 
Environmental justice affirms the need for urban and rural ecological policies to clean up 
and rebuild our cities and rural areas in balance with nature, honoring the cultural integrity 
of all our communities, and providing fair access for all to the full range of resources. 
13. Informed 
consent 
Environmental justice calls for the strict enforcement of principles of informed consent, 
and a halt to the testing of experimental reproductive and medical procedures and 
vaccinations on people of color. 
14. Opposing 
corporate 
destruction 
Environmental justice opposes the destructive operations of multi-national corporations. 
15. Opposing 
oppression 
Environmental justice opposes military occupation, repression and exploitation of lands, 
peoples and cultures, and other life forms. 
16. 
Intergenerational 
equity 
Environmental justice calls for the education of present and future generations, which 
emphasizes social and environmental issues, based on our experience and an appreciation 
of our diverse cultural perspectives. 
17. Conscious 
consumerism 
Environmental justice requires that we, as individuals, make personal and consumer 
choices to consume as little of Mother Earth's resources and to produce as little waste as 
possible; and make the conscious decision to challenge and reprioritize our lifestyles to 
insure the health of the natural world for present and future generations. 
(Information for this table retrieved from Carder 2018) 
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These principles were originally influenced by the justice theories of prominent 
philosophers, such as John Rawls, Amartya Sen, and Martha Nussbaum (Rawls 2001; 
Sen 1999; Nussbaum 2011). One of these theories is ‘justice as fairness,’ which 
prescribes social systems that give the best advantage to the least well-off in the 
community as long as everyone’s equal claims to liberty are recognized, promoting 
equity and acknowledging that anyone could end up in such a condition at any time 
(Rawls 2001; Beatley 1984; Langhelle 2000). Justice as fairness rests on two principles: 
 
1) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate 
scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the 
same scheme of liberties for all; and 
2) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, 
they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to 
the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the 
difference principle) (Rawls 2001, 42-43). 
 
Rawls’ theory shares a similarity with deontological ethical theory in that they both 
include respect of others as an important principle, but Rawls’ theory also is 
distinguishable from consequential ethics. Consequentialists select from alternatives 
based on maximizing the net collective good, and Rawls’ criterion selects the option that 
is best for the worst-off individuals. In Rawls’ theory, the collective good and impacts on 
those who are better-off are less significant concerns. Therefore, Rawlsian justice 
scholars and ethicists can disagree. 
Another justice theory, the ‘capabilities approach’ developed by Amartya Sen and 
Martha Nussbaum, is integral to the Human Development Index (see Robeyns 2011). 
This theory labels basic opportunities to flourish as ‘capabilities’ defined as “the ability 
to satisfy certain elementary and crucially important functionings up to certain levels” 
  39 
(Sen 1992, 45), and often equates capabilities to “freedoms” or “real opportunities” 
(Robeyns 2011). Capabilities differ from the related concept of ‘functionings,’ which are 
“various states of human beings” and “activities that a person can undertake” (Sen 1985). 
That is, functionings are “beings and doings,” and capabilities are “the opportunities to 
achieve those beings and doings” (Robeyns 2011). Nussbaum’s corresponding theory of 
justice entails providing essential capabilities to all people for a decent life (Robeyns 
2011). 
While the notion of capabilities for a good life is similar to Aristotle’s pursuit of 
human excellence and flourishing, Sen and Nussbaum’s theory is not based on character, 
habit, and virtue. That is, the capabilities approach is not a theory describing how one 
ought to live in order to be their best or how to act ethically; it is a theory of how to 
organize society (justly). Nussbaum’s theory of justice is also similar to a rights-based 
ethics approach (a type of deontological ethics), but while rights-based ethics can inform 
individual action and entails responsibilities within daily life, the capabilities approach is 
generally limited to responsibilities of governments (Robeyns 2011). Furthermore, while 
human rights are typically considered to be universal, Sen refers to “normal capabilities” 
(i.e., universal rights) as “absurd” and promotes a more contextualized theory (Sen, 1984, 
311) (see also Sen 2004, 2005 for further distinctions). 
Various categories of justice are used within this energy justice framework (i.e., 
provided by Sovacool et al. 2017). One definition of “energy justice” describes the 
central role of two of these categories: “a global energy system that fairly disseminates 
both the benefits and costs of energy services, and one that has representative and 
impartial energy decision-making” (Sovacool and Dworkin 2015, 436; see McCauley et 
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al. 2018 for an alternative definition). Distributive justice concerns costs and benefits and 
refers to equity, and procedural justice refers to inclusive stakeholder engagement (Ikeme 
2003). Distributive justice is used to evaluate issues such as whether someone is 
disproportionately gaining at someone else’s expense, whether someone is 
disproportionately harmed, or whether everyone gets a fair share of a resource. 
Distributive justice typically concerns outcomes; procedural justice concerns the process 
of deciding. Providing adequate time for public comment and giving proportional weight 
to stakeholders’ interests are examples of procedural justice. A just process does not 
guarantee just results; so, decision-makers must consider both distributive and procedural 
justice (Fainstein 2010; Klinsky and Golub 2013). 
The categories of justice can help to distinguish ethics from justice more 
generally. While it is common to judge outcomes as just or unjust, it is awkward to judge 
them as ethical or unethical, according to the distinct conventional usage of the concepts. 
Even consequentialists, the ethicists most concerned with outcomes, judge action as 
ethical or unethical, not the outcomes of the action. According to consequentialism, 
outcomes are judged as good or bad, or positive or negative, leading to the conclusion 
that the action is either ethical or unethical. To further emphasize the distinction, there is 
a difference in currency between justice and ethics (Miller 2017). That is, one aim of 
analysis in justice is proportional distribution, whereas the aim in ethics is typically either 
on an individual or a collective whole (Miller 2017). Furthermore, a just distribution is 
not guaranteed to follow from an ethical action, as the action may be approved for other 
overriding reasons of ethical merit. Similarly, a just distribution need not follow from an 
ethical deliberation, as deliberation is simply one type of action. For example, the 
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democratic process sometimes leads to unsettling policies. Likewise, a just negotiation is 
not necessarily ethical, as it may be wrong to negotiate such things, and just deliberations 
need not produce (decided and acted on) ethical action. This latter instance may be due to 
misinformation, a lack of will to act, a lack of consensus, or the wrongness of the decided 
action. 
Recognition, corrective, and restorative justice are additional categories discussed 
in the literature, but these categories may not be distinguishable from distributive and 
procedural justice. Recognition justice, acknowledges that different people come from 
different backgrounds, have different needs and abilities, and have different feelings, and 
could be described as either procedural or distributive justice. If “treating unequals 
unequally” means giving them different consideration in decision-making, then 
recognition is a type of procedural justice. If their differences suggest they deserve 
different (amounts of) resources, then recognition is a type of distributive justice (Lucy 
1981, 448). Corrective justice and restorative justice can be classified as subsets of 
distributive justice, since they involve allotting either a punishment or compensation for a 
harm, respectively. Energy justice scholars often use this framework of principles and 
categories of justice to retain consistency of method in their research, but energy ethics 
lacks such a basis. 
 
Critique of Prior Accounts of Applied Energy Ethics 
This dissertation is different from previous attempts to integrate applied ethics 
into energy research (e.g., Sovacool and Dworkin 2014; DesJardins 2001; Miller 2014). I 
conduct a more orthodox, systematic analysis using the three major, classical ethical 
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theories – virtue theory, deontology, and consequentialism – which are my standardized 
frameworks for applied energy ethics. For instance, some authors do not clearly 
distinguish ethics from justice (e.g., Miller 2014). Case studies do not always contain 
complete analyses (e.g., DesJardins 2001; Miller 2014). Rhetorical questions leave too 
much unanswered or assume that the ethical merit is obvious (e.g., DesJardins 2001). 
Occasionally, ethical theories are intermixed without clarifying the reasoning. That is, 
sometimes an author begins a statement describing “responsibilities,” which gives an 
impression of an ethical duty, but rather than support the reasoning with deontology, 
describes consequences that are better associated with consequentialism (e.g. DesJardins 
2001). My work is different from others due to my explicit use of theory to guide less-
experienced ethicists and to comprehensive case studies that present arguments in favor 
of and against the action. 
One prominent attempt to integrate applied ethics into energy research lacks 
significant aspects of each of the three theories used (i.e., Chapters 3-5 of Sovacool and 
Dworkin 2014). While I am critical of this attempt, the document establishes a foundation 
for energy ethics research, and I suggest that revisions to update the methods can better 
serve as a foundational guiding document. Although the authors use the three major 
ethical theories, the versions used are not fully comprehensive versions of classical 
theory. For instance, in an account of virtue ethics, energy efficiency is described as a 
search for excellence; inefficiency is labeled a vice and assumed to be unethical 
absolutely (Sovacool and Dworkin 2014). A more conventional view defines virtue as an 
intermediate between vices of excess and deficiency, favoring actions done in moderation 
(Aristotle 1984). In the conventional view, actions are not right or wrong absolutely, but 
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instead, are wrong when habitually done in excessive or deficient amounts. It is more 
likely that the conventional view would allow some energy inefficiency (such as losses 
during transmission or conversion, since they are inherent to the physics of technology), 
without supporting radical wastefulness. 
In the proceeding chapter, their account of Kantian deontology exclusively 
focuses on respect, neglecting two further tests of duty ethics, which are 
universalizability and intentionality (i.e., Sovacool and Dworkin 2014). Furthermore, the 
application of Kantianism is written in terms of rights violations, which convolutes 
patient-centered rights theory with Kant’s agent-centered theory (Alexander and Moore 
2016). This criticism is not to suggest that Kant never wrote about rights, but rights are 
not typically treated as a prominent feature of his work; so, it mischaracterizes the theory. 
Furthermore, neglecting to perform all three tests of Kantian ethics can lead to a faulty 
conclusion about the target action’s ethical merit. 
Lastly, one account of consequentialism rejects fossil fuels for having negative 
costs or harms while lauding renewable energy for its benefits (i.e., Sovacool and 
Dworkin 2014). While these aspects are certainly significant, this analysis could be 
strengthened by noting that fossil fuels also have benefits and that renewables also have 
harms. These additional details weigh both the pros and cons of each alternative for a 
complete comparison.  
These theoretical accounts do not give a conventional portrayal of applied ethical 
theory. From them, evaluators might adopt incomplete or mistaken methods of analysis, 
which are more likely to lead to faulty conclusions. Practicality, impact, or credibility 
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might also be hindered. If it is to be properly supportive, energy ethics could use a new, 
standardized foundation. 
 
Reinventing Energy Ethics 
Ethical theory has only been applied to general case studies within the last several 
decades. In response to “apparent inattention to practical moral problems that arose in the 
wake of significant social and technological transformations” in the 1970s, “the field of 
applied ethics is now a well-established, professional domain sustained by institutional 
research centers, professional academic appointments, and devoted journals” (Axtell and 
Olson 2012, 183). While the rules of deontology and consequentialism were the first to 
be applied to case studies, virtue ethics followed in the late 1980s and is now also a 
distinct, mainstream approach (Annas 2015). 
Professional ethics is studied and practiced in medicine, business, law, media, 
social work, engineering, sport, education, and environmentalism, but it has yet to be 
applied extensively to the energy sector (e.g., Beauchamp and Childress 2012; Johnson 
2017; Pollock 2016; Harris et al. 2013; Day 2005; Simon et al. 2014; O’Neill et al. 2007). 
The absence is striking because energy issues can be just as life-threatening as medical 
issues and just as significant economically as business and law (Lim et al. 2012; 
Sovacool and Dworkin 2014; Teller-Elsberg et al. 2016; Maricopa County Public Health 
2018). With lives on the line, some are calling for mandatory ethical training and 
“Hippocratic oaths” for energy managers, technicians, and decision-makers (Popper 
1969; Probert 1976; Kashmeri 2017; Murphy 2017). 
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Proponents requesting more integration of energy ethics into research and 
decision-making are not trying to tell energy managers what to do paternalistically.1 
However, because energy decisions “will likely determine which people, plants and 
animals will live and die,” they “raise the most momentous ethical questions” (Brown 
2003, 229). The claim that “most of the analysts working on global warming issues are 
not trained in ethics” can similarly be said of energy researchers and decisionmakers 
(Brown 2003, 234). Therefore, making energy ethics a specific focus can help to provide 
action-oriented, theoretical support to help overcome the challenges of incoherence and 
abstraction. 
This dissertation defines applied energy ethics: 
 
Applied energy ethics is the analysis of questions of right and wrong using 
a framework for prescribing action and proper policies within private and 
public energy decisions. 
 
Put another way, ethical analysis of cases from the energy sector can be described as 
crafting philosophical arguments with positions in favor of and opposed to alternative 
actions. These arguments are created by critically analyzing the action’s merits according 
to given principles with the purpose of supporting a prescription for action. This 
definition has been crafted using similar language from definitions of business ethics, 
medical ethics, and environmental ethics to retain continuity with these related fields. 
 
Principles and Application Methods of the Three Major Ethical Theories 
 While applying ethics to case studies is relatively new, the most commonly 
studied ethical theories have survived centuries of scrutiny to retain their prominence. 
                                                 
1 This worry was similarly expressed when agricultural ethics was introduced (Dundon 2003). 
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Three major ethical theories are most strongly accredited to four philosophers: Aristotle 
(virtue ethics), Immanuel Kant (deontological theory), and the combination of the work 
of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill (consequentialism) (Aristotle 1984; Kant 1785; 
Bentham 1789; Mill 1861). The work of the originators of these theories continues today 
through the research of applied ethicists studying applied virtue (e.g., Hursthouse 2006; 
Walker and Ivanhoe 2007; Austin 2014; Van Hooft 2014; Annas 2015), virtue applied 
specifically to environmental ethics (e.g., Sandler 2007; Zwolinski and Schmidtz 2013; 
Cafaro 2015), applied Kantian deontology (e.g., Hardwig 1983; Reynolds and Bowie 
2004; Fry 2011; Breakey 2009;), and consequentialism (e.g., Pettit 1991; Vallentine 
2006; De Lazari-Radek and Singer 2017). The classical versions of these theories each 
provide a framework for creating arguments describing the ethical merits of an action and 
establish the conditions that determine what is ethical and unethical. I discuss each theory 
and present them in three forms to show a variety of ways to understand the framework 
constituted in each theory— as questions to consider, conditions to meet, and a generic, 
formulaic argument. 
 
-Virtue Ethics- 
Aristotle’s virtue theory, described in Nicomachean Ethics, is based on the 
“Golden Mean,” which defines virtue as an intermediate between extreme vices: 
 
Similarly, with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the 
intermediate. Now excellence is concerned with passions and actions, in 
which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate 
is praised and is a form of success; and both these things are 
characteristics of excellence. Therefore, excellence is a kind of mean, 
since it aims at what is intermediate (Aristotle 1984, 1106b8-1106b28 p. 
1747). 
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Actions are not wrong absolutely but could be wrong in certain contexts. Although 
Aristotle admits that some actions “do not admit of a mean,” (i.e., should not ever be 
performed), such as adultery, theft, murder, and possibly others, actions typically should 
be done in moderation since doing them excessively is wrong, while performing actions 
deficiently is also wrong (Aristotle 1984, 1107a9-1107a27 p. 1748). Therefore, when 
applying virtue theory to a case, the first question to ask is where the action sits on a 
Golden Mean spectrum—is it deficient, moderate, or excessive? If an evaluator is merely 
constructing an argument of a preconceived position, then the evaluator would describe a 
favored action as moderate and an opposed action as either extreme. I evaluate from a 
neutral stance and instead construct arguments that highlight factors of the case that could 
be placed at any of the three positions. These arguments then must be compared to 
determine an ethical verdict. I will only be scrutinizing claims that an action is moderate 
if it is suspicious in some manner, but conditions which imply that the action is extreme 
(i.e., unethical) will require some manner of addressing that concern. I express this 
positioning as the condition: “If the action can be demonstrated as extreme or deficient in 
some regard, then the action is unethical.” If the action can be done more or less 
frequently or to a greater or lesser extent, then the agent is likely to have addressed this 
concern by acting more moderately. 
To support the judgment imposed by positioning the action on a Golden Mean 
spectrum, Aristotle evaluates the action’s manifestation of the individual’s character—the 
type of person one’s actions show the person to be (Homiak 2015). Since someone can 
perform an action that is “out of character” (which would arguably not be a good 
reflection of the agent), the action is usually evaluated as if it were done habitually. When 
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applying virtue theory, a second question to ask is what sort of character is demonstrated 
by performing the action. Agents seeking to perform only ethical actions, as I assume, 
would avoid actions demonstrating bad character. Therefore, another condition for the 
evaluation related to this aspect is: “If the action can be objected for reflecting bad 
character, then the action is unethical.” To satisfy this condition, the agent might have to 
perform the action differently or with additional effort that explicitly demonstrates a more 
admirable character. For instance, sending a check to a charity organization and donating 
one’s time might both accomplish the same goal, but the difference in effort required 
might reflect character differently. 
Character evaluations are a form of judgment, and Aristotle provides criteria to 
support these judgments. Both virtues and vices are types of habits that constitute one’s 
character. Virtuous habits are made of moderate actions that demonstrate human 
flourishing, excellence, or role model behavior. Vicious habits are made of excessive or 
deficient actions that hinder flourishing. Virtuous habits are ethical, and vicious habits are 
unethical. The ultimate aim of Aristotelian ethics is “eudaimonia,” a term sometimes 
translated as “happiness” or “flourishing” but more literally translated as “good soul” or a 
soul that is in proper order. For Aristotle, a good or excellent soul is one that functions 
well, and human functioning is related to the capacity to reason and to human’s social 
nature. Translated more loosely, it is sometimes referred to as “the good life.” While 
other theorists refer to the good life as a life of pleasure, Aristotle also includes right 
action. In this way, Aristotelian ethics is not merely selfishness, as it accounts for how 
others are treated, and similarly, the Aristotelian theory of well-being is not merely 
personal success, but a life that includes respect of others. So, the sense of human 
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flourishing in this concept includes both individual and collective meaning. Therefore, 
when applying virtue theory to a case, these further questions arise: 1) Is the action (done 
in this manner) one that can be promoted as a model of excellence, repeated habitually in 
similar situations? 2) Does the action help people to flourish? Conditions related to these 
aspects include: “If the action does not demonstrate role model behavior, a model of 
excellence, or promote human flourishing, then the action is unethical.” These 
determinations rest on such conditions as whether the action is something children ought 
to be taught, one we would want to see more people doing, helps growth or progress, or 
makes for admirable goals, for instance. To satisfy these conditions, the agent might need 
to modify behavior to conduct the action in a way that improves well-being of the agent 
and of others. While this suggestion seems similar to how a consequentialist evaluates 
ethical merit, they act for different reasons. The virtue ethicist improves others’ well-
being for the sake of demonstrating good character; the consequentialist improves others’ 
well-being for the sake of doing more good than harm. A deontologist might also 
improve others’ well-being in order to show them respect. Helping others (i.e., improving 
their well-being) is generally ethical behavior, but each theory explains ethical reasoning 
in a different manner. 
One particularly strong, orthodox example of applying virtue ethics to a case 
distinguishes ethical actions of humility in sport from unethical behavior (Austin 2014). 
Humility is described as the proper amount of self-assessment and self-lowering. Too 
much self-lowering amounts to a lack of confidence, or self-deprecation at a more radical 
level, and these ways of seeing one’s self could impair the ability to play the game, harm 
relationships with others, or generally embarrass or humiliate that person to a point which 
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keeps that person from not achieving more. On the other end of the spectrum, there is 
deficient self-lowering, which could also be called egotistical behavior. These boastful 
individuals can put themselves above other players (perhaps refusing to play), be rejected 
for endorsements due to vanity, underestimate opponents, causing them to be beaten in 
competition due to a lack of preparation, have a bad attitude toward relationships, or 
belittle people off of the field. Instead, a moderate amount of humility implies giving 
proper respect to opponents, acknowledging defeat, does not seek to dominate or harm 
others during competition, and does not exaggerate athletic talent as more significant than 
is reasonable off the field. The example also recognizes counterarguments, providing a 
comprehensive evaluation. 
To summarize the application methods which constitute a standardized 
framework for virtue ethics, I list key questions, a checklist of conditions, and a generic 
form of argument. Fundamental questions of the general sort that capture the most 
significant aspects of virtue theory include: 
• Is the agent doing too much or not doing enough, in such a way as the 
action might seem extreme to an outsider? 
• Is the agent demonstrating admirable character by performing the action? 
• Is the action (in this manner) one that can be promoted as a model of 
excellence, repeated habitually in similar situations? 
• Does the action help people to flourish? 
A second way to illustrate a virtue ethics framework is through qualifying conditions: 
• If the action can be demonstrated as extreme or deficient in some regard, 
or 
  51 
• if the action can be objected for reflecting bad character, or 
• if the action does not demonstrate role model behavior, a model of 
excellence, or promote human flourishing, then the action is unethical. 
These conditions express reasons that the action could be considered unethical, and the 
agent should act to address these objections, if possible. If it is not possible to avoid these 
conditions, the action should not be done. 
 A formulaic way of constructing an applied virtue argument would fit a pattern 
such as this one: 
 
[Insert action] is (un)ethical because it is [insert corresponding position 
on Golden Mean spectrum: deficient, moderate, or excessive]. 
Excessiveness in this case is demonstrated by [insert description of doing 
action excessively to clarify], which is excessive because [insert reasoning 
that shows impairment of human flourishing or bad role model behavior]. 
Habitually performing the action in this manner reflects poor character 
because [insert reason explaining viciousness]. 
Deficiency in this case is demonstrated by [insert description of doing 
action deficiency to clarify], which is deficient because [insert reasoning 
that shows impairment of human flourishing or bad role model behavior]. 
Habitually performing the action in this manner reflects poor character 
because [insert reason explaining viciousness]. 
The moderate amount of action which would demonstrate virtue is [insert 
description of doing action moderately to clarify], which is virtuous 
because [insert reasoning that shows enabling human flourishing, role 
model behavior, or human excellence]. Habitually performing the action 
in this manner reflects good character because [insert reason]. 
 
Although an evaluator does not have to stick to this exact form, the reasoning 
would generally capture the same considerations and use similar language, such 
as the keywords: excess, deficiency, character, excellence, and flourishing, to 
explicitly signal that virtue theory is being applied. 
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-Deontological Theory- 
Kantian deontology, described in Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals 
(1785), can be summarized in three tests—intentions, universalizability, and respect. 
Kant describes ethics as obligations (duties) that all rational beings could discover 
through reason. Since rationality is important, Kant focuses on the intentions for 
performing the action. Good intentions are likely to produce ethical actions, while bad 
intentions are likely to lead to unethical actions. Therefore, the first questions to ask in 
applying deontology are what intentions are associated with the action and whether they 
are good or bad motivations. Good intentions support the action as ethical and only need 
to be scrutinized if suspicious. For example, while a profit motive is good for the agent, if 
profit comes at someone else’s expense, then the motivation is suspicious. Bad intentions 
are a reason that an action is unethical. If the action is associated with ill intentions, then 
the agent must act in such a way so as to avoid this objection. While it is difficult to get 
inside someone’s mind and expressions of intentions could be lies, the agent may have to 
behave differently to demonstrate alternative intentions to satisfy the condition to avoid 
this objection. 
Kantian ethics is absolute and does not change in different contexts. It applies to 
everyone equally; therefore, an action is likely ethical if it can be universally obligated 
and unethical if it would be self-defeating to obligate the action: 
 
Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the 
same time will that it become a universal law (Kant 1785, Ak 4:421 p. 37). 
 
It is also stated: 
 
  53 
So, act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a 
universal law of nature (Kant 1785, Ak 4:421 p. 38). 
 
A maxim refers to a rule of conduct. Kant argues that rules regarding ethical 
actions would be able to be obligated of everyone universally (as a universal law), 
and to capture this notion, I ask whether the action can be done universally (by 
everyone) and whether the action is self-defeating. If the action is not one that can 
be done universally or if performing it defeats its own purpose, then the action 
cannot be obligated of everyone, which means it could not be a universal law. 
Therefore, it would be unethical, and an agent must act in such a way so as to 
avoid this objection, by performing an action that everyone can do. 
Lastly, as rationality is important in this perspective, autonomy is also important 
since it allows the expression of reason and is the source of human dignity, in this theory. 
Respect is defined as honoring the autonomy of others by refusing to use them 
involuntarily for one’s own benefit without consent: 
 
Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person 
of every other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as 
means (Kant 1785, Ak 4:429 p. 46-47). 
 
 
Actions that show others respect are likely ethical, while disrespectful actions are likely 
unethical. The evaluator applying this test to a case would ask whether the action is 
disrespectful by determining whether everyone involved is helping voluntarily. If 
someone involved in the performance of the action is not participating voluntarily, then 
action is unethical, and the agent must act in such a way so as to avoid this objection. 
This condition can be met by gaining the consent of participants, or in cases when 
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consent is not able to be achieved, the evaluator should at least demonstrate that the level 
of participation required is one that would be commonly agreeable (i.e., most would not 
find objectionable if asked). Sometimes, this qualification might be demonstrated by 
showing a benefit to the participants, but this reasoning would reflect consequentialism 
rather than deontology. Explaining that individuals have consented to similar 
involvement in the past is one way to demonstrate consent without having consent at the 
time, though such reasoning is not as strong as having actual consent. 
These three tests support the ethical merits of an action using deontology. One 
case study regarding corporate ethics programs includes all three tests and stands out 
from other duty applications as a model example for this reason (i.e., Reynold and Bowie 
2004). To summarize the application methods which constitute the standardized 
framework for deontological ethics, I again list key questions, a checklist of conditions, 
and a generic form of argument. Fundamental questions of the general sort that capture 
the most significant aspects of deontological theory include: 
• What is the motivation for the action? 
• In what ways can the action be replicated elsewhere? 
• Does the action defeat its own purpose? 
• How can the action be performed so that it respects all people impacted? 
The conditions agents would strive to meet to avoid objections include: 
• If the action is associated with ill intentions, or 
• if the action is not one that can be done universally or is self-defeating, or 
• if someone involved in the performance of the action is not participating 
voluntarily, then the action is unethical. 
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Agents seeking to only perform actions with no such objections would seek alternative 
ways of acting to avoid these reasons to object to the action or would do not the action. 
A generic form of argument that reflects deontological ethics would include these 
types of considerations: 
 
[Insert action] is ethical because the agent intends to [insert good 
intention] which is good because [insert reason]. The action is 
universalizable because [insert reasoning that argument can be done by 
everyone and that it does not defeat its own purpose]. The action also 
respects autonomy because [insert reason confirming consent or 
agreeableness]. 
 
Similarly, an unethical action could be argued in this form: 
 
[Insert action] is unethical because the agent intends to [insert bad 
intention] which is bad because [insert reason]. The action is not 
universalizable because [insert reasoning that argument cannot be done 
by everyone or that it defeats its own purpose]. The action also disrespects 
human dignity because [insert reason neglecting consent or objectionable 
aspects]. 
 
Using the keywords: intentions, universal, self-defeating, respect, and autonomy, signal 
applied deontology. 
 
-Consequentialism- 
Though some forms of this theory are ancient, the founding of consequentialism 
is often attributed to Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill (Bentham 1789; Mill 1861). 
Bentham and Mill are hedonic utilitarians. Utilitarianism is a type of consequentialism, 
and hedonic utilitarians judge an action by the pleasure or pain that results from it: 
 
Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong 
as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended 
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pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation 
of pleasure (Mill 1861, 210). 
 
Although their theories both focus on pleasures and pains, their theories have at least four 
differences. First, Mill contends that pleasures can be of varying quality in addition to 
varying in quantity. That is, some pleasures (usually intellectual pursuits) are of a higher 
quality and thereby preferable to lower quality or animalistic pleasures such as satiating 
hunger or bodily pleasures. Second, Mill evaluates the collective impact for everyone 
affected by the action, and Bentham only evaluates actions that result in the best 
consequences for the agent. Third, Mill not only sums the pleasures produced by the 
action in question, but also deducts the resulting pain. Fourth, Mill analyzes the 
consequences of rules of conduct that guide generally compliant, non-specific actions, 
while Bentham analyzes the consequences of an action itself. Yet, it is more common that 
ethicists acknowledge more positive consequences than mere pleasure and more negative 
consequences than only pains, for a more general consequence-based theory than these 
two authors describe. 
In its most prevalent forms, consequentialists use a maximizing rule to seek “the 
greatest good for the greatest number” of people or “the most good for the most people,” 
called the “Greatest Happiness Principle.” Consequentialists typically conduct a 
“calculus” weighing positive and negative consequences for all stakeholders, similar to a 
cost-benefit analysis. They often treat the action with the highest “net good” (the total of 
the positive consequences reduced by the number of negatives) as the only ethical option, 
while other options are treated as unethical (or less ethical, if the evaluator believes ethics 
  57 
is nonbinary). Peter Vallentyne provides a consequential calculus that is easy to 
understand (Vallentyne 2006). 
I present a standardized consequentialist framework constructed of key questions, 
objectionable conditions, and a general form of argument. Consequentialism generally 
uses questions to evaluate ethical merit such as the following: 
• Who is impacted, by which alternative actions, and in what ways? 
• Which groups should be given priority due to their size or the significance 
of impacts on them? 
• Which alternatives provide more positive than negative consequences? 
One objectionable condition associated with consequentialism is: 
• If the net good of the action is not the highest achievable among 
alternative options, then the action is unethical. 
To address this concern, the agent might further consider these corollary conditions: 
• If significant negative consequences of an action are avoidable, then the 
agent must act in such a way as to avoid these consequences. 
• If a significantly large population is negatively impacted by the action in 
avoidable ways, then the agent must act to avoid these consequences. 
These conditions demonstrate reasons that contribute to the net good and also specify 
how to act differently to avoid the objection that the action is unethical. 
A generic form of argument reflecting consequentialism would include 
considerations such as the following: 
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[Insert action] is ethical because it produces the greatest good for the 
greatest number of people. The major stakeholder groups impacted by the 
action include [insert Group A, Group B, Group C, etc.]. [Insert 
explanation of size of each group, what the impact on each group is, 
whether the impact on each group is positive or negative from their 
perspective and why they judge it this way, the level of significance of the 
impact on each group]. [Repeat assessment for alternative actions]. 
[Include assessment comparing the net good of the alternative actions]. 
 
An additional way to depict a consequential calculus is in the form of a table 
comparing the positive and negative impacts of alternative actions: 
 
Table 3: Generic Consequential Calculus 
 
Alternative Actions 
A B C D E 
St
ak
eh
o
ld
e
rs
 W + 0 0 - - 
X + - - + + 
Y + - - - - 
Z - + + - - 
Net Good +2 -1 -1 -2 -3 
 
 
Discussion of harms and benefits signal a consequentialist analysis, and selecting the 
action with the highest net good distinguishes it from other forms of analysis that also 
study outcomes. Because it can be cumbersome to identify and evaluate all consequences, 
I identify the most significant consequences and those that impact the largest groups in 
the proceeding analyses as a shorthand method to determine the action’s ethical merit. 
 
Further Assumptions and Considerations 
Along with the theoretical frameworks I described, I assume ethical realism, treat 
ethics as binary, and take a pragmatic approach to utilizing multiple theories. That is, I 
will assume that there is a truth to the ethical merit of the action and that the action is 
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either ethical or unethical, rather than ethical to a certain degree, for simplicity. I create 
arguments for and against performing the action from each ethical theory, using the 
frameworks previously described integrated with salient features discovered through 
extensive research of these events. I treat each ethical theory as having an equal claim to 
the truth of the matter regarding ethical merit of the action being analyzed and make no 
comparisons between arguments of different theories. I only scrutinize reasons in favor of 
performing the action if they are suspicious. I work more extensively with reasons against 
performing the action because I assume that agents seek to only perform an ethical action 
(i.e., with no objections against it that qualify it as unethical). I prescribe actions that 
could address these objections. Because the theories can produce arguments in favor of 
and against performing the action, there is additional judgment required to determine the 
overall ethical verdict in the case (i.e., whether the action is ethical and ought to be 
performed). Using these methods, I evaluate the targeted action and determine how to 
proceed to be ethical. 
A pragmatist explains how a plurality of theories work together in a piecemeal 
fashion to give theoretical support to philosophical conclusions (i.e., Wimsatt 2007). Like 
having a variety of tools in a toolbox, utilizing multiple theories can help to persuade an 
audience of the proponent’s position, providing evidence of the ethical merit of an action. 
More evidence typically creates a stronger argument. Although ethical principles are 
meant to apply universally, any one theory is not always easiest to apply to any given 
situation and not always the most relevant to or easiest understood by the audience. 
However, not all of the features of the three major ethical theories – character, intentions, 
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and consequences – will be significant or significant to the same extent in different 
situations. 
To illustrate my view, I can adapt a philosopher’s discussion of scientific theories 
to the case of ethical analysis: 
 
I suggest that we think of the different ethical theories as tools in a box 
that can be drawn upon to answer different questions. If ethicists want to 
know merit based on demonstrated character, then virtue ethics provides 
an answer. If they want to know what merit the agent’s intentions 
demonstrate, then deontology provides an answer. There is no uniquely 
correct and exhaustive evaluation of ethics. Each theory only provides 
informative partial considerations. Depending on what question one asks, 
one partial consideration might provide a cleaner parsing of ethical merit 
than the other. It would be a mistake for ethicists to anoint one theory as 
fundamentally correct and others as mistaken. Many ethical theories 
belong in the ethicists’ toolbox (adapted from Waters 2011, 11). 
 
Similarly, pragmatists view the language provided in the various theories as another type 
of tool for expressing the proponent’s position (e.g., Rorty as described in Grippe 2018). 
Using the ethical theory’s vocabulary helps to explicitly demonstrate application of that 
theory. 
 
Objections 
 In response to this proposal, at least two major objections and a few minor 
objections arise. One major objection is that standardization might constrain the field or 
does not suit the nature of this research, as demonstrated by the plurality of topics, 
principles, and arguments possible. In response, I reiterate that I support diversity but that 
unconstrained analysis contributes to a perception of disorganization. I am only 
suggesting to trim the hedges, not to uproot the entire garden. In the least, I am merely 
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criticizing two existing documents that could be argued to be foundational to the field 
(i.e., Frigo 2017; Sovacool and Dworkin 2014). I am not suggesting that only the three 
specific versions of the three major, classical ethical theories presented here should be 
used for ethical analysis, and I will add to them in subsequent chapters of this 
dissertation. I only suggest that because these theories represent fundamental concepts 
that reappear in similar fashion across cultures universally that they provide a basis on 
which the field rests. Acknowledging this basis brings an element of organization for 
even some of the most unconventional principles. Authors using unconventional 
principles might use these frameworks as a touchpoint merely to contrast their principles 
to conventional perspectives before proceeding in whichever way they see fit, for the 
sake of enhancing continuity with the larger literature. The questions, conditions, and 
forms of argument listed for each of the three ethical theories which provide the 
frameworks for analysis are meant to be a guide and not meant to be definitive in any 
way that excludes further elaboration or modifications. There are additional facets of 
each of the three classical ethical theories that are not captured in these questions, but I 
have chosen these aspects to highlight major considerations that exemplify some of the 
most commonly referenced aspects of the theories. These ethical theories have been 
expanded and altered in innumerable ways, and I am not opposing freedom of thought. I 
merely encourage strategies to help map the field of research and to make analysis more 
routine for those researchers less familiar with ethical study. 
Another major objection is that the insights gained by making ethical reasoning 
more explicit might actually make problems worse. For instance, what may have been 
perceived as merely a difference of opinion might now (after explicit ethical analysis) be 
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an exposed conflict of interests and may create an impasse. I recognize that making 
ethical reasoning explicit can both strengthen and reveal weaknesses of an argument. 
Often, that type of insight is important for the individual or group presenting an 
argument. In response, there are methods for resolving conflicts of interests, and unless 
there is some sort of time constraint involved, that should not stop from refining an 
argument. With standardization, the issues can be refined so that opponents are not 
talking passed each other or creating strawman exaggerations. In this way, problems are 
better solved, rather than solutions that do not address the actual issue. Using similar 
language helps to begin to attain common ground, and willingness to enter into such a 
dialogue shows congeniality. This type of transparency should be welcomed rather than 
feared. 
 Minor objections might be raised regarding my assumptions and methods. Ethical 
realism assuming there is a truth to ethical merit might cause concern when considering a 
variety of ethical views exist, some of which change over time. The difference between 
perception and actuality addresses this objection. That is, there could be a gap or 
discrepancy between how any one or more evaluators understand the ethical merit of an 
action and its actual merit. The action is either ethical or unethical regardless of the 
arguments produced by a fallible evaluator; the evaluator’s arguments do not make the 
action ethical or unethical. However, these arguments contribute to the evidentiary 
account that hopefully gets us closer to the truth of the matter; this contribution is known 
as “ethical progress.” The assumption that the ethical theories have equal claim to the 
truth entails that these theories build our evidentiary account and contribute to ethical 
progress, closing the gap between perception and true ethical merit. For instance, slavery 
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was popularly accepted for centuries. To a realist, it is not the case that slavery became 
unethical when it was abolished, only that the popular understanding of slavery’s ethical 
merit shifted in ways that we believed now better reflect its true ethical merit. Hopefully, 
the popular view is now correct, but there is a possibility that popular views can be 
wrong. Ethical analysis helps to align reasoning with other beliefs (i.e., amoral 
perceptions of the world, such as observations of nature and assumptions of how humans 
think and work) to help society gain a better understanding of truth, just as 
phenomenology and metaphysics also help to align perception of reality with the actual 
truth of these matters. 
Someone might object to treating ethics as binary rather than having degrees of 
strength (i.e., actions that are more or less ethical than others). A spectrum of strength can 
still apply to my analyses, but rather than degrees of truth regarding ethical merit or 
degrees of ethical merit, I consider degrees of strength of the arguments based on the 
evidentiary account produced by the supporting reasons (i.e., some arguments are better 
than others; some reasons are stronger than others). More and better reasons build 
stronger belief in the true ethical merit of the action. If multiple theories provide a variety 
of reasons to object to particular conditions of the action, then there is stronger reason to 
believe that aspect makes the action unethical. When some theories evaluate an aspect of 
the case as a reason against the action’s ethical merit while other theories evaluate that 
aspect in favor of performing the action, then the argument and the strength of belief are 
weaker. Such disagreements invoke skepticism. There may not be sufficient time to 
determine alternative actions to address these doubts, but in the least, the agent could 
proceed with greater caution in these instances, knowing that the matter is unsettled and 
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why it is controversial. In analyses when the theories agree, the agent can be more 
confident in the belief of the action’s merit. 
It might be controversial that an open, pluralistic approach allows for 
unreasonable theories, such as ethical egoism, to be applied to cases. The three major 
classical theories are the most commonly used in research, and additional ethical theories 
are provided in subsequent chapters, related to the communities impacted in those cases. 
While there are other forms of virtue ethics, deontology, and consequentialism and other 
ethical theories, these three theories, as presented by these authors, point out salient 
features that are universally acknowledged as ethically significant in many cases. Some 
theories such as ethical egoism (an ethical theory based on self-interest) are also well-
known, but they are not as unanimously accepted as the three classical theories. 
Furthermore, ethicists typically reject most forms of egoism. Acceptable exceptions 
might include “rational egoism,” which acknowledges that it is irrational (and perhaps 
immoral) for someone to act against their own interests, or “enlightened self-interest,” 
which recognizes that some actions performed in the interests of others also support the 
agent’s self-interest (Rand 1964; Seed et al. 1988). A comprehensive critique of these 
theories is beyond the scope of my project; however, I acknowledge that there is a 
spectrum of how much personal and others’ interests ought to count in ethical analysis. I 
also recognize that radical forms of altruism are also suspicious if they require radical 
self-sacrifice, (as critiqued in Wolfe 1982). There might be additional ethical theories or 
principles that evaluators desire to apply to cases, but as mentioned previously, use of 
unconventional principles risk turning away readers. Evaluators must justify any 
additional theories or principles to ground their work in a similar way that the classical 
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theories are grounded. The additional ethical theories could also create conflicts with 
each other or with the classical theories. For instance, one theory might denote actions 
that give preference to the agent’s family as ethical while another theory might denote 
such favoritism as unethical. Therefore, care must be taken to avoid contradicting 
theories because they would impede the ability to reach a verdict or confuse the action 
prescription. 
Someone might object that the frameworks do not definitively produce an ethical 
verdict without additional subjective judgment. While ethical theories can create 
arguments both in favor of and against performing the action, there is a remaining 
responsibility for the evaluator to determine which argument is better. The framework 
does not yield decisive ethical decisions since weighing reasons for and against an action 
involves judgment regarding which reasons are given higher priority, but it is an ethical 
guide. Still, this weakness can be diminished through practice, meaning that ethicists (and 
anyone with a conscience) develop a sense of ethical merit that prioritizes some aspects 
of a case as more salient than others. For example, it is commonly understood that the 
loss of a human life is generally a worse than the loss of a few minutes of time, other 
things being equal. While I am optimistic that further study of axiology (the study of 
values) might reveal a formal method of weighing priorities through universally shared 
values, such a complex endeavor is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Without such a 
scheme, the methods I use to develop supporting reasons for action prescriptions in 
subsequent chapters will be assessed through my individual sense of their strength. 
However, the reasons themselves ought to have some weight, even if weighed differently 
by different evaluators. It is the reasons that support (or condemn) the action, rather than 
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the verdicts, that ought to be given higher authority than the verdicts in my analyses in 
this dissertation, thereby emphasizing the process more than the conclusions. To help 
standardize the evaluations and reduce the influence of personal judgments, I present the 
frameworks as conditional statements as one way of applying the ethical theories to a 
case. 
The pluralistic approach invokes questions of how to proceed when theories do 
not agree on an action’s ethical merit. For example, it may turn out that an action passes 
all but one of an evaluator’s tests. This evaluator is not able to fully demonstrate the 
claim that the action is ethical, since one failed test suggests the action is unethical for at 
least one reason. If the evaluator wants to only perform actions that have no doubts 
regarding ethical merit, then the evaluator has reason not to perform this action. Not 
everyone has such a high bar, and not every choice allows enough time to overcome such 
high expectations. Yet, the strongest argument for ethical merit would find alternative 
ways to perform the action to avoid these apprehensions, when possible, and refrain from 
performing the action in cases where it is not possible to work around them. 
Another conflict could occur if one ethical theory strongly supports the action but 
another theory strongly opposes it. In this situation, the argument is not as strong as it can 
be, had the theories agreed. As with the previous conflict, the reasons within the 
argument opposing the action should be further evaluated before proceeding to act, or the 
agent has reason to believe that the action is unethical for those reasons. Such an 
occurrence would likely result frequently, as using more ethical theories means 
integrating more principles and further tests that could provide reasons to doubt ethical 
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merit of the action and since theories tend to produce reasons both for and against 
actions. 
Because of differing evaluation criteria, worries might arise regarding a conflict 
between ethical theories. Prescriptions from the classical theories I use do not conflict 
since any theory can produce reasons for and against a targeted action and since the 
targeted feature of a theory is not the same as the target of a different theory. For 
example, deontology evaluates intentions while consequentialism evaluates 
consequences. While evaluation of the intentions may produce a stronger argument in 
favor of the action, it is not necessarily contradictory should the evaluation of the 
consequences produce a stronger argument against the action, for instance. The reason 
favoring the action is only further evaluated if suspicious, and the reason against the 
action requires attention, just as in any other case. Consider fracking as an example. The 
good intention which supports fracking’s ethical merit is to increase energy security for 
the US. Simultaneously, it may be argued that fracking is unethical due to the net 
negative consequences of health impairment due to water contamination which outweigh 
the energy benefits. In my proposed analysis, the energy security motivation is only 
scrutinized if suspicious because it supports performing the action. In the fracking 
example, energy security could be suspicious if the natural gas is exported rather than 
used domestically since energy security would not be provided in that way. However, 
without exportation, I assume this reason is uncontested. The objectionable condition of 
more harm than benefit requires some way of addressing this concern before the action 
can be considered ethical. The fracking company might donate profits toward healthcare, 
clean water, or otherwise provide positive benefits to locals put at risk of contaminated 
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water to offset the threat and disarm the objection. If the method for addressing the 
objection changes the intentions, then the intentions need to be re-evaluated. In the same 
way, if addressing an objection regarding intentions changes the consequences, then the 
consequences have to be re-evaluated. However, the theories are not necessarily in 
conflict, even if not fully aligned and analyzing similar aspects from different 
perspectives. 
Similarly, it may be the case that the only option to address an objection to an 
action discovered by one theory is to violate another. In these situations, there is no 
universal solution. All ethical theories face these predicaments because they are beyond 
the scope of the theories themselves. One way to resolve this situation is by selecting the 
argument which provides stronger evidence or the ethical theory that has more meaning 
to the agent, and in that way, the agent is acting with integrity. If they are equally 
meaningful and their reasoning is equally strong, a third theory might be used to break 
the tie, or this aspect might simply be treated as having undeterminable ethical merit, 
suggesting that other conditions should be used to determine how to act in this case. 
 There are further questions and conditions that can be derived from the classical 
theories, but I provide a basic understanding at a beginner’s level to illustrate some of the 
most prominent features of the theories. Additional and more advanced questions and 
conditions can be utilized by evaluators with greater knowledge and ability. 
 
Conclusion 
 Energy ethicists have struggled to establish a coherent and systematic field of 
research that prescribes ethical action. They are held back from producing stronger 
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reasoning that might be more powerful in energy decisions when they do not use ethical 
principles for analysis. Without reference to ethical theory, they appear to be merely 
stating an opinion, and it is harder to recognize their work as ethics. The proposed 
standardized frameworks use the most common ethical theories as bases for action 
prescriptions to provide an organized structure to make analyses more easily recognized. 
Energy ethicists also lack a formal definition for energy ethics to guide their 
research. Although one has been proposed, it is not yet universally adopted (i.e., Frigo 
2017). Furthermore, this definition becomes confused with merely descriptive work, 
energy justice, and abstract reasoning, which are different from the conventional critical 
task of applied ethics. By defining energy ethics as a subfield of applied ethics, this 
proposed framework can make use of conventions of other professional ethics, such as 
business and bioethics, and does not need to start from scratch. Integrating a critical 
perspective sets philosophical study apart from some other disciplines and is appropriate 
for decision arenas where there is a choice between the status quo and alternative actions. 
Distinguishing from energy justice frameworks helps to strengthen reasoning of ethical 
merit which is not always the same as justice or fairness. 
Energy ethicists tend to publish in reaction to crises, but their influence fades 
without building cohesive academic momentum through collaboration. Additionally, 
energy ethicists struggle with finding the right level between theory and practice where 
they can use general philosophical knowledge without becoming too abstract. Though, 
some authors are discovering a critical lens at the level of energy decisions which can 
more easily be adopted by decisionmakers. When they are not able to overcome these 
obstacles, energy ethicists have difficulty influencing energy decisions. In the proposed 
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standardized frameworks, there is consistency of method which can more easily 
accommodate comparative studies. 
I propose changes here to begin to overcome these challenges by redefining 
energy ethics as a specialized subdiscipline of applied ethics. I believe that the foundation 
provided by the three major categories of ethical theories can help to identify this 
research as distinct, give consistency of method, and provide supportive reasoning to 
make action prescriptions that are more strongly supported. In this way, I hope it is 
clearer that energy ethics is not merely descriptive morality, not the same as a judgement 
of justice, and a source of action-oriented guidance for decisionmakers. Although I use 
three popular theories of ethics here, additional indigenous ethics from the Lakota Sioux, 
Navajo Nation, and Hopi Nation will also be integrated in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 While applied ethics does not create new solutions, it produces reasoning to either 
support or refute a target action. Using applied ethics will not guarantee an ethical 
decision is made (since the reasoning may be faulty), but ethical decisions are more likely 
to follow when explicitly using these methods of evaluation. Decision-making without 
ethical reasoning would be ethically haphazard at best. From ethical evaluations, the 
analyst establishes the conditions that prescribe the targeted action as well as conditions 
that demonstrate the action is unwarranted. In the next two chapters, I evaluate case 
studies related to the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline and the closure of the 
Navajo Generating Station to show how the generic reasoning of each ethical framework 
makes sense of action alternatives in these cases. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ENERGY ETHICS IN THE CASE OF THE DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE AND THE 
GREAT SIOUX NATION 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I demonstrate how energy ethics reinvented can prescribe action 
by evaluating the decision of whether to construct the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL). 
The pipeline construction is controversial because the benefits of improved energy 
security and lower oil prices are weighed against leaks that could harm public and 
environmental health, and a fear of leaks is reasonable because the pipeline has leaked 
multiple times since its completion (Brown 2018). Looking back on the construction, 
which was completed in 2017, I ask whether the pipeline should have been built. I see 
this investigation is important not only for determining whether the right action was 
selected in this case at the time, but whether the pipeline should be allowed to continue to 
operate today, and whether construction of similar pipelines (existing or proposed) is 
ethical. 
I proceed to analyze the case as follows. First, I provide a historical account of 
major energy events and violent episodes involving the tribes of the Great Sioux Nation 
(Oceti Sakowin Oyate) and nontribal entities. Second, I describe the details of the 
modern-day case. Third, I analyze two competing economic analyses of the pipeline’s 
construction. Fourth, I explain Lakota ethics and compare it to the other Western ethical 
theories described in the previous chapter. Next, I use all four ethical theories (Lakota 
ethics, virtue ethics, deontological theory, and consequentialism) to determine 
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contextually-specific conditions regarding the ethical merit of the pipeline’s construction. 
Finally, I compare the economic and ethical analyses and address objections. 
 As I described in the previous chapter, I assume ethical realism and treat ethics as 
binary. These assumptions allow the arguments in favor of and opposed to the action to 
differ in strength, which requires further judgment to reach a verdict. I assume all four 
ethical theories used have equal claim to the truth of the matter regarding the ethical 
merit of the action. I only further scrutinize reasons in favor of the action if they are 
suspicious, but I propose action prescriptions to address all significant reasons that 
determine the action is unethical from any of the four theories to provide alternatives to 
decisionmakers. 
In this chapter, I argue that avoiding excessive risks, respecting all stakeholders’ 
autonomy, and addressing community and environmental concerns in a caring manner 
would be reasons to believe that DAPL’s construction is ethical and permissible to be 
built. However, these conditions did not actualize. Because stakeholders were 
involuntarily exposed to harm and since the pipeline transports oil that is burned for 
energy, DAPL’s construction was unethical and condemnable. I argue that, for these 
reasons (justified below), the pipeline’s construction should have been done differently, 
and it remains unethical as long as these or similar conditions are unmet. I address these 
objections by explaining what ought to be done to make current operations ethical. 
 
History of The Great Sioux Nation and Energy Disputes 
 The Great Sioux Nation has a contentious history with the US government. 
Although the French interacted with the Sioux for roughly 150 years prior, historians 
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often treat the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 and Lewis and Clark’s expedition beginning in 
1804 as the start of the US-Sioux history (Estes 2016). In 1862, one early encounter with 
the Sioux people stands as the largest mass execution of all time, when 38 Sioux were 
hung in a spectacle to inspire fear and obedience. In 1863, the Whitestone Massacre 
included 300-400 Sioux killed (Allard 2016). Violence continued in both Red Cloud’s 
War (1866) and the War for the Black Hills, including the Battle of the Little Bighorn 
(Greasy Grass), known for the death of George Custer, in 1876. The US lost both these 
wars. Similarly, in 1890 at Wounded Knee, Sioux leaders Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull 
were killed, along with 300 others. It is said that the tribes fought these battles strictly 
defensively and that the massacres were unprovoked (Blackhawk 2014). These terrible 
events provoked resentment that lingers today. 
The violent history sometimes also relates to energy. DAPL exemplifies “the third 
time that the Sioux Nation’s lands and resources have been taken without regard for tribal 
interests” (Archambault 2016). Beyond fur, the Black Hills region hosted a gold rush in 
1876. In 1877, the US government took the Black Hills from the Great Sioux Nation 
reservation to facilitate greater access to the region. This area would later be valuable for 
its bituminous coal and uranium. In the 1950s, the Pick-Sloan Plan created a series of 
dams along the Missouri River for hydroelectricity, agriculture irrigation, flood control, 
and navigation control that flooded 12 Sioux towns, displacing the occupants and defiling 
a sacred burial ground. Now, water and fossil fuels again combine in the new threat of 
DAPL. 
Sioux scholars argue that DAPL violates these federal laws: 
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• Fort Laramie Treaty of April 29, 1868, which guarantees the tribe 
“undisturbed use” of the territory 
• Executive Order 12898 on Environmental Justice, requiring assessment of 
disproportionate impacts to tribal or minority communities 
• Pipeline Safety Act and Clean Water Act, because it is not identified as “high 
consequence” due to its potential drinking water impact, and for not assessing 
maximum possible spills in its emergency plans 
• National Environmental Policy Act, since it is argued that an interdisciplinary 
Environmental Impact Statement ought to be done, rather than the less 
comprehensive Environmental Assessment that was performed 
• Executive Order 13007 on Protection of Sacred Sites (Camp of the Sacred 
Stones, 2016, 4). 
These objections are not without argument since proper operation of the pipeline is not so 
disruptive. Yet, a leak could be dangerous to public health, water safety, and soil quality. 
Furthermore, the pipeline does not cross current reservation land; however, the pipeline 
crosses land historically important to the Great Sioux Nation, and sacred sites were 
reported to be destroyed during pipeline construction. The tribes also “reject the 
appropriation of the name ‘Dakota’ in a project that is in violation of aboriginal and 
treaty lands” which gives a false impression that the Sioux support it (Camp of the Sacred 
Stones, 2016, 2). The Treaty of 1868 also requires consent of three-fourths of the Sioux, 
but this requirement has not been enforced in the Pick-Sloan Plan and is questionable 
because of the technicality that the pipeline is not on the reservation. Beyond lingering 
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resentment of past violence, these potentially illegal violations also create discontent 
among members of the Great Sioux Nation. 
DAPL is not the first pipeline to disrupt the Dakotas. TransCanada’s Keystone 
Pipeline System currently transverses along the eastern borders of North and South 
Dakota, carrying bitumen from tar sands fields in Alberta, Canada to Potoka, IL, and to 
additional terminals in Port Arthur and Houston, TX. The contentious Keystone XL 
Pipeline (Phase IV of the Keystone Pipeline System) was a proposed additional branch 
through Montana and western South Dakota, but it was temporarily defeated through 
intense public opposition in 2015. However, defeat was similarly short-lived as the 
Trump Administration executive orders (EO13766 and EO13807), which allowed for the 
completion of DAPL, also expedited environmental assessment to renew construction for 
Keystone XL. Yet, even with this expedition, Keystone XL has once again been halted in 
November 2018 by a US federal judge, citing an insufficient environmental assessment 
that still lacks spill plans, evidence of pipeline viability, and a comprehensive analysis of 
the full pipeline project (rather than pipeline segments) (Reuters 2018). The history of 
US-Sioux relations, previous resource grabs, potential illegality, and recent battles 
against other pipelines have infuriated the Sioux and neighboring communities. 
 
Case Details 
DAPL carries approximately 450,000 barrels of crude oil per day from extraction 
points within the Bakken Formation near Stanley, ND to a refinery hub in Patoka, IL. 
Construction was completed in 2017 after tumultuous protests that gained national 
attention in late 2016. Although a short delay postponed construction of the final segment 
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during Barack Obama’s presidency, President Donald Trump took office and utilized 
executive orders (EO13766 and EO13807) to approve completion. The pipeline is 
controversial because it repeatedly passes various tributaries of the Missouri (Mni Sose) 
and Mississippi Rivers, including within a half-mile of Standing Rock Reservation, home 
to a portion of tribes of the Great Sioux Nation. 
 Because DAPL crosses these waterways and the Ogallala Aquifer (serving South 
Dakota, Nebraska, Wyoming, Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Texas), an 
oil spill potentially threatens drinking water and irrigation for households and farms 
throughout the Midwest. With protest slogans, such as “Water is life” (“Mni wiconi”); 
“Water is sacred”; “Can’t drink oil”; and “Keep it in the ground”, over 100 tribes were 
joined by sympathizers of Black Lives Matter, Occupy Wall Street, and US Army 
Veterans, expressing their discontent that additional precautionary measures to prevent or 
to respond to a spill in light of recent accidents were not being included in this pipeline 
project. 
Along with threats to health, emissions created through oil combustion and 
throughout the fuel chain contribute to dangerous climate change. Therefore, these 
protests are not merely a local matter, with a wider significance that opposes all aspects 
of fossil fuel industries, giving the decisions in this case global import. In this wider 
context, the extraction and flaring practices are environmentally controversial. Although 
hydraulic fracturing (commonly called “fracking”) is often utilized to extract natural gas, 
oil is the primary target of extraction in the Bakken fields. While natural gas is also 
released in the process, it is cheaper to flare methane here than to capture it for sale, 
creating fires that can be seen from space at night. While combustion lessens the 
  77 
environmental impact of methane by converting it to carbon dioxide, the emissions are 
wasteful in that the fuel is not powering any work, frustrating environmentalists. 
 While DAPL faced opposition for social and environmental impacts, the $3.7 
billion project belonging to Energy Transfer Partners, L.P. (ETP) is part of a greater fuel 
system providing financial benefits and employment. Yet, both oil prices and hiring were 
on suspicious trajectories in 2014, as the pipeline was being considered, since it was 
unknown whether the gains of the previous five years would continue. The Bakken is the 
largest oil field in the lower, contiguous 48 states. Nearly 10,000 wells were profiting $24 
million each in 2014, and more were planned (Becker 2016, 20). The wells brought over 
$2 billion to the state government and are part of an industry that is valued at $1 trillion 
or 7.3% of US Gross Domestic Product (Becker 2016, 20). However, the boom that 
began around 2008 and grew some western North Dakota towns to three times their size 
may have already peaked before DAPL’s construction began. Oil prices fell from 
$90/barrel in 2013 to $40/barrel in 2015 (Becker 2016, 1). There was only approximately 
one-third of the rigs (dropping from 174 to 65), 5,000 less jobs retained, and nearly half 
of the oil royalties (dropping from $128 million to $69 million) in 2015, as compared to 
2014 (Becker 2016, 1). Yet, the looming national oil market decline was not anticipated 
to occur until after a plateau expected over a few years near 2020, according to Energy 
Information Administration projections at the time (Becker 2016, 20). Macro-scale 
projections created an optimism contradicting local pessimism; yet, the forthcoming 
production decline, as reserves were emptied, was indisputably going to occur at some 
time. 
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 This mismatch of projected production versus reality and the resulting uncertainty 
did little to calm the nerves of locals. North Dakota’s elderly population ranks second-
oldest in the US at 14.4% (Sobolik 2016, 166). This oil spree was the third of its kind, 
with previous booms in 1951 and in the early 1980s. Many residents in the state can 
remember experiencing the busts that followed those booms that turned cities into ghost 
towns. Moreover, the Sioux reservations include six of the 10 poorest counties in the US 
(Estes 2014). Communities can often withstand population growth of about 5%, but 
breakdowns of social services are observed to occur at 10%-15% (Becker 2016, 15). The 
state noted an average population growth of 20%, with some areas seeing 32% 
(Williston) and 46% (McKenzie County) (Becker 2016, 16). The sure bust loomed 
menacingly as a tremendous influx of out-of-state workers flooded the region and 
strained social services. 
 The Great Sioux Nation are not the only tribes impacted by this fuel system, and 
not all Sioux are impacted equally. The Fort Berthold Reservation in North Dakota is 
home to the Three Affiliated Tribes (Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nation), and the Fort 
Peck Reservation in Montana hosts the Assiniboine and more Sioux tribes. These tribes 
are among the organizations extracting crude oil from the Bakken Formation which is 
transported via DAPL. While the benefits did not last forever and although corruption 
arose in those communities, it is inaccurate in a greater context to portray this debate as 
strictly harmful to Native Americans in the region, since members of the Great Sioux 
Nation not only live at the extraction site but have financially benefited from the oil 
extraction. However, research has not revealed any connection or agreements between 
the two Sioux reservations which could confirm sharing of benefits, and there is not 
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necessarily a contradiction between supporting extraction while taking offense to the 
pipeline’s route. Today, the Seven Fires Council, a meeting of tribal councils of each of 
the major divisions within the Great Sioux Nation across their separate reservations, is 
more of an alliance between the divisions rather than a formal governing entity. The 
reservations each maintain their own tribal governance councils. So, while Yanktonai 
Dakotas live at both Standing Rock and Fort Peck reservations, they do not share a single 
governing body or share financial relations. With these considerations in mind, I ask 
whether DAPL should have been built. 
 
Economic Analyses 
On behalf of the Sioux and ETP, researchers have created two competing 
economic analyses that capture dominant narratives influencing the pipeline construction 
decision (Siegelman et al. 2014; Ackerman and Knight 2017). Economic analyses are 
included in the typical protocol for evaluating strategic infrastructure projects. I juxtapose 
these analyses with the ethical analyses later in this chapter. Here, I review each analysis 
and its criticisms. 
On behalf of ETP and in favor of DAPL’s construction, Siegelman and colleagues 
argue that the pipeline is motivated by desires to increase safety in terms of reduced leaks 
while transporting oil and to lower costs of transport and costs paid by consumers (at the 
pump) (Siegelman et al. 2014). The report evaluates the project at three scales, including: 
impacts at each of the four states the pipeline spans (North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, 
and Illinois), a regional aggregation of impacts across those four states, and a few 
anecdotes about nation-wide impacts. The researchers conduct the analysis using 
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IMPLAN, modeling software that uses input-output analysis tables to simulate 
transactions and their indirect and induced secondary spending cycles until they “leak” 
out of the territory, which is when the money exits or is spent outside of the territory. 
Besides monetary estimates, the model also predicts the number of jobs related to the 
project. The analysis includes estimates during the construction stage and long-term, 
post-construction effects. The primary figures cited are costs of construction, labor 
income, jobs (direct, indirect, and induced), production and sales gains (direct, indirect, 
and induced), and tax revenues (including state sales tax, local property tax, and income 
tax). Beyond these estimates, competition with crop transport by rail further negatively 
impacts costs. 
DAPL is assumed economical because it is expected to provide 33,000 job-years 
with an average compensation of $57,000 for a total labor income of $1.9 billion, $5 
billion production and sales gains, and $156 million tax revenue, at a cost of $3.8 billion 
during the construction phase (Siegelman et al. 2014). The labor income estimate 
includes DAPL employees, contracted workers, and secondary jobs demanded through 
increased consumption of goods and services. Of the $7 million in benefits created, 
employees collectively receive approximately 27%; businesses receive 71%; and 
governments receive 2%. After construction, the project remains economical with 
benefits of 160 job-years with an average compensation of $68,750 for $11 million in 
labor income, $23 million in production and sales gains, and $56 million in tax revenues 
at a cost of $13 million (Siegelman et al. 2014). The long-term benefits are distributed 
12% to workers, 26% to businesses, and 62% to governments. These distributions 
illustrate that the construction phase is more beneficial to employees and businesses but 
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less beneficial to governments, which receive a majority of the long-term benefit. Once 
construction ends, over 99% of the jobs disappear, and their impact on sales throughout 
the community diminishes. However, the community benefits if the government properly 
spends the money it receives on public services. 
Analysis of the impacts to crop transport and safety considerations complement 
the cost-benefit analysis, but these sections of the report are controversial. Siegelman and 
colleagues explain that oil and crops compete for rail space. Although a majority of this 
section of analysis discusses a report that the authors acknowledge has been recalled for 
questionable calculations, the analysis as a whole can be further criticized for a lack of 
clarity and comprehensiveness (Siegelman et al. 2014, 42). For instance, the authors cite 
a backlog related to rail transport that could cause crops to fail but additionally say that 
the backlog has been diminished from a few weeks to only several days (Siegelman et al. 
2014, 41). It is further unclear that such bottlenecks have had any noticeable impacts 
downstream for consumers of the crops (or significant impacts to the producers 
upstream), because these details are neglected. While “record” production of crops is 
cited and assumed to be good, there is no talk of whether it might be overproduction, 
though pre-consumer food waste is a problem in the US (Siegelman et al. 2014, 41). 
Although it is stated that pipeline transport (99.999% effective) is more reliable 
than oil transport by rail (99.997% effective), it is also acknowledged that trains carry a 
smaller volume at a time; so, less product is likely to be lost during a rail accident than a 
pipeline spill (Siegelman et al. 2014, 48-49). However, trains and pipelines have both 
caused fatalities in recent accidents, but speeding trains running off-track can also 
damage buildings (Siegelman et al. 2014, 48-49). It is unclear whether rails or pipelines 
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are safer because the figures are not reported in comparable units. Railroad spills are 
cited for 2013, a year particularly high in spills at 800,000 gallons of oil. However, 
pipeline spills of hazardous liquids (not just oil products) over a five-year period occurred 
361 times at 81,971 barrels per accident (Siegelman et al. 2014, 49). Converting the 
pipeline estimate to gallons in an average year for the sake of comparison yields the 
approximation that 248,568,860 gallons spilled from pipelines on average each year. It is 
unclear how much of this volume is oil products, but the absolute figure does not favor 
the authors’ contention that pipelines are safer. 
Furthermore, two noted incidents (the Kalamazoo River pipeline oil spill of 2010 
and Lac-Megantic rail accident of 2013) both required five years of cleanup. The pipeline 
spilled roughly 1 million gallons, while the train spilled approximately 30,000 
(Devereaux 2016; CBC 2013). The Kalamazoo River spill cost an estimated $1.4 billion, 
but while the Lac-Magentic accident killed 47 people, it only cost $225 million 
(Devereaux 2016; CBC 2013). Neither company involved in these incidents had enough 
insurance to cover the costs of the event, with only $650 million and $25 million in 
insurance, respectively (Devereaux 2016; CBC 2013). Therefore, these costs were 
absorbed by other stakeholders, as externalities of the firm at fault. There is no particular 
mention of insurance coverage in the DAPL analysis, but a critic might determine how 
much renewable energy, water, or spill prevention or cleanup equipment could be 
purchased for $1 billion as an alternative investment. 
While the report mentions trucks as a mode of transport between pipe and rail 
sites, truck transport is not considered as an alternative for complete trips. Two 
alternatives to DAPL are identified but dismissed abruptly. That is, building refineries 
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near the extraction site is unsuitable since it only changes the product transported (from 
crude oil to refined, which is still dangerous), and expanding rail infrastructure is 
mentioned as another alternative without any judgment or serious consideration 
(Siegelman et al. 2014, 45). While the household impacts that the economists mention 
help to make the data more meaningful to stakeholders outside the industry, they are 
listed at a national scale as a $33 billion saved or at the transaction level as $0.10 less per 
gallon of gasoline (Siegelman et al. 2014, 50). There is no deliberation of whether this 
$55-258 in savings per household is worthwhile in comparison to the associated risks 
(i.e., climate change, water contamination, etc.) (among the other benefits). While the 
analysis estimates that 34% Keystone XL’s jobs were filled by local workers, the 
economists list intentions to have at least 50% of DAPL’s jobs filled by local workers, 
and IMPLAN assumes 90% of the direct jobs will be filled by local workers (Siegelman 
et al. 2014, 22). However, they make no guarantees and provide no strategies to reach 
these goals, which seem unrealistic in comparison to Keystone XL. 
On behalf of the Sioux, Ackerman and Knight produce an opposing economic 
analysis condemning the pipeline’s construction as an addendum in response to the 
preceding analysis. In this second study, two prior years of market downturn are used as 
evidence that completing construction would have little economic gain for the region. 
Since the pipeline is 92-98% complete at the time of writing, the authors assume only 2-
8% of the benefits of construction are still available. Much of the economic benefit of 
construction comes from single time gains, and since the pipeline was nearly complete at 
that point, only a trivial amount of benefit was left to obtain. The authors also belittle the 
post-construction gains, noting that job gains and GDP increases only amount to 0.002% 
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of available jobs and current GDP in the region and no more than 0.02% in any state 
(Ackerman and Knight 2017, 9-10). Post-construction tax benefits for the region only 
reach 0.06% of current budgets and only 0.5% in the highest state (Ackerman and Knight 
2017, 10). As a comparison, Colorado receives “more revenue per month from marijuana 
taxes and fees than North Dakota or South Dakota will get from a year’s worth of Dakota 
Access property taxes” (Ackerman and Knight 2017, 10). However, the authors are also 
concerned that $2 billion (half of the construction costs) is in danger of being canceled 
because construction was behind schedule. The report is shortsighted for neglecting all 
benefits of construction produced thus far. The use of stock pricing is also controversial, 
since the authors note that construction is behind schedule and since stock pricing can 
change greatly in any given day. 
One noticeable difference with this second study is the inclusion of perspective, 
as figures are stated relative to a wider context to support why the gains are trivial in the 
authors’ view. For instance, estimating figures in millions and billions sometimes seem 
like astonishing amounts to laypeople, but explaining that just a few dozen full-time 
permanent jobs are created in a region with over 8 million existing jobs provides a 
context that helps to demonstrate the (small) magnitude of impact. Ackerman and Knight 
also suggest that oil prices have dipped below a breakeven rate, which suggests that 
continued extraction may create economic losses rather than profits. They also emphasize 
accidents, providing some examples of recent worst-case scenarios and estimates of an 
average spill. However, their average spill cost of $15 million per year does not seem as 
high relative to the revenues gained as the authors’ language portrays it (Ackerman and 
Knight 2017, 12). 
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In either analysis, the authors avoid addressing the range of uncertainty inherent 
in their assumptions and provide little comparison to alternative scenarios. Critics of the 
plans point out a variety of objections, including: 
• the pipeline’s impact on global oil production is arbitrary; 
• the jobs estimates are dubiously annualized; 
• tracking spending and cash flows is difficult; 
• the “social cost of carbon” is not included in calculations; 
• energy security (real or imagined) is hard to quantify; 
• and the state economies in the region and ETP were financially struggling 
at the time (Hytrek 2016; Paul 2016; Swenson; Thompson 2016; 
Williams-Derry 2016; Paul 2018). 
There is no comparison of alternative energy development along the same route, such as 
constructing a wind turbine or solar photovoltaic farm, to produce energy for the nation 
rather than using oil. Renewable energy projects are noted to provide roughly 10 times 
the jobs provided per megawatt-hour as compared to fossil fuel-based projects (Sovacool 
2008, 108). Transport of oil via trucks, leaving the oil in the ground, or reducing oil 
extraction to levels that existing pipelines can transport are further neglected scenarios. 
Additionally, these economic analyses are presented in a one-sided manner, rather than as 
a more comprehensive analysis of pros and cons. Some peculiarities could be a mistaken 
calculation or could be a rhetorical trick to present data more favorably. When analyses 
such as these do not give full comparisons of any alternatives, they lack a 
comprehensiveness that would give stronger support to why a particular option is better, 
rather than merely saying one option is good on its own. Furthermore, environmental and 
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social impacts are difficult to monetize, and there is nearly no reference to them in these 
studies, though there are methods to quantify these impacts, too. There is no mention of 
how DAPL’s construction interferes with historical treaty agreements, and there is no 
mention of strategies that might help to mitigate the prevalence of crimes, drug use, 
prostitution, rape, and violence that occur more frequently during construction projects 
(Whyte 2018; Caraher and Conway 2016). There is no mention of water use or land use 
related to fracking, construction, or operation of the pipeline. 
 Economic analyses differ from ethical analyses, and economically efficient 
solutions are not guaranteed to be ethical. The most efficient way of completing a project 
might not produce the least harms (if not all harms are monetized) and might not avoid 
other unethical considerations that overrule efficiency. DAPL’s economic analyses 
questionably assume that extraction of oil is not only desirable, but that we ought to 
accommodate increased extraction. Economics assume a goal of low cost, but 
environmentalists argue that fossil fuels are too cheap, leading to overconsumption. 
Similarly, economists assume increased spending throughout the impacted communities 
is beneficial and that the lack of ability to transport crops is negative. There are plenty 
more assumptions of questionable ethical merit within these reports that ought to be 
deliberated to determine whether the project ought to proceed. 
 
Lakota Sioux Ethics 
While the Great Sioux Nation consists of many tribes, the ethics of the Lakota 
Sioux have been shared in academic literature and can be used to derive a representative 
ethical framework (e.g., Byerly 2015; Caldwell 2017; Craig 1999; Verbos et al. 2011). I 
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introduce Lakota ethics and then compare and contrast them to the classical ethical 
theories in a non-judgmental manner. This tactic is selected to preemptively address 
objections criticizing that applying ethical theories cross-culturally is an unreasonable 
endeavor. I extend Lakota ethics the same claim to truth extended to the other theories. 
Lakota ethics is another tool in the ethical toolbox, which allows for another way of 
analyzing a case and of expressing ethical merit. Understanding this aspect of Sioux 
culture helps to further humanize deliberation of this case, rather than treating the issue as 
merely technical in nature. 
Traditional values and the notion of “the hoop” define Lakota ethics as an 
ecocentric view, mindful of recurring behaviors. The four traditional values are bravery, 
generosity, fortitude, and wisdom. Lakota generosity is described as not taking more 
resources than needed and sharing liberally with others (Byerly 2015). One question to 
ask when applying Lakota ethics to a case is whether the action reflects these values, and 
actions which do not reflect these values would be considered unethical. 
Lakota scholars describe ethics in terms of “the hoop” and “circles” of life which 
can describe either ethical or unethical behaviors. “Virtuous circles explicate increasingly 
positive human behavior in social systems, whereas vicious circles explain pathological 
negative spirals” (Verbos et al. 2011, 11). These vices could be cycles of poverty, 
depression, alcoholism, violence, greed, or other abuses that tend to perpetuate 
themselves. An evaluator would seek to determine whether a virtuous or vicious hoop 
would be perpetuated by the action. An agent should strive to avoid vicious hoops. 
The hoop also refers to an interconnection and equality with other living things 
and with natural objects, giving Lakota ethics an inherent ecocentrism. The circle of the 
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universe includes plants, animals, rocks, stars, and all things, which also are considered 
“family”, as described in the common saying, “‘Mitakuye Oysain’ (‘All are relatives’)” 
(Craig 1999, 285). Lakota duty is “one's obligations towards the land”, whereby certain 
duties are naturally assumed by living in an area (Craig 1999, 291). Ceremonial functions 
are required to be performed to remain worthy of living there (Craig 1999, 291). 
Therefore, evaluators would question whether an action respects other beings and nature 
as relatives and fulfills obligations to the land. Ethical actions reflect such concerns, 
while unethical actions neglect them. 
Lakota scholars say that “each person’s acts are often measured in terms of their 
impact on the entire social unit, the tiyospaye, and people within the tiyospaye align 
together and cooperate for the good of all of its members” (Byerly 2015, 1). Evaluators 
using Lakota ethics would ask whether there is an overall positive or negative impact on 
the community as a result of the action. Agents would seek to behave in ways that 
produce positive overall impacts, mindful of the community’s needs. If actions neglect 
community needs or affect them negatively overall, the action is unethical. 
Comparing it to the three major categories of ethics, Lakota ethics is most similar 
to Aristotelian ethics, but it does not use the Golden Mean description of virtue, even 
though its four traditional values (or virtues) echo Aristotle’s cardinal virtues—justice, 
courage, moderation, and wisdom. Both Lakotas and Aristotle value modesty, restraint, 
and temperance. Lakotas understand duty, but differently from Kant. Lakotas extend 
respect further than Kant to include not just persons, but nonhuman creatures and natural 
objects (Caldwell 2017). Furthermore, Lakota duty is derived from the land, while Kant’s 
duties arise from rational obligations of good will between autonomous individuals living 
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together. Lakota ethics is least similar to consequentialism. While Lakotas make 
decisions mindful of the public good, they do not traditionally calculate harms and 
benefits in such a quantitative way as most consequentialists do. 
With an emphasis on sharing and caring, Lakota ethics arguably best matches 
feminist relationship-based ethics, or ethics of care, attributed to Nel Noddings 
(Noddings 2007). Feminist ethics is commonly categorized as a type of virtue ethics, 
rather than treated as a distinct category. Because Lakotas treat everyone as relatives and 
since “care for the human condition” extends to sharing of emotions and personal time, 
the Sioux might find ethics of care most agreeable (Byerly 2015, 1). Through emphasis 
on concern for others as parents care for a child, empathizing with others emotionally 
(rather than merely rationally in Kantian ethics), and inclusion of others in decision-
making, feminist ethics matches Lakota ethics quite well. 
While some distinctions might be made with other Western perspectives, 
descriptions provided by Lakota scholars use similar concepts of virtues, duties, and a 
role for consequences in Lakota ethics. Initiatives that can be shown to avoid excess, 
promote human flourishing, give concern to others’ needs as a thoughtful relative would 
show, and honor a sense of duty to the community and natural world would likely be 
viewed favorably by Sioux and non-Sioux communities. However, speaking of 
deficiencies, individual gains, cost-benefit analyses, and profit maximization would be 
more likely to appear foreign to Sioux members. That is not to say that no Sioux person 
would understand those ideas, but that these latter types of reasoning are less likely to be 
congenial to them and more likely different from the way they would typically explain 
themselves. 
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While Lakotas might not present their ethical perspective in such a rigid format as 
I describe, to summarize Lakota ethics as a structured framework for applied analysis, 
these types of questions arise: 
• How do bravery, generosity, fortitude, and wisdom guide the action 
decision? 
• What does the decision to act show about one’s character? 
• If the action were imagined as a recurring loop, would it foster goodwill or 
spiral into perpetuating ill-will for others? 
• Does the action tend to all people and creatures as relatives? 
• What do duties to the land obligate here? 
• Does the action neglect certain peoples’ needs? 
To structure Lakota ethics into conditions that must be met for ethical merit, these 
qualifications can be applied to a case: 
• If the action does not demonstrate bravery, generosity, fortitude, or 
wisdom, or 
• if the action is feared to perpetuate negativity, or 
• if the action neglects to treat all of beings and nature as relatives or neglect 
duties to the land, or 
• if the action has an overall negative social impact or neglects community 
members’ needs, then the action is unethical. 
Agents striving to perform actions with no objection of their ethical merit would look for 
ways to act differently to avoid these concerns. 
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Ethical Analyses 
 By evaluating the ethical merits of the decision to construct the pipeline using 
four ethical theories— Lakota Sioux ethics, virtue ethics, deontological theory, and 
consequentialism, I reveal conditions that justify building it and those that condemn it. 
From these analyses, I determine that the construction is unethical and ought not to have 
proceeded unless certain actions were taken. Some of these action prescriptions might be 
enacted presently to make the operation of the pipeline ethical, to “right the wrong.” In 
this section, I present my arguments and evaluate them individually to reach a verdict. In 
the next section, I prescribe alternative actions to address objections to the ethical merit 
of the pipeline’s construction because some aspects are flagged by multiple theories. 
 
Lakota Sioux Ethics 
My analysis of whether to construct DAPL generally follows the framework of 
questions and qualifying conditions derived from Lakota ethics. I replace the generic 
“action” placeholder with the specific action being evaluated in this case (i.e., 
constructing DAPL) throughout the framework. This substitution produces these 
questions: 
• How do bravery, generosity, fortitude, and wisdom guide the pipeline 
construction decision? 
• What does the decision to construct the pipeline show about one’s 
character? 
• Does the pipeline tend to all people and creatures as relatives? 
• What do duties to the land obligate here? 
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• If the pipeline construction were imagined as a recurring loop, would it 
foster goodwill or spiral into perpetuating ill-will for others? 
• Does the pipeline construction neglect certain peoples’ needs? 
I follow the previous order of questions to argue in favor of the pipeline from the 
Lakota perspective. To reflect Lakota traditional values, pipeline proponents might cite 
exporting oil to energy poor nations as demonstrating generosity because it exemplifies 
sharing with others. Proponents could argue that providing oil via the pipeline 
demonstrates good character since it helps to support a higher standard of living 
(domestically or internationally through exports). The direct route of the pipeline is 
arguably accommodating duties to the land and treating other creatures as relatives, by 
minimizing the area potentially impacted by a spill. If exporting the oil is for the goodwill 
of helping other countries to develop, then it would constitute a positive recurring loop, 
hopefully perpetuating further good. With energy access, consumers often are better 
enabled to live and work freely, and these improvements could lead to innovations, 
products, or services that help others by “paying it forward.” Since the local communities 
are some of the poorest in the nation, the economic gains might bring new public services 
to their aid. These considerations give some reasons supporting the positive ethical merit 
for the pipeline’s construction, but they are weaker than arguments opposing the 
construction. 
For an opposing perspective, I construct an argument in opposition to DAPL’s 
construction. Because Lakota generosity condemns taking more resources than needed 
and encourages sharing liberally with others, a profit motive would conflict with Lakota 
generosity if revenues from the pipeline are not distributed throughout the community. 
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The lack of safety precautions shows a reckless character that is not mindful of others. 
The threats to nonhumans are even greater than to humans, since humans have some 
capability of cleaning up spills or avoiding the area in the case of an accident, which 
animals and plants do not always have. The construction violated duties to the land by 
building in areas held sacred by the tribe. The pipeline helps to enable an addiction to oil 
and creates a perpetuating loop of social harms through increased occurrences of crime 
and violence during construction. The need for safe drinking water sources and 
mitigation of climate change threats remain unmet needs, put at greater risk via the 
pipeline. 
Substituting DAPL’s construction as the targeted action in the previous statements 
produces these more specific conditions: 
• If the pipeline construction does not demonstrate bravery, generosity, 
fortitude, or wisdom, or 
• if the pipeline construction is feared to perpetuate negativity, or 
• if the pipeline construction neglects to treat all of beings and nature as 
relatives or neglect duties to the land, or 
• if the pipeline construction has an overall negative social impact or 
neglects community members’ needs, then the pipeline’s construction is 
unethical. 
If ETP seeks to only proceed with DAPL’s construction if it avoids red flags which give 
reason to object to the construction, then ETP must consider alternative actions to avoid 
these concerns. 
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 To compare these arguments, I evaluate opposing sides of the argument. DAPL is 
not convincingly demonstrating genuine generosity because the oil is sold for profit 
rather than given freely and may even be exploiting consumers abroad. The higher 
standard of living is arguably destructive of the planet, and the negligence of risk 
demonstrated by a lack of spill plans is a significant breach of character that should be 
addressed. As higher incidences of crime and violence are associated with infrastructure 
construction projects, more ought to be done to police these areas to maintain safety. To 
summarize, whether or not the pipeline construction demonstrates generosity is 
suspicious; disturbing sacred land, the impact of global warming, and potential impacts 
from spills violate duties to the land; and the disruption to the community caused by the 
busts after the temporary population boom are additional red flags to object to the 
pipeline’s construction derived from Lakota ethics. 
 
Virtue Ethics 
As described in the previous chapter, Aristotelian virtues are habits of moderate 
actions that demonstrate good character (Aristotle 1984; Austin 2014). Habitually 
excessive or deficient actions display bad character and are vices. Good character (or bad 
character) results when those habits show (or fail to show) human flourishing, excellence, 
or role model behavior. While this view of ethics relies on a conceptual relationship such 
that (repeated) actions become habits which constitute character, there are judgments 
inherent in virtue analysis that leave room for difference of opinion to arise, such as what 
constitutes human flourishing, model behavior, or excessive action. Because of these 
differences of opinion, ethical analyses do not definitively settle all debates on their own, 
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but they help to expose salient features and build a case for or against the action, which 
help to determine whether to proceed with the action. 
I replace the action placeholder with the pipeline construction to derive these 
questions to analyze the case from an Aristotelian standpoint: 
• Is ETP doing too much or not doing enough, in such a way as the pipeline 
construction might seem extreme to an outsider? 
• Is ETP demonstrating admirable character by constructing the pipeline? 
• Is the construction of this pipeline (in this manner) one that can be 
promoted as a model of excellence, repeated habitually in similar 
situations? 
• Does the pipeline help stakeholders to flourish? 
In favor of the pipeline’s construction, there are a variety of ways to illustrate a 
Golden Mean, related to the size, length, and number of pipelines constructed. 
Constructing too few pipelines leads to deficient oil flows and reduced energy security, 
which would reflect poorly on the character of ETP and those in control of the oil system, 
as it shows they are not doing their part to provide energy resources and the peace of 
mind that comes with that. This example assumes current flow rates are insufficient and 
that other transport options are already providing the maximum they can. In comparison, 
DAPL helps to provide sufficient oil flow to meet demand. At the other extreme, a longer 
pipeline that avoids the protesting communities might be argued to be excessive if the 
length puts other communities or environments at risk (as ETP has argued) or if doing so 
makes the pipeline unmanageable for some other reason. However, the pipeline’s route is 
rather straight, allowing for efficient transport, and it crosses fewer tributaries and states, 
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which reduces risks and bureaucracy of interstate transport, supporting its ethical merit. 
Scholars argue that larger pipelines are preferable because if their proposals are rejected, 
multiple, smaller pipelines are then proposed, which potentially increases the area of 
environment and number of communities impacted (Mazer 2017). Furthermore, the lines 
might be split into segment project proposals to escape more detailed analysis of the 
whole system (Mazer 2017). Proponents might also point out that pipelines have the 
lowest risk of accidents, when compared to trucks or rail (Furchtgott-Roth and Green 
2013). These reasons lend support to building the pipeline from the perspective of virtue 
ethics. It may be awkward to talk about the character of a company or sector, but if ETP 
and the oil industry are efficiently constructing DAPL to meet needs safely, then they act 
admirably. Such action helps communities to flourish through the energy resources 
provided and reflects good stewardship through the emphasis of safety. 
Against constructing the pipeline, some protestors have argued that constructing 
this pipeline would create (or worsen) an (already) excessive number of pipelines and 
that “no more” should be built (i.e., Dhillon 2016). They argue that a fossil fuel economy 
shows poor character for disregard of the environment, or that oil pipelines are too risky 
to health (rather than promoting human excellence or flourishing). These claims are 
based on pollution, spills, production wastes, and other hazards of the fossil fuel industry 
(Laurel 2016; Willow and Wylie 2014; O’Rourke and Donnelly 2003). While ETP and 
the US Army Corps of Engineers might argue that they have performed sufficient 
environmental analysis (e.g., US Army Corps 2015), appropriately mindful of risks, a 
court decision in June 2017 has mandated that further evaluation and planning must be 
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performed to address concerns related to potential leaks, deeming current measures 
insufficient and risk exposure excessive (Hasselman 2018; Bender 2018; Lavelle 2017). 
The conditions of virtuous action that the pipeline must meet include: 
• If the pipeline construction can be demonstrated as extreme or deficient in 
some regard, or 
• if the pipeline construction can be objected for reflecting bad character, or 
• if the pipeline construction does not demonstrate role model behavior, a 
model of excellence, or promote human flourishing, then ETP must act in 
such a way so as to avoid this objection. 
From a virtue perspective, the construction of the pipeline might be a financially-
efficient way to transport oil from a short-term perspective, but other long-term, non-
financial concerns seem to override this consideration, qualifying the construction as 
unethical. The character of ETP is unamiable since risks are excessive and since safety 
protocols are deficient. As Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, poet and critic from the Crow Creek 
Sioux tribe, asks, “Is what I am doing of value to the continuation of the Indian Nations 
of America?”, it can also be asked whether DAPL helps the Sioux to flourish (Cook-
Lynn 1991, 13). Since most of the jobs are temporary, there is no substantial opportunity 
to flourish. Since the methane is flared and oil likely combusted, global warming threats 
also impede flourishing. As it is currently constructed, DAPL is unethical according to 
these considerations using virtue ethics. 
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Deontological Theory 
Immanuel Kant describes ethics as obligations (duties) that every rational person 
can come to know through reason (Kant 1785). For instance, someone can determine 
through reason that it would be unethical to make a promise that the person knows cannot 
be fulfilled because it defeats the purpose of making a promise in the first place (a pledge 
to be fulfilled); that is, the promise is unreasonable because it is self-contradictory. If 
there are no other prevailing reasons that could defeat this seeming contradiction, then 
reason provides an obligation not to make the promise. There are three key elements to 
Kantian ethics—intentions, universalizability, and respect (Reynold and Bowie 2004). 
Failing the three tests would make the strongest case for an unethical action, while 
passing all three tests would make the strongest case for an ethical action. Because of the 
focus on rationality, intentions are important. Kant would rather someone act in some 
way simply because it is reasoned to be the right thing to do, though it turns out poorly, 
than to act for selfish reasons in many cases. Because ethics can be known through 
reason, it applies universally to all people. This principle helps to oppose hypocrisy or 
favoritism, such as the oddity of a country with nuclear weapons criticizing another 
country for developing nuclear weapons. If the maxim guiding the action is 
universalizable, then it is more likely ethical, but if it is not universalizable, it is likely 
self-defeating and thereby unethical. For instance, if everyone lied often, it would defeat 
the purpose of lying, since most people either expect you to be lying or simply no longer 
believe what anyone says, since lying is the norm. Lastly, Kant defines human dignity as 
expressed through rationally choosing how one ought to live; so, actions that respect 
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others’ autonomy are more likely ethical, but actions that force someone to comply 
without consent or that use someone for another’s gain are more likely unethical. 
Converting the generic questions derived from deontology to analyze this case, I 
produce these questions about DAPL’s construction: 
• What is the motivation for building this pipeline? 
• In what ways can the pipeline be constructed that can be replicated 
elsewhere? 
• Does the construction of the pipeline defeat its own purpose? 
• How can the pipeline be constructed so that it respects all stakeholders? 
I create a duty-based argument against the pipeline’s construction. A profit motive 
need not be unethical in all cases, but such an intention is not admirable in this case as it 
disrespects the local communities by involuntarily exposing them to risks of tainted 
water. Scholars also report one of the primary motivations for the DAPL project is the 
intention of gaining transport access to a coast (for refining and possibly export), but 
crude oil pipelines to the Atlantic and to the Gulf of Mexico were already available 
(Mazer 2017). Exporting crude oil to other (poorer) countries seems to be a self-defeating 
endeavor if profit is the motive, as margins are already low and ability to pay would be 
further reduced. Furthermore, climate change impacts portray the use of fossil fuels as a 
self-defeating endeavor that could make the planet uninhabitable for humans. Also, 
constructing pipelines to reduce the cost of oil might be a self-defeating action if it turns 
out that greater climate change threats from combustion of oil lead to a carbon tax that 
raises the price of oil. Additionally, if the pipeline is created for the purpose of energy 
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security in the sense of trying to avoid turmoil abroad related to battles for energy, then 
the pipeline is self-defeating as the domestic protests disrupt energy security locally. 
On the other hand, ETP might argue an ethical duty to construct the pipeline to 
operate its business. They might support this claim by explaining that the pipeline 
respects consumers’ choice to consume oil. Providing a basic service to communities 
seems to be a universalizable action. These considerations support the pipeline from a 
Kantian perspective. 
The conditions of ethical merit in deontology that the pipeline construction must 
meet include: 
• If the pipeline construction is associated with ill intentions, or 
• if the pipeline construction is not one that can be done universally or is 
self-defeating, or  
• if someone involved in the construction of the pipeline is not participating 
voluntarily, then ETP must act in such a way so as to avoid this objection. 
This analysis using duty-based ethics determines that DAPL’s construction is 
unethical. While the pipeline might be an expression of business autonomy for ETP, it is 
disrespectful of the tribes’ autonomy and of those who involuntarily suffer harms of 
climate change. The argument that the pipeline is built to the best standards available or 
safer than other options still is not convincing that such construction could be 
universalized, since exporting and combustion make it self-defeating. While there is 
some measure of safety and environmental assessment performed, there are clear profit 
motives that seem to unethically override safety motives. The three tests of Kantian 
deontology more reasonably support the claim that DAPL’s construction was unethical. 
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Consequentialism 
Consequentialism is similar to a cost-benefit analysis in that positive 
consequences of the targeted action are weighed against its negative consequences to find 
the resulting “net good” of each alternative action being considered, but the costs and 
benefits are not limited to financial considerations. Each stakeholder counts equally in a 
consequential calculus, and impacts are evaluated through the perspective of those 
stakeholders (that is, whether it would be beneficial or harmful to them). In an economic 
analysis, for instance one done by a firm considering a new business strategy, 
stakeholders do not necessarily count equally, and impacts on the agent performing the 
action (the firm) are often weighted heavily, because utility for the company might be the 
goal rather than what is best for the public good. This strategizing is economic but not 
ethical. Economic evaluations might also maintain the agent’s (the firm’s) perspective 
when analyzing impacts on others, rather than evaluating from the impacted person’s 
point of view, but that would differ from convention in ethical analysis of using the 
stakeholder’s perspective. The ethical option is the one with the highest net good, doing 
the most good for the most people (collectively). Whereas in some economic analyses, 
options that are most favorable to the agent (the firm) and have least harms to others are 
likely to be favored. However, in some cases, what is best for a firm is not best for 
society, and ethicists might argue against their analysis as selfish or egoistic. However, 
economic analysis that treats all stakeholders as equal could be nearly indistinguishable 
from ethical analysis. For instance, proper economic analyses of public policy are like 
ethical analyses when they provide maximum utility for society. Unethical policymaking 
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results from disproportionately favoring the local community at the expense of harms to 
other communities. 
In comparison to Kant, it is not the agent’s intentions that matter in 
consequentialism, but the results of the action are what matter. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill are among the most prominent 
consequentialists (Bentham 1789; Mill 1991; Vallentyne 2006). In a consequential 
analysis, the following questions are key to determining ethical merit: 
• Who is impacted, by which alternative actions, and in what ways? 
• Which groups should be given priority due to their size or the significance 
of impacts on them? 
• Which alternatives provide more positive than negative consequences? 
The conditions associated with consequentialism that ETP must meet include: 
• If the net good of the pipeline construction is not the highest achievable 
among alternative options, or 
• if significant negative consequences of the pipeline construction are 
avoidable, or 
• if a significantly large population is negatively impacted by the pipeline’s 
construction in avoidable ways, then ETP must act to avoid these 
consequences. 
As the economic analyses and criticisms of them show, the energy and job 
impacts are relatively insignificant to region since the oil is likely to be transported by 
other means and used regardless of whether the pipeline is built. Here, I only highlight 
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some alternative actions that could potentially significantly change the consequences of 
the pipeline’s construction. 
The city of Bismarck, upstream from the Standing Rock Sioux reservation along 
the Missouri River, presents a large population (72,000) that justifies a downstream route 
(as currently constructed) to minimize harms created by a leak (as compared to only 
8,000 living on the reservation), if it is assumed that these communities are the only 
people harmed. Alternative routes can be shown to be riskier since they would threaten 
more people and cross more bodies of water (upstream tributaries). Exporting to help 
other countries in need could also produce positive outcomes. However, besides 
comparing building the pipeline and not building it, further considerations of building the 
pipeline with extra safeguards to respond to leaks would likely show higher net good, 
which would change the construction from ethical in light of the claims just mentioned to 
an unethical endeavor. 
In opposition to the pipeline, protestors would likely argue that the harm to their 
lives is a more significant harm in their calculus than the trivial benefits of company 
profit and $0.10 savings on every gallon of gas. Furthermore, while Bismarck has a larger 
population, they are also more affluent and thereby more likely to be able to financially 
manage a spill than poorer communities have the resources to respond. The pending 
economic bust and the loss of culture caused by out-of-state workers might outweigh the 
temporary economic gains. Evidence of a loss of culture and reduced civility is found in 
increases in prostitution, violence, and other criminality, as well as the influx of 20-46% 
higher populations due to new people immigrating from other states (Becker 2016, 16). It 
is unknown whether the government revenues would be more than sufficient to cover the 
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influx of out-of-state workers to show that they provide benefit to the local community. 
Furthermore, the impact of climate change threats is menacing. As a consequentialist 
account includes more than financial considerations, it is difficult to support pipeline 
construction without greater safeguards for leaks. Because further safeguards could be 
implemented and since some greatly significant threats from water contamination and 
from climate change are not mitigated, the DAPL construction is unethical, since 
alternatives exist that could provide a greater good for a greater number of people. 
 
Discussion 
The multiple ethical analyses presented collectively paint a more comprehensive 
picture than any one of them alone could because they investigate different aspects of the 
case. They can be compared to the economic analyses mentioned previously. In an ideal 
economic analysis, the decision would follow from the evaluation. That is, the analyst 
would remain neutral until the evaluation determines whether it is best to proceed with 
the action, rather than take a stance and then find reasons to support that stance, which is 
not an analysis. The economic analyses previously discussed seem to only justify a 
preconceived stance, rather than to assess options neutrally because they do not give 
much consideration to opposing views or conflicting information. In the ethical analyses I 
provide, I give attention to arguments in favor and against the pipeline’s construction to 
demonstrate that I have considered both sides of the argument and to show that I 
performed an analysis. While an analyst cannot completely remove personal feelings, I 
took a perspective in which I would allow the research to have an opportunity to 
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convince me. That is, I could have been swayed to adopt a stance opposing my original 
intuitions. 
In the Lakota analysis, I discern that the lack of adequate spill prevention and 
response plans does not serve others’ needs, other creatures as relatives, nor duties to the 
land. Though proponents of the pipeline’s construction could present a weak case around 
ethical merit based on generosity, the crux of the matter falls on spill management and 
planning with consideration to impacts beyond the pipeline itself, such as global warming 
due to oil combustion. It seems to me less caring and more arrogant to pursue the pipeline 
construction without further safeguards and for a different purpose than using the energy 
for fuel. To show generosity, ETP might instead devote portions of proceeds to 
mitigating climate change, such as planting trees along the pipeline route or investing in 
renewable energy to offset carbon emissions. This change could help to meet the 
conditions of honoring duties to the land and treating others as relatives. Increased 
policing can help to keep crime rates and violence low, to hopefully break these cycles of 
negativity. Innovative ways to address additional community needs for water and better 
incomes can be provided through local hiring and delegation of community funds to 
water treatment and management plans. 
Lakota ethics and virtue theory agree on measures that help serve community 
needs because they also help the community to flourish. Employing the Sioux in 
construction or in social services to address the population boom or providing preferential 
access to the oil (perhaps after it is refined) are additional measures to help them to 
flourish. Extraction or transportation taxes might also be financial mechanisms to 
redistribute wealth through DAPL to tribes or other communities to create emergency 
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funds or response systems in case of spills that would hinder their abilities to flourish. 
These practices were not performed during DAPL’s construction, but some could be 
implemented now to address objections against its ethical merit. 
 Virtue ethics and duty ethics highlight similar concerns supported with different 
reasoning. Excessive pipeline networks and deficient risk mitigation capture ETP’s bad 
character instantiated in the decision to construct the pipeline. Worries of climate change 
threats are further enabled rather than reduced, hindering human flourishing. The 
distribution of jobs primarily to non-locals seems to give deficient attention to the 
poverty within the Dakotas. Furthermore, safety is a minimal expectation, not excellence. 
For ETP to demonstrate excellence, they can address these needs to turn the Dakotas 
from some of the poorest counties in the US to some of the most attractive to live. 
Using deontology, I discern a moral obligation to protect people by ensuring 
water safety that seems more reasonable than a supposed duty to offer a service, proposed 
in the argument favoring construction. Not just any business should be allowed to 
operate, even if popularly demanded. Disrespectful relations between stakeholders seem 
clearly manifested in the lack of spill planning and lack of foresight for climate impacts 
enabled by the pipeline system. Similarly, the delegation of revenues to emergency funds 
and climate offset measures can help to extinguish the objection that cite a profit motive 
as an ill-intention.  Had ETP offered the Sioux priority for employment, the Sioux who 
live on the reservation would not be viewed as being used for ETP’s gain through 
exposure to risk, since they might freely accept employment and thereby receive a 
portion of the revenue. 
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There are negotiable conditions that could have been deliberated between ETP 
and the tribe to help win their consent and perhaps might have convinced some members 
to join as voluntary (paid) employees, as builders or water protectors. I highlight further 
negotiations which may demonstrate more positive intentions and respect. 
Tribal autonomy is important to many American Indian communities. Since the 
1970s, some tribes, such as the Crow and Navajo Nations, have learned about energy 
resource management and contracting and have used this knowledge to gain greater 
control over energy resources and better revenues from royalties and operation 
agreements, such as the Fort Peck and Fort Berthold reservation tribes have gained. Sioux 
tribes request more direct participation in regional infrastructure projects to help regain 
the mutual agreement originally established in the Treaty of 1868 that requires tribal 
consent. However, DAPL was not constructed in this way, and its construction 
disrespected the autonomy of the tribes. Furthermore, financial compensation or another 
form of recompense may be in order for the destruction of sacred Sioux land during 
construction. Rerouting, spill prevention, and response plans could have been negotiated 
collectively to ease community apprehensions. These measures could be applied 
universally to all pipelines to support safety motives and achieve consent. 
Additionally, since the Sioux referred to themselves as “water protectors” during 
the protests, they may find it amicable to be hired as a type of quality control or response 
team that could monitor the pipeline and respond to leaks. In this way, they would be in 
control of their own safety and could perhaps be given some authority over these aspects. 
This type of management position honors their human dignity through their autonomy, as 
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Kant endorses. While the Sioux were not employed this way during construction, this 
option is still available to make DAPL’s operation ethical. 
I offer the next proposal in recognition of the energy-water nexus, in which 
decisions concerning energy or water are sure to impact the other, and situate it with 
some historical context. A century ago, the tribes relied on the river for drinking water, 
but the Oahe Dam construction made the river water unsafe to drink (Allard 2016). 
Furthermore, fracking is water-intensive. “A typical fracking well in the Bakken needs 
about two million gallons of water to complete" (Braun 2016, 105). So, the community 
competes with fracking for their water supply. Additionally, Energy Transfer Solutions 
Inc. (ETSI) (not to be confused with Energy Transfer Partners, ETP), has been permitted 
an allotment of water for an interstate coal slurry, partitioning even more water to the 
energy sector (Caposella 2015). So, there are concerns that the river is overdrawn at 
times. An alternative use of the pipeline would be to pump water (possibly desalinated 
water from the Gulf of Mexico or Great Lakes) in a reverse direction (i.e., north or west, 
toward the Dakotas, rather than away from them), to accommodate the loss of water this 
area has experienced. This alternative use of the pipeline could allow the tribes to 
flourish. 
To address objections regarding pipeline safety, some engineering changes might 
reduce potential for spills and restore the ethical merit of the pipeline. Adding 
coagulating agents to the oil slurry, coatings on the inside or outside of the pipeline, or a 
sealing agent at the spot of leaks might be possible innovations to improve safety. 
Including more safety valves along the route could also help to stop or control leaks. 
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To address water contamination concerns, backup water supplies should be 
arranged. However, the Sioux previously refused water allotment rights and monetary 
compensation, provided as amelioration for displacement and water losses due to the 
Pick-Sloan Plan dams, on principle; so, now that the pipeline has been built, they may not 
appreciate this gesture. 
The Sioux are not the only individuals who need to be respected in this case; the 
impending bust creates problems for the out-of-state, temporary workers, too. The 
pipeline arguably does not impact Sioux daily life until a spill occurs, but the decisions of 
whether to frack and whether to build the pipeline will directly impact the construction 
workers’ livelihoods. Cross-training pipeline construction workers with the skills to 
perform other construction projects or different skills to work across the fuel chain (post-
construction) could help to retain their labor in ways that grant them extended job 
security and honors their human dignity rather than merely using them for their labor in 
order to profit, to help make DAPL’s construction ethical. 
Lastly, the Sioux argue that ETP inappropriately acquired the land for the 
pipeline. If ETP restore ownership of the land to the Sioux, it might go a long way toward 
improving relations with these tribes. However, many out-of-state workers have already 
moved into the region; so, putting the land under new authority or expanding the 
reservation into areas already occupied by nontribal members is a somewhat hypocritical 
way for the Sioux to regain their land, as it is similar to how they were first removed 
from it. Furthermore, the Sioux have refused monetary compensation in the past; so, it is 
unlikely that payments could settle this dispute. Still, monetary solutions at least might 
show an act of good faith and could perhaps be used to buy alternative water supply 
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solutions. Proponents of the pipeline might argue that the lands should be purchased by 
the Sioux so as to be protected as they please, but this suggestion appears callous in light 
of their history. If ETP secures the proper permits and rights-of-way (though an 
injunction argues it has not always done so), there is some support to the notion that it has 
properly acquired the route (Standing Rock Sioux Tribe 2016). As it stands, ETP’s 
controversial permits and land obtainment add to the argument that DAPL’s construction 
was unethical. 
 With consequentialism, analysis also favors other options besides proceeding with 
construction in the way it was done. Beyond safeguards and alternatives to combustion, 
as the economic analyses suggest, if jobs are a primary objective motivating the pipeline, 
more jobs might be available in energy efficiency or alternative energy (Sovacool 2008). 
For instance, a report from the US Department of Energy finds that 2.2 million 
employees worked in energy efficiency while nearly equal jobs were available when 
comparing the combination of solar and wind to oil, at approximately half a million jobs 
(US Department of Energy 2017, 29, 61). Hybrid and electric vehicle manufacturing also 
employ over 60,000 workers (US Department of Energy 2017, 74-75). Some of the local 
tribes have extensively promoted wind energy since at least 2008, and some of the largest 
wind energy projects on tribal land expect to begin operating in 2021, through their 
efforts (Clancy 2018; Jossi 2018; Kessler 2018). Alternative energy jobs continue to 
become more available while the fracking bubble bursts, with its jobs in decline. What 
the economic analyses discussed in a previous section neglect but is better captured in an 
ethics-oriented perspective is that jobs and revenue creation are not necessarily always 
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valued or valued to the same degree; it matters what types of jobs are created, for whom, 
for how long can the revenue last, and whether it is gained in appropriate ways. 
 Stepping back to a broader context, the decision to pursue an oil pipeline is an 
energy decision that supports the status quo rather than a transition to something new. 
Because of the conflict over the pipeline with some of the tribes, there is cultural 
instability that makes the project unsustainable. In this way, the lack of ethical merit in 
this energy decision contributes to a less sustainable future. 
 
Objections 
To be sure to treat these matters most seriously and comprehensively, I should 
respond to potential objections to claims that may have been too easily brushed aside 
throughout this discussion. One objection is that the pipeline is ethical because it enables 
international development through exported oil. This claim is controversial since oil 
consumption contributes to international climate change threats. It is difficult to 
determine whether a single pipeline contributes net positively or negatively to climate 
change on a national or global scale, but because ETP does not perform a broader 
environmental impact assessment, the burden remains on them to prove net positivity or 
face criticism. For this reason, this type of evaluation should be required for such projects 
(i.e., pipelines), especially when products are intended for export, though it is not 
standard protocol. Furthermore, it generally seems that more direct foreign financial aid 
or support for clean energy installations would provide the same benefits without the 
harms as compared to exporting oil. 
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A second objection is that there may simply not be any way to prevent or respond 
to leaks to make a safer pipeline, even if we ignore costs of safety precautions. I speculate 
about coagulants, valves, and other such precautions, which might not exist or might 
increase leaks. Even so, if the safest is not safe enough, then pipelines ought not be 
pursued. I am merely trying to imagine ways to overcome concerns over safety, but if it is 
not possible to be safer, then this reason to not build the pipeline is stronger than even I 
imagine it to be. 
Third, this oil is going to be moved (perhaps in more dangerous ways with greater 
emissions) and consumed (combusted) anyway; so, this pipeline does not matter 
significantly in a larger context. Yet, the pipeline is not trivial, and this line of reasoning 
dilutes support of the pipeline construction almost as much as it criticizes objecting to the 
pipeline. All options of oil transportation should be given comparable analysis, and it 
should not be assumed that the oil is used for only one purpose. However, if certain uses 
are more dangerous than others, then it is perhaps necessary to restrict them. 
Fourth, the pipeline arguably helps the Great Sioux Nation to flourish. This claim 
may refer to giving the Sioux tribes extracting the oil upstream a larger market to which 
to sell, to keeping Sioux members out of harm’s way from being employed in the 
dangerous occupation of pipeline construction, or to the diversity of ideas brought 
through immigration of out of state workers into the Dakotas. This line of reasoning 
implies that the Sioux members are perhaps in denial or unaware of how this event 
impacts their lives or communities. I cannot imagine that the Sioux tribes would continue 
to fight pipeline projects and adamantly pursue wind projects if they were benefiting 
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overall from pipelines. I trust they are assessing their conditions accurately and that they 
would deliberate appropriately whether to voluntarily accept such jobs if offered. 
A fifth claim might be made that giving the Sioux tribes a share of pipeline 
revenue or other preferential treatment (to jobs, water, or energy access) would only 
perpetuate their welfare state status and keep them from the autonomy they seek, which is 
further enhanced by having to fight for a cause. No community should intentionally have 
obstacles put in its way to promote its integrity, and the financial or resource aid might be 
enough to enable the tribes to become self-sufficient. It seems awkward to criticize the 
self-sufficiency of these tribes since they have existed longer than communities that have 
displaced them. 
A sixth objection is that temporary jobs reduce the harm to which any one 
individual might be exposed. It might be possible to quantify the harms of accidents in 
comparison to the benefits of full employment, but such a determination of whether the 
risk is worth the reward should be left to the employees themselves. It would seem that 
when employees accept such risks, full employment is preferable, other things being 
equal. 
It may be the case that all pipelines were being used to capacity at the time of 
construction of DAPL, requiring DAPL to be constructed. This condition, if taken to be 
true, is neither a reason for or against the construction of the pipeline; it merely limits the 
means available to transport the oil. 
Someone may object to one energy company (ETSI) receiving water allowances 
while ETP is criticized for potentially contaminating water, as unfair discrimination. Yet, 
the water used in ETSI’s operations might be recovered through proper treatment, while 
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ETP’s normal operation does not require water. It is not normally the case that water 
would be set aside to be used for leaks and spills (i.e., to be contaminated), but it would 
be appropriate to designate sufficient water as a backup source in case of accidents. 
In response to any number of objections to using the pipeline to transport water 
instead of oil, I will simply say that this alternative is only a suggestion and that much 
further analysis is needed to determine whether it would be beneficial to the community, 
feasible, and should receive ethical evaluation of its own. I only propose it as a potential 
option and do not claim to have performed a comprehensive assessment of its value 
beyond an assumption that water spills appear less dangerous than oil spills of equal 
volume and that the region’s water availability has been hindered by previous projects 
such as the Pick-Sloan Dams. I acknowledge that pumping fresh water into the Great 
Plains may exacerbate the communities with further population booms, create intense 
water battles, and lead to further encroachment on tribal land. Each of these concerns 
should weigh into additional analysis of this option. 
Objectors might also claim that members of the Great Sioux Nation are not all 
trained in oil (or water) systems and putting them in charge of such decisions might lead 
to harms to others. However, I do not intend to claim that the Great Sioux Nation be 
given full or complete authority over such matters. While it may be the case that they 
deserve a greater say in proportion to the impacts they face, it is not necessarily the case 
that they would be unchecked and that further training or education could not be provided 
to them to make them suitable authorities. 
Next, an objection can be made that the tribe can move to escape harms or take 
countless other actions to protect themselves from threats associated with the pipeline. 
  115 
Granting such claims does not significantly change the merit of whether the action is 
ethical. It only, at best, qualifies some of the impacts on one stakeholder group. 
Motivating a dissenting group to be displaced from the land they have fought for over a 
century to keep secure does not provide favorable reasoning to support the construction. 
It might also be objected that providing present people livelihoods through the oil, 
revenue, and jobs is more important than concerns over future people’s livelihoods, as 
expressed in worries over climate change and impacts of combustion emissions on future 
generations. I side with Simon Caney on ignoring a “discount” on future generations as a 
form of discrimination and emphasize that some impacts of climate change are happening 
to present generations (Caney 2008). While particular harms caused specifically by the 
oil combusted after transport through this pipeline may take decades to manifest, similar 
occurrences have been happening for a century now. The delay is insignificant. The 
continuation of such harms perpetuated by pipelines is tragic. 
One final objection to specific proposals within this chapter is that the land used 
for the pipeline can still be used for solar photovoltaics or wind turbines, such that these 
seemingly better power options are not actually competing with oil generally or DAPL 
specifically. I agree that such a scheme, similar to mixed-use development in urban 
planning where apartments are built over street-level shops, is more attractive than the 
pipeline on its own, but again, this more complex, hybrid, multi-energy infrastructure 
option is still subject to ethical scrutiny of its components. It ought to be determined 
whether any one of these energy infrastructures is ethical before any combination of them 
is considered. 
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 Besides objections to particular details, the project of the entire chapter may be 
criticized for a lack of novelty. That is, it might be the case that all of these issues 
identified here have already been considered by the various stakeholders involved with 
this issue. This objection may be a true assessment of the included details, but it misses 
the purpose of this chapter, which is to illustrate how explicit, standardized applied 
ethical analysis is conducted. While these factors may have been considered at various 
points throughout the planning, protests, and further research of this case, there are not 
standardized applied ethics studies of the arguments that apply to either side of the 
pipeline debate. While there are a variety of energy morality, energy justice, and 
descriptive ethics accounts of the case, I argued in the previous chapter that those 
methods and perspectives from other disciplines are conducting studies with significant 
differences with applied energy ethical analysis and reach conclusions that are different 
in nature, sometimes compatible, and not necessarily in conflict to this study. It is the 
way these matters are discussed that is different, rather than a difference of what is 
discussed. 
 
Conclusion 
Due to massacres, flooding and shrinking of their native land, and a lack of 
sufficient consultation with the tribes, the Great Sioux Nation is reasonably upset about 
the construction of DAPL even before its construction. The tribes and their allies setup a 
protest camp at Standing Rock to attempt the block the completion of construction in 
order to protect their land, water, health, and to oppose climate impacts from the oil’s 
eventual combustion. Both the economic analysis and environmental analysis presented 
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by proponents of the project give insufficient reason to move forward with construction. 
There is not a sufficiently low probability for potential accidents, not enough safeguards 
in place to prevent or respond to spills, no alternative energy analysis for comparison, and 
other deficiencies that make construction controversial. The benefits of full-time jobs are 
few, and the financial gains are short-lived. The quick increase in population stresses 
communities’ service providers in already poor counties. These economic factors can be 
compared to other ethical factors to determine whether the pipeline ought to have been 
completed. 
Four ethical analyses were performed to evaluate the merits of DAPL’s 
construction, and each gives evidence that the pipeline construction is unethical. In order 
to say that DAPL’s construction is ethical or that it ought to be allowed to continue to 
operate, a variety of conditions would need to change. In the virtue analysis provided, 
while the pipeline’s construction might have positive merit in that it is an efficiently 
straight and perhaps the safest type of oil transport available, oil combustion emissions 
contributing to climate change and threats to environmental and public health from a 
potential oil spill are vicious habits encouraged by the fossil fuel industry that could 
eventually make the world uninhabitable, overriding the benefits oil-produced energy 
provides. It seems more reasonable to believe that DAPL’s construction does not enhance 
human flourishing. However, if the proceeds or preferential access to oil are used to help 
the impoverished communities of North and South Dakota, then this change would reflect 
positively on the character of ETP. If the pipeline’s construction is used to help the Great 
Sioux Nation to regain native land or used to pump fresh water from another source, then 
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the project would help the Great Sioux Nation to flourish and begin to reconcile for past 
losses. 
The analysis of duty ethics argues that it is more likely to be the case that there is 
a duty to avoid building DAPL, rather than a duty to build it. DAPL’s construction seems 
to disrespect both the tribes and the temporary workers seeking more fulfilling careers. 
The tribes argue that they were not consulted sufficiently and are involuntarily exposed to 
risk of contaminated water. Temporary workers might more meaningfully be put to work 
with cross-training that allows them to continue in new construction or post-construction 
duties to maintain sufficient work hours. Without proper safeguards, DAPL’s 
construction cannot reasonably be said to be universalizable, and profiting seems to occur 
at others’ expense, making it a bad motive. For these reasons, the analysis of duty ethics 
condemns DAPL’s construction. 
The consequentialist evaluation weighs the harms to the smaller population of the 
tribe and those impacted by climate change to alternative routes near a larger population, 
such as closer to Bismarck, ND. While DAPL’s construction might not create much 
emissions contributing to climate change, the greater fossil fuel industry that includes it 
and is further enabled by it is producing what might soon become an inescapable threat to 
human existence. Because alternatives such as safer pipelines, leaving the oil in the 
ground, and not combusting the oil exist, DAPL’s construction cannot be said to be the 
greatest good for the greatest number. Therefore, DAPL’s construction is unethical. 
Lakota ethics is distinguished by recurring hoops of behavior and ecocentrism 
which would condemn DAPL’s construction, even if some considerations can be stated in 
favor of the construction. As with other theories, the lack of safety precautions is most 
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troubling, as they neglect the interests of others, rather than treating them as relatives. 
Obligations to the land the Lakota find sacred would keep the construction from 
occurring. Perpetuating social harms through the boom and bust of the oil industry reflect 
negative hoops. These considerations also determine the construction of DAPL to be 
unethical. 
While changes can still be made to adjust operations to increase the ethical merit 
of the pipeline, each of the four ethical theories provide reasons to condemn the pipeline. 
Until these considerations are resolved, factors remain that make the pipeline’s 
construction and its operation unethical. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ENERGY ETHICS IN THE NAVAJO NATION’S TRANSITION FROM COAL TO A 
SOLAR ECONOMY 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I describe the shock that the Navajo Nation (Diné) experienced in 
2017, when the executive board of the Navajo Generating Station (NGS) coal plant voted 
to prematurely end a contractual agreement that was to run until 2044. The case is 
ongoing, as the coal power plant is scheduled to close by December 2019. I analyze the 
ethical merits of whether to pursue a solar economy and its most significant impacts for 
the Navajo Nation, Hopi Nation, and community of Page, AZ. First, I provide some 
details of the Navajos’ energy history in order to recognize important context for 
understanding their current attitudes toward non-tribal stakeholders. Second, I describe 
the case and explain the economic analyses that have been performed. Third, I 
acknowledge that the Navajo and Hopi tribes have their own ethics, which give some 
insight into their decisions. Then, I analyze whether the Navajo Nation should transition 
to a solar energy economy, using virtue ethics, deontology, consequentialism, Navajo 
ethics, and Hopi ethics. These analyses provide the determinant conditions of ethical 
merit of pursuing a solar economy, which are that it provides for those in need, begins to 
recover lost revenue and jobs, and respects tribal members’ autonomy. While more needs 
to be done to replace losses of the closure of the plant and mine and to reduce negative 
impacts of the solar economy system-wide as they become available because these 
conditions make the action unethical, there is no reason to believe these factors will not 
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be addressed in time and may already be part of plans not yet available to the public. I 
argue that the transition to solar is the ethical choice and ought to proceed. 
 
History of Navajos and Energy 
 Though their land has some of the richest coal, uranium, and solar energy 
resources in the US, the Navajo and Hopi people are not often discussed in energy 
journals. At over 300,000 members, the Navajo Nation is the largest Native American 
Indian tribe, and approximately 200,000 live on the reservation which covers roughly a 
third of northeastern Arizona and extends into Colorado, New Mexico, and Utah. The 
Navajo Nation has had a contentious relationship with the US government in the past. 
The tribe was forcefully relocated from Northern Arizona to Bosque Redondo, NM 
between 1864 and 1866, in what is called “The Long Walk.” Navajos have also suffered 
public health harms and soil and water contamination caused by uranium exposure 
(Tsosie 2009, 2015; Pasqualetti et al. 2016; Voyles 2015). The Navajo Nation somewhat 
reluctantly reorganized tribal governance into the Tribal Council to enable resource 
contracts and land use agreement when oil was discovered on the reservation in the 1920s 
(Voyles 2015). 
Besides commercialized energy and fuels, the mass reduction of livestock 
performed by federal agents in 1930 is another important early energy event in Navajo 
history because of the tremendous economic and cultural disruption it caused to the tribe 
(Powell 2015). Worries related to overgrazing, regional development, and erosion 
motivated the US government to greatly reduce the herds on which the Navajo tribe 
traditionally depended for their way of life. It is an energy event because the sheep 
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provided nutritional energy and because the soil erosion was feared to impact energy 
generation at Hoover Dam, if loose soil would travel across Lake Mead and into the 
turbine apparatus. 
Among different energy types, the Navajo Nation has the most experience with 
coal. Along with NGS and Kayenta Mine, Navajo Nation also is home to Cholla 
Generating Station, Four Corners Generating Station, San Juan Generating Station, and 
San Juan Coal Mine, and the Navajo Nation own the Navajo Mine (purchased in 2013) 
and two units of Four Corner Generating Station. However, a majority of Navajo people 
did not support Desert Rock Power Plant, proposed in 2006, which never materialized 
once plans were cancelled in 2011. The Navajo reservation encircles the Hopi 
reservation, which has a population of roughly 12,000 members and are the primary 
laborers of Kayenta Mine in the Black Mesa region of Arizona. More recently, the 
Navajo Nation began fracking on their land in New Mexico in 2014. 
The Navajo reservation also has high renewable energy potential. They have 
installed wind turbines atop the mountain ridge in eastern, central Arizona, called “Big 
Boquillas Ranch,” and the Navajo Nation leads the US in solar energy potential. Because 
of the high solar insolation, the Navajo Nation has contracted to construct a series of solar 
photovoltaic farms to begin to offset the losses of NGS. 
 
Case Details 
In 2017, the executive board voted to cease operations at NGS coal plant in Page, 
AZ, citing tens of millions of dollars lost annually to competition of cheaper electricity 
from natural gas (Randazzo 2017b). The decision would end land lease revenues, valued 
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at as much as 85% of tribal budgets by some accounts (e.g., Locke 2018; Craft 2018), 
which would be significant losses to the tribes. While there is less moral outrage over the 
closure itself, the decision is more ethically controversial because of job losses 
potentially displacing approximately 400 plant workers. A later decision from majority 
owner and operator, Salt River Project (SRP), reduces some of this worry because they 
have offered their workers relocation to other plants. Another recent agreement among 
unspecified stakeholders extended operations through 2019, confirmed that Navajos will 
have first preference in post-decommissioning employment, and verified that payments to 
the tribe will continue for 35 years (Frazier 2017). These latter decisions provided some 
relief, but relocation to another coal plant, mine, or to Arizona’s nuclear plant may only 
provide temporary relief, as coal plants, nuclear plants, and coal mines close across the 
nation (Haggerty 2017; Kennedy 2017; “Greene Co.” 2018; Carley et al. 2018). Some 
workers struggle with accepting the relocation option because the Navajo people have a 
place-based identity which causes reluctance to live or work off-reservation. 
Furthermore, these decisions still leave unclear whether enough available positions will 
result. Because more can be done to improve their lives rather than merely offering them 
more of the same, these arrangements arguably reflect a moral minimum but at least give 
these individuals options to consider. 
Because Kayenta Coal Mine exclusively serves NGS, lacks infrastructure to 
supply another plant, and has no likely buyer, it will also close, displacing another 200 
workers. While the larger Navajo Nation often attracts attention because of its name 
shared with the plant and larger population, the Hopi workers at Kayenta Mine could be 
in comparable or worse danger of losing their livelihoods. The coal workers have not 
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been provided a similar offer to relocate; however, they might be able to put their skills to 
use in Arizona’s prevalent copper mines. Plant employees and miners receive much 
higher salaries with greater benefits than most of Page’s minimum wage workers, 
presenting a further ethical complication, since they may not be the worst-off and may 
perpetuate or worsen existing inequalities (Wyloge 2017). 
 The tribes requested federal and local assistance, and secured a Department of 
Commerce grant, providing about $625,000 (Hand 2017; Randazzo 2017a; US Economic 
Development Administration 2017). Locally, they have joined with Northern Arizona 
University and Coconino Community College to create new education programs in Page 
(Cowan 2018a) and have hired Arizona State University as consultants to discern 
potential renewable energy projects. While the Navajo Nation has opened one solar farm 
in Kayenta and while a second is being constructed, it is unclear how open the tribes are 
to renewable energy, considering reluctance to build on sacred ground and because the 
energy is often going off the reservations to urban consumers (Smith 2017). Furthermore, 
if urban stakeholders ask to build solar farms on tribal land without first outfitting their 
own buildings and spaces, it presents a somewhat hypocritical request since urban 
residents do not generally consider cities sacred. The Hopi are also investigating solar 
farms. Multiple large solar installations will be needed, considering that the coal land 
leases provided $14 million annually and that a solar farm big enough to power nearby 
Flagstaff would provide $3-5 million annually (Cowan 2018a). While distributed 
photovoltaics might more directly help the one-third of tribal households currently 
lacking electricity, it is unclear whether they want it, leaves payment responsibility 
unknown, and ignores financial needs of the tribe (Hand 2017). While the tribes are 
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considering solar, there is some chance that they are reluctant to proceed since they have 
not yet fully endorsed this path.  
Because of the tribes’ vulnerabilities (due to the poverty of its members and 
precariousness of being tied to a single power plant as a significant source of community 
revenue) and large amounts of money at stake, there are uncertainties about how to 
proceed ethically. Since competition from renewable energy is another underlying reason 
for the plant and mine closures, the tribes’ hands are somewhat forced. The tribes might 
also be skeptical of assistance from the local photovoltaic provider, First Solar, because 
of the conflict, self-serving financial interest the solar company has. It is also difficult to 
determine just how well-off these communities are, considering the energy workers’ 
salaries on one hand but historical struggles with pollution-damaged soil and waterways, 
alcoholism, unemployment, food insecurity, poor education, lack of electricity, heat, and 
running water, criminality, and suicides on the other (Tsosie 2009; Nadesan and 
Pasqualetti 2016; Cornell and Kalt 2010; Noisecat 2015). The uncertainty about 
motivations, competing objectives, and well-being can make it more difficult to create 
shared value through mutually beneficial initiatives. So, whose values and interests 
should take priority, and towards which needs should help be given remain significant 
ethical disputes related to this case. Should the Navajo Nation pursue or avoid a “solar 
economy”? Should they transition from an economy based primarily on coal-based 
electricity generation to one that receives its primary revenue through solar energy 
installations or avoid a solar economy and continue with coal? 
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Economic Analyses 
 Because the decision to transition to a solar economy is motivated by the closure 
of the plant and since economic reasons are cited as the reason for closing NGS, an 
understanding of the coal and solar financial markets is crucial to understanding one of 
the dominant narratives in this case. Multiple economic analyses regarding NGS, 
Kayenta Mine, and their impacts on local communities are publicly available and are a 
standard procedural step in energy decisions. These studies detail financial data but do 
not discuss ethical implications of the decision to close these facilities or many 
alternative actions. Five of these reports are described here. 
The first report from the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis 
(IEEFA) (i.e., Schlissel 2017) determines that $2.4 billion in subsidies would be needed 
to keep NGS open until 2030. Because such high subsidies are undesirable, the report 
implies that the closure is a good idea. This conclusion is based on operating expenses for 
NGS that have risen over $40/MWh, while electricity is selling at market prices below 
$25/MWh, which means the plant loses more than $10/MWh without subsidy (Schlissel 
2017, 3-8). Natural gas, solar energy, wind energy, and battery prices are all trending 
toward lower prices, while coal costs are rising, presenting a grim outlook for coal’s 
future. Solar and wind energy also have the advantage of negligible operation costs, 
which economically incentivizes dispatching energy generated from these sources first, 
when available (Schlissel 2017, 11). This report was created in May 2017 and was one of 
the first to explain the plant’s and market’s financials to the public. 
The IEEFA created a second analysis in June 2017 which was one of the first to 
discuss a transition plan in response to the closures (i.e., Sanzillo 2017). Lack of such a 
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plan created some tension in the early months following the board’s vote to close, as 
many people interested in the situation were unsure of what the closure would mean for 
them and their communities. The author proposes creating an executive board to oversee 
small, local business ventures. The author assumes most of the money to fund these 
ventures would come from a federal infrastructure fund and that it would be used in three 
ways: to provide jobs, compensate the Navajo Tribal Council for lost revenue, and 
encourage diverse economic growth in the impacted communities. While the report 
improves on the previous report by giving slightly more detailed plans and proposes a 
shorter timeline (5 years) and lower expenses ($370 million), it is dismissive of the jobs 
issue. The author states that the owners of the plant and mine have triple the needed job 
positions available in other locations due to regular annual turnover and new jobs 
expected before the end of 2019 and that the greater community has 27,000 similar 
positions (Sanzillo 2017, 4, 11). The author also notes that Kayenta Mine’s land leases 
contribute approximately $51 million annually to the tribes ($28-37 million to the Navajo 
Nation, and $14-14.7 million to the Hopi Nation) (Sanzillo 2017, 6). The report is 
missing details of specific initiatives that might be helpful for the communities, beyond 
generally stating that energy, agriculture, tourism, retail, meat processing, public safety, 
and infrastructure (including road construction, water treatment, waste treatment, 
telecommunications, and broadband) are priorities. A more detailed comparison between 
this report’s plans and the failed Navajo Green Jobs program (Curley 2018) would help to 
show that these ideas are more advanced than previous (failed) initiatives. 
 A third report conducted on behalf of SRP in July 2017 notes that NGS 
contributes $51 million to the economy of Page, AZ annually, which is credited for 
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maintaining 147 indirect or induced jobs (5% of Page’s employment) (Combrink et al. 
2017). Another report commissioned by Peabody Coal includes an objection to the claim 
that the Central Arizona Project, a series of canals that supplies water to Phoenix and 
Tucson and the largest purchaser of NGS’s electricity, would lose $38.5 million if 
continuing to purchase from NGS (Energy Ventures Analysis 2018). The authors of this 
fourth analysis claim instead that the Central Arizona Project would save $370M by 2030 
if it continued to purchase from NGS. IEEFA created a fifth analysis in the form of a 
briefing note to respond to the objection, stating that even if the objection were true 
(which IEEFA disputes as an unsubstantiated claim), the Central Arizona Project only 
purchases 25% of NGS’s electricity, which means that 75% of NGS’s production would 
still need to be subsidized or managed in another way to avoid losses. These five analyses 
indicate that over $100 million of economic impact to the tribes and community of Page 
need to be offset to compensate for the closure of the plant and mine. 
 While there are a variety of economic analyses of the plant and mine available, 
the same cannot be said for the decisions of the Navajo and Hopi tribes to pursue solar 
energy, but anecdotes can be found in public news articles. The Navajo Nation’s first 
solar project since the NGS closure announcement, called Kayenta Solar, created an 
estimated $15.6 million in economic activity during construction and employed up to 280 
people at its height (Bebon 2018). This solar project is different from others in that land 
leases are not the only source of revenue for the tribe (Hay 2018). Navajo Tribal Utility 
Authority owns and operates Kayenta Solar and receives energy sales revenue as well. 
However, Kayenta Solar cost $60 million, and a second solar farm, called “Kayenta II” 
will cost $50 million (Associated Press 2017; Smith 2018). A third solar farm at 
  129 
Cameron, AZ is in the planning stage. This third farm will not provide energy to Navajo 
homes but is expected to be co-located with a technology manufacturer and some 
additional utilities (water and communications) (Cowan 2018b). While Kayenta and 
Kayenta II are 27.3MW facilities, the Cameron farm is expected to produce 100-150MW 
(Cowan 2018b). The third farm should open by 2020. If these three solar installations 
create 200MW of electricity, they have replaced less than one-tenth of NGS’s 2250MW. 
The Hopi are also planning a 19MW solar facility to supply Flagstaff with electricity, and 
an agreement between the Navajo Nation and SRP includes 500MW of power. Still, it 
will take time to construct these installations and to pay off the upfront loans needed to 
afford them. After construction, such facilities require less than a dozen full-time 
permanent employees to manage them. Even though a dozen such facilities need to be 
created to reach an equivalent production of energy, the number of employees is likely to 
be at a deficit in this transition, considering 100-200 temporary workers moving between 
installations and that a dozen facilities require a dozen employees each totals 
approximately 100-150 workers. The solar economy would be expected to employ 
approximately 200-350 people over the next decade or longer, which is only about half 
the number of direct energy employees of the coal economy. Because of the tens of 
millions of dollars in costs for these installations and the deficit of available jobs, the 
solar economy will require additional programs, such as rehabilitation of the coal site or 
employee transfers to other plants to compensate for losses. 
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Navajo Ethics 
Although the Navajo Nation had previously restricted sharing information about 
their culture with Western audiences, Navajo scholars have recently begun describing 
Navajo ethics (e.g., Yazzie 1994; Vecsey 2015). While the Navajo people have terms for 
good (hózhó) and evil (hóchó), they are generally taught that “you can do what you want” 
and typically describes ethics as “relative to situation and to consequences rather than 
absolute” (Vecsey 2015, 82). Still, Navajos have “moral qualms” which include specific 
negative prescriptions, such as "do not rape, steal, molest a sleeping woman, argue over 
sexual jealousy, wish ill of another’s person or possessions, ridicule other people’s 
defects, commit adultery, kill, or lie” (Vecsey 2015, 82). “The Navajo moral code tends 
toward the negative, because ‘its only purpose is to rule out those actions which would 
make life in general impossible, such as sickness, hard feeling among men, or poverty’” 
(Vecsey 2015, 83). Yet, the notion of “obligation” is not foreign to the Navajo people. 
For instance, “the Navajo primary duty is to one’s kin group,” and “a Navajo is urged by 
tradition to preserve and promote hózhó as an effective moral duty” (Vecsey 2015, 85, 
87). 
 Navajos oppose “monsters” akin to vices, such as “selfishness, greediness, envy, 
hate, and jealousy” (Vecsey 2015, 111). With regard to respect, Navajos are not to coerce 
others and see using someone else for one’s own gain as a form of witchcraft, punishable 
by death (Yazzie 1994, 180). Excess, particularly excessive wealth, is another form of 
witchcraft (Vecsey 2015).  
 Navajos generally have no concern for “intent, causation, fault, or negligence” but 
believe that bad fortune, shame, and “disruptive societal consequences” are deterrents to 
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behaving unethically and that consequences follow “from everything you say and do” 
(Yazzie 1994, 184, 188). Navajos generally want to avoid sickness, pain, trouble, 
embarrassment, and poverty and want to attain health, pleasure, wealth, and longevity 
(Vecsey 2017). Rather than maximizing collective utility at the possible expense of a 
few, the Navajo people generally seek win-win solutions and “compensation, rather than 
revenge and retribution” (Yazzie 1994, 185, 188). It is said that “just as good comes from 
good” and that “harm must be paid through restitution (nalyeeh)” (Yazzie 1994, 188). 
 Like other Native American tribes, respect is extended to other living beings as 
equals. Navajos conventionally call other people and nonhumans “relative” to symbolize 
this respect. This relational view best matches feminist care ethics due to the pragmatic 
way that Navajos try to constantly maintain positive relationships with everyone in the 
community as a central feature to their ethics that is not captured as well in the principles 
of the three major ethical theories (Noddings 2007). Empathy, inclusion, and subjective 
experience are criteria within care ethics. For instance, it is very important to Navajos to 
restore good relations, and in disputes, the perpetrator is treated as a victim as well 
(Yazzie 1994). This empathetic recognition contributes to the communal sense of 
equality they share with another. 
 While the Navajo people might not structure their ethical perspectives in this way, 
for the purpose of evaluating cases, these qualifying conditions can illustrate ethical merit 
from a Navajo-based perspective: 
• If the action requires condemnable actions that make life impossible, such 
as rape, murder, stealing, lying, etc., or 
• if the action involuntarily uses someone else for the agent’s gain, or 
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• if the action neglects duties to one’s kin group, upsets natural balance 
(hózhó), or fails to treat others as relatives, then the action is unethical. 
Agents seeking to only perform actions with no objections of ethical merit, as I assume, 
must act in such a way so as to avoid these objections. 
 
Hopi Ethics 
One Hopi scholar explains the ethics of the Hopi people (i.e., Glowacka 2009). 
Seeking a fulfilled life (naavokyawintiwa), the Hopi see role models of moral excellence, 
or moral exemplars, in spiritual entities, called the “katsinam”, discussed in their 
traditional katsina songs (Glowacka 2009). Their concepts of “suyanis’unangwa (good-
heartedness)” and “unàngwtalsino” reflect good character, while “okiw’unangwa (poor 
heart)” suggests a bad character. The Hopi see their identity as a form of duty (Glowacka 
2009). The Hopi value “sincere, heartfelt efforts to live right in accordance with 
traditional instructions (wukwtutavo)”, and they revere “the sense of proper and right 
living” “that helps people realize a good life.” (Glowacka 2009, 169, 171). On the other 
hand, the word “nukpansino” denotes bad intentions. Yet, they see ethics as “based not 
on universal moral laws” but culturally relative (Glowacka 2009, 169). The Hopi also 
oppose using others for one’s gain without consent. Such a person is called “powaqa” 
and is said to “take the hearts from people, unangwhorokna” or “phrased differently, to 
weaken qatsi’nangwa, or the people’s ‘will to live’” (Glowacka 2009, 177). Hopi songs 
encourage them to “correct their conduct for the benefit of the collectivity” (Glowacka 
2009, 169). “Those who do not adhere to communal values, who display mental-
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emotional imbalance, become more susceptible to illness and misfortune” such as suicide 
or social isolation (Glowacka 2009). 
Hopi music often describes their ethical views in what could be seen as a hybrid 
of Western ethical perspectives. For example, one katsina song encourages “people to 
live right and come to care for each other (naavaastoti) so that rains representing the 
power of fertility and abundance of the harvest will arrive from all directions and ensure 
the continuity of the life cycle” (Glowacka 2009, 168). In this song, feminist care is 
described for its communal consequences (e.g., consequentialism), which bring fertility, a 
type of flourishing (important to virtue ethics). Hopi ethics is inherently vitalistic in that 
life is often held as something of the highest value, giving respect to all forms of life. For 
instance, the Hopi also personify nature and see equal kinship with nature, as the Navajo 
people do. They also believe in “the collective goal of sustaining life” (Glowacka 2009, 
172). Their notion of care is exemplified in the notion that “caring for balance, in the 
sense of peacefulness in life, is actually caring for the conditions needed to maintain life” 
(Glowacka 2009, 173). The importance of care shows similarity to feminist ethics, but 
they also warn that chaotic emotions can impair duties and caution against “mental-
emotional excess” (Glowacka 2009, 173). While these suggestions seem to reduce the 
importance of feelings in ethical decision-making, “coming together as one” is an 
important principle reflecting empathy. Hopi ethics is comparable to a vitalistic feminist 
ethical theory. 
While Hopis might not express their ethics in such a structured approach, 
conditional statements reflecting their perspective can be used to evaluate cases, such as: 
• If the action does not demonstrate imitate the Katsinam, or 
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• if the action demonstrates bad character (okiw’unangwa), or 
• if the action is associated with bad intentions (nukpansino), or 
• if the action does not avoid involuntarily using others (weakening their will to 
live, qatsi’nangwa), or 
• if the action does not adhere to communal values or displays mental-
emotional imbalance, or 
• if the action does not respect all forms of life as of the highest value, then the 
action is unethical. 
Agents must act to avoid these concerns if they wish to only act in ways that do not have 
objections of their ethical merit, as I assume in the forthcoming analyses. 
 
Ethical Analyses 
 While both Navajo and Hopi tribes have decided to pursue solar energy as a way 
to transition away from their coal economies, their decisions may be rushed. That is, if 
the tribes are desperate due to the potential of losing significant revenues, they may be 
succumbing to pressure from others, settling for a lesser option. I evaluate whether the 
Navajo Nation ought to pursue a solar energy economy or avoid it, using virtue ethics, 
deontology, consequentialism, Navajo ethics, and Hopi ethics. Similar concerns apply to 
the Hopi’s transition, and I only address theirs directly from their ethical perspective, 
though it also can be used in analyses of Navajo actions. I use only conditional statements 
(and not a framework of questions) for the Native American perspectives to avoid 
redundancy and because the tribes would not necessarily ask this sort of questions when 
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deliberating, but I still want to show how their perspective can be understood by an 
outsider. 
 
Navajo Ethics2 
 The analysis through a Navajo perspective includes these conditional 
considerations, derived from substituting the pursuit of a solar economy for the action 
placeholder: 
• If the pursuit of a solar economy requires condemnable actions that make 
life impossible, such as rape, murder, stealing, lying, etc., or 
• if the pursuit of a solar economy involuntarily uses someone else for the 
agent’s gain, or 
• if the pursuit of a solar economy neglects duties to one’s kin group, upsets 
natural balance (hózhó), or fails to treat others as relatives, then the Navajo 
Nation (or Hopis) must act in such a way so as to avoid this objection. 
Because there is no rape, stealing, adultery, or murder involved in the decision to 
pursue a solar economy, the action thereby demonstrates ethical merit by avoiding these 
condemnable actions within Navajo ethics. Yet, the decision to pursue solar also ought 
not to be excessive or use others for one’s own gain. Producing more energy than is 
demanded or capable of being used (due to lack of transmission, for instance) might be an 
example of excess to avoid, but the tribes are pursuing solar installations at a reasonable 
pace, taking care not to go bankrupt or to overburden the electric utilities with new 
                                                 
2 A previous analysis comparing the proposal for the Dessert Rock Power Plant to alternative renewable 
energy projects is also available and has great insights relating Navajo ethics to energy issues (Ecos 
Consulting 2008). 
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generation. Similarly, the Navajo Tribal Utility Authority has confirmed with members at 
each solar project site that they would be willing to give up their grazing rights, where 
necessary, for construction (Hay 2018). By directly gaining the consent of these families 
on whose land they will build, the Navajo Tribal Utility Authority is regaining the trust of 
Navajos, showing respect, and honoring duties to their kin. The Navajo Nation might also 
see the pursuit of solar as a way to reconcile wrongs of the coal plant’s previous 
pollution, which is a positive aspect of Navajo ethics. If site remediation of the plant and 
mine are performed in the future, these measures would further support reconciliation. By 
tending to the needs of tribal members (such as demonstrated in the expanded access to 
utilities that the Cameron project will provide), the solar economy combats poverty rather 
than perpetuating it, a Navajo duty mentioned previously. Sickness can also be avoided if 
the photovoltaics models chosen are created with less toxic substances and production 
wastes, so that health impacts across the entire supply chain system and end of product 
life are minimal.3 In these ways, Navajo ethics supports the transition to solar energy. 
 
Hopi Ethics 
 These conditions of ethical merit from Hopi ethics can be applied to this case: 
• If the pursuit of a solar economy does not adhere to communal values or 
displays mental-emotional imbalance, or 
                                                 
3 E-waste has already been noted as a problem of previous solar photovoltaic distribution initiatives by at 
least one scholar (Powell 2015). 
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• if the pursuit of a solar economy does not respect all forms of life as of the 
highest value, then the Navajo Nation or Hopis must act in such a way so as to 
avoid this objection. 
The conditions mentioned in a previous section related to intentions, character, and using 
others are already discussed in the analyses of other theories, but they could also be 
refined with further study of what Hopis consider as good intentions, good character, and 
exemplary behavior of the Katsinams, from their perspective. I do not have extensive 
knowledge of this perspective which would support that type of more specific application 
here. 
If the Hopi community takes precautions in its pursuit of a solar economy so as to 
respect all forms of life, such as using the energy to satisfy unmet needs within its own 
community, asking for permission to build on tribal members’ land, and planning for 
proper disposal of photovoltaics in order to avoid health and environmental 
contamination in the future, then it is ethical to proceed. To acknowledge the value of 
plants and animals as living beings, the Hopi would likely be concerned with restoring 
the mine to a thriving habitat. Such restoration may go beyond the mine itself to also 
include wherever its waste has been transferred. These restorative acts and behavior 
improving their community would likely help in mental-emotional balance, as guilt from 
environmental destruction caused by coal mining and its pollution can be replaced by 
positive feelings. If done in this way, the restoration promotes life and is thereby ethical. 
As solar photovoltaic installations grow to replace the revenue, jobs, and energy lost from 
the coal plant’s closure, the financial stress related to these deficiencies would become 
relieved. On the other hand, if restoration is not performed, the solar economy does not 
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eventually replace the losses from the closure of the mine, or uses photovoltaics that are 
harmful to life (due to toxic components, for instance), then their pursuit of a solar 
economy is unethical. 
 
Virtue Ethics 
I evaluate the case through the lens of Aristotle’s Golden Mean by describing 
vices and virtues of solar production. As in the case from the previous chapter, the same 
general questions can be adapted to the details of the new case. From an Aristotelian 
standpoint, key questions include: 
• Is the Navajo Nation doing too much or not doing enough, in such a way 
as the pursuit of a solar economy might seem extreme to an outsider? 
• Is the Navajo Nation demonstrating admirable character by pursuing a 
solar economy? 
• Is the development of the solar economy (in this manner) one that can be 
promoted as a model of excellence, repeated habitually in similar 
situations? 
• Does the solar economy help stakeholders to flourish? 
As stated earlier, the rate of transition to a solar economy could be evaluated, but 
it is difficult to find fault in their rate unless it were to bankrupt the tribe by transitioning 
too quickly or impair the tribe financially by not transitioning quickly enough. 
Alternatively, the extent of transition could be evaluated, but because the energy of the 
coal plant primarily went off-reservation and because the shutdown of the coal plant is an 
all-or-nothing decision at this point, I am less interested in analyzing these aspects. 
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Furthermore, it is not controversial to say that the Navajo should neither be excessively 
dependent on solar revenue for its economy nor deficiently reliant. Instead, I analyze how 
much solar ought to be built, rather than at what pace or to what extent it impacts the 
community because it reflects controversial aspects of the decision, including where to 
build. The vices constitute excessive production of solar energy and deficient production, 
which correspond to building too much or too few solar photovoltaic installations, 
respectively. Between these extremes, an intermediary amount of solar production is 
virtuous and ought to be pursued. I address excess, deficiency, and moderation, in turn. 
Excessive solar production would result if tribes gave up sacred land sites or 
forced reservation inhabitants to move in order to accommodate solar arrays. Abandoning 
their values by spoiling their land does not reflect an admirable character. Moving 
inhabitants of the reservation to construct a solar farm would also seem wrong since 
photovoltaics often can be placed on rooftops, allowing activities to continue underneath 
them. It would also be excessive if photovoltaic arrays are placed over scenic views, 
impeding the Grand Canyon, Antelope Canyon, or other tourist attractions, as they are 
important revenue sources to the community. 
Deficient production could be argued if the solar revenues are not enough to 
compensate the tribe once the coal revenues end. Deficiency could also manifest if the 
jobs created through solar construction are not enough to cover losses of the plant and 
mine closures. Either of these situations fails to address two of the most pressing needs 
that have been broadcasted by the community. It is also arguably deficient if current 
Navajo citizens without electricity (who want it) do not obtain access to the energy since 
  140 
a benefit of solar lies in its ability to be located on-site. This failure shows a poor 
character if Navajos are not taking care of their own. 
The virtuous amount of solar production provides jobs, revenue, and electricity 
access to compensate for the eventual end of coal revenues and to address individual 
members’ household needs. This action shows a model for other communities and 
demonstrates flourishing through healthier living (without the coal plant’s emissions). 
The pursuit of solar energy can also serve as a model for other communities (tribal or 
nontribal). In this way, other chapters also have access to land that could be used for large 
solar farm installations, which could help other members of the tribe. 
The conditions for virtuous action that must be met in this case include: 
• If the pursuit of solar can be demonstrated as extreme or deficient in some 
regard, or 
• if the pursuit of solar can be objected for reflecting bad character, or 
• if the pursuit of solar does not demonstrate role model behavior, a model 
of excellence, or promote human flourishing, then the Navajo Nation (or 
Hopi tribe) must act in such a way so as to avoid this objection. 
It seems to me that the Navajo Nation is meeting these conditions without 
drawing objections. However, further considerations beyond the contracted solar farms 
could be evaluated less favorably through the lens of virtue theory. One proposed option, 
introduction of a solar art display as a tourist attraction (see the Land Art Generator 
Institute website, for example), could be both excessive and deficient for different 
reasons. The solar art might be said to be deficient because it might not produce sufficient 
power or revenue to be significant, and it might be called an excessive use of materials. 
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As more solar contracts are confirmed, the solar economy will move from a deficient 
state to a sufficient state of providing energy, jobs, and revenue. These considerations can 
be compared to analyses from the other ethical theories. 
 
Deontological Theory 
Kant’s ethics can help to determine whether there is an ethical duty to pursue 
solar or a duty to avoid solar. In a similar approach as in the previous chapter, intentions, 
universalizability, and respect can be tested by asking the following questions, refined for 
this case: 
• What is the motivation for pursuing a solar economy? 
• In what ways can a solar economy be developed that can be replicated 
elsewhere? 
• Does the development of the solar economy defeat its own purpose? 
• How can the solar economy be developed so that it respects all 
stakeholders? 
The conditions of deontology that must be met in this case include: 
• If the Navajo Nation’s or Hopi’s pursuit of solar is associated with ill 
intentions, or 
• if the Navajo Nation’s or Hopi’s pursuit of solar is not one that can be 
done universally or is self-defeating, or  
• if someone involved in the Navajo Nation’s or Hopi’s pursuit of solar is 
not participating voluntarily, then Navajo Nation or Hopi must act in such 
a way so as to avoid this objection. 
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In favor of the transition to solar, the intentions to provide jobs, revenue, and 
electricity access seem like reasonable motivations. While not every community has the 
solar irradiation that the Navajo Nation has, photovoltaics can produce at nearly any point 
on the Earth open to the sky; so, this action seems to be universalizable. The autonomy of 
the tribe is honored if the contracts are negotiated respectfully, voluntarily, and in ways 
that include everyone impacted. Furthermore, the land owners have provided consent for 
the installations on their lands, as already noted. 
In opposition to solar, the land use may once again come into question if it 
impinges on tribal sacredness. Furthermore, the tribal government would be 
demonstrating selfishness, which is a poor motivation, if it is only seeking to restore its 
revenue and neglects community needs. Additionally, the action could be self-defeating if 
the solar technology impedes the tribe’s ability to make decisions in the future, such as 
due to contractual obligations. “Selling out” by giving up land for solar farms could result 
in an employment boom during installation which dwindles to only a few dozen workers 
once construction is finished. This bust would be disrespectful to the workers given hopes 
of a new job that does not last, further supporting the judgment that it could be self-
defeating. The three tests also show conditions that would determine that pursuing solar 
energy is unethical. However, none of these conditions are actualizing; so, there is no 
significant objection to the transition to solar at this time. 
As an additional consideration, forming an energy cooperative (or expanding the 
current Navajo Tribal Utility Authority) might at first seem to be an instantiation of the 
tribe’s value of self-determination (or Kantian autonomy), but it could also be judged 
unfavorably if the cooperative is pursued to cut ties with SRP, for example. Perhaps, the 
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cooperative would allow the tribe to remove SRP as a middleman in order to sell directly 
to urban consumers, maybe to earn more of the revenue. Such a move might backfire 
(i.e., become self-defeating) if the tribe is not as competent as it imagines its workers to 
be or if bureaucracy of legislation interferes with energy transactions (which SRP might 
already have produced workarounds to address). Similarly, a previous initiative to 
encourage renewable energy, the Navajo Green Jobs Movement in 2009, failed because it 
attempted to facilitate entrepreneurial opportunities for tribal members, though they 
lacked interest in business ownership and faced improper financing (Curley 2018). The 
transition to solar should avoid these shortcomings to avoid repeating this mistake. The 
solar art idea might also be self-defeating if the technology impairs tribal culture, as new 
technology sometimes brings new values as well, or it could be self-defeating if the 
expensive installation fails to attract tourists’ interests. However, some of these concerns 
are more apt for consequence-based ethics. 
 
Consequentialism 
The impacts of the decision to pursue solar energy can also be analyzed to 
determine ethical merit. In a consequentialist analysis, the following questions are key to 
determining ethical merit: 
• Who is impacted, by which alternative actions, and in what ways? 
• Which groups should be given priority due to their size or the significance 
of impacts on them? 
• Which alternatives provide more positive than negative consequences? 
Consequentialist conditions that must be met in this case include: 
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• If the net good of pursuing a solar economy is not the highest achievable 
among alternative options, or 
• if significant negative consequences of pursuing a solar economy are 
avoidable, or 
• if a significantly large population is negatively impacted by pursuing a 
solar economy in avoidable ways, then the Navajo Nation (or Hopis) must 
act to avoid these consequences. 
Some of the most prominent alternatives for action related to this case include: the 
Navajo Nation purchases the plant and mine to continue operation, contracting solar 
photovoltaic installations as currently planned, a solar art installation, retrofitting the 
plant building as a museum (dedicated to Navajo culture or energy history), converting 
the coal plant for natural gas combustion, converting the coal plant to a syngas processor 
(turning the coal to a fuel for sale), or any number of alternative economies focused on 
such things as tourism, Navajo culture, electric vehicles, and more. The stakeholders 
impacted include: owners, plant and mine employees, Navajo and Hopi tribal members, 
Page residents, regional energy consumers, residents downwind who suffer from 
pollutant emissions, competing energy utilities, photovoltaic providers such as First 
Solar, tourists, and nonhumans. A table illustrates a simplified consequentialist calculus 
of these options (Table 3). 
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Table 4: Simplified Consequentialist Calculus for Navajo Transition Case 
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Owners + 0 0 - - 0 0 0 
Plant employees + - - + + - - - 
Mine employees + - - - + - - - 
Navajos - + + - - + + + 
Hopis + + + - - + + + 
Page residents 0 + + + - + + + 
Regional energy 
consumers 
0 + - 0 - - - - 
Residents downwind - + + + - + + 0 
Competing utilities + - 0 - + + + + 
Photovoltaic providers - + + - - - - - 
Tourists - + + 0 0 + + 0 
Nonhumans - + 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Net Good 0 +5 +3 -3 -4 +2 +2 0 
 
The depicted analysis is overly simplified since it treats all stakeholders as constituted by 
the same number of people and their impacts as equally significant but gives a 
preliminary overview of ethical merit of available options in this decision. 
The calculus shows that converting the coal plant is likely the worst option 
because, although it could keep the miners employed, the financial feasibility of investing 
in syngas processing equipment and poor revenue expectations give it the lowest net 
good. While solar art installations, tourism, or a museum show positive net good, they do 
not impact as many stakeholders positively as solar farming. The solar photovoltaic 
contracts as planned, produce the highest net good and are thereby the ethical choice. 
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Not all details that weigh into the consideration are captured in the table. The 
temporary benefit of the jobs is only a short-term gain. The health benefits of ending the 
coal emissions may take a decade or more to manifest. The water and land that become 
available by shutting down the plant and mine are additional significant benefits to 
consider, which are currently being contested in courts. The proposed 500MW solar 
agreement is less energy than the 2250MW that NGS produces; so, urban consumers will 
have to be supplied with energy from another source or reduce their consumption. 
However, the other forms of energy in this region are all cheaper and pollute less than 
coal; so, energy consumers are benefited. The solar contracts might aid in spreading jobs 
and revenue to other tribal chapters for additional benefits. 
Beyond the human impacts, some utilitarian ethicists would also include impacts 
on nonhumans (e.g., Singer 1975). Pursuing solar could allow for restoration of the mine 
land, water, and air, which would benefit the local animals and plants. However, the solar 
farm might also change the light available under the photovoltaic units for plant life to 
grow. It is also important to consider the mining for metals and silica as components of 
solar modules. The mining is destructive of landscapes and can create wastes that can 
contaminate water and soil. While it is difficult to estimate any of these impacts, they can 
be considered to some extent. 
Photovoltaic manufacturing also currently includes handling of toxic chemicals, 
which can cause health problems for workers. Silicon tetrachloride in older modules and 
cadmium in modern, thin-film modules can be toxic (Fthenakis 2009; McDonald and 
Pierce 2010). Beyond the immediate impacts of purchase and the upstream impacts of 
mining, the temporal downstream impacts are meaningful. Photovoltaics are not yet 
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designed to be fully recyclable. So, the toxic chemicals integrated during construction are 
still contained at end of life. Properly managed disposal processes can recover or 
neutralize these substances to prevent contamination and adverse health impacts. While 
the Navajo and Hopi tribes do not have control over which substances are used to create 
products if they do not manufacture them themselves, their purchasing power and 
decisions at the end of the product life have ethical implications. Plans for a solar 
economy that include stipulations for these spatial impacts within the greater solar 
economy and for intergenerational consequences will be less ethically controversial than 
plans without such foresight. This condition seems to have the potential to produce the 
most negative impacts; so, to avoid objection about the transition’s ethical merit, toxicity 
and disposal ought to be integrated into the transition plan.  
 
Discussion 
 Using five ethical perspectives, I determine that the pursuit of a solar economy is 
ethical. There are no major violations of condemnable behavior; therefore, Navajo ethics 
gives no strong reason against the energy transition. However, to increase the strength of 
the argument for ethical merit, further remediation of the plant and mine sites ought to be 
considered because it could provide more jobs and helps to rectify the coal industry’s 
damage. Providing expanded utility access also strengthens the ethical merit. Hopi ethics 
brings attention to the impacts on all living beings. Mindfulness of the impacts from 
extraction to end of product life can strengthen ethical merit of the energy transition, but 
for now, the tribes are mindful of local needs and are not selling all of their energy off-
reservation. Retaining some of the energy generated helps the tribes to flourish and 
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improves lack of energy access across the reservation. The pursuit of a solar economy has 
not been deficient but rather adequate. While the contracts thus far are ultimately not 
enough to offset lost jobs and revenues on their own, the slower pace of planning is at 
least aggressive enough to provide some jobs in the short-term while not bankrupting the 
tribes. Because of the even-handed transition pace, the decision is respectful of others and 
one that can be universalized. The tribes appear to be intentionally acting ethically by 
pursuing the solar economy in ways mindful of duties to respect others. The positive 
consequences of jobs and revenue for the tribes also support the transition to solar. The 
only remaining considerations are broader than the tribe, across the supply chain and at 
end of product life, which can still be part of the plan. The ethical theories each support 
the transition to solar energy. 
In objection to my comments throughout these analyses, an opposing point of 
view may still elicit reasons to refrain from pursuing a solar economy. For instance, it 
may be claimed that the solar economy is repeating the previous historical mistakes of 
economic dependence on energy which has been plaguing the tribes for years. From 
uranium to coal to solar, this energy strategy may simply become a dead end after a few 
generations of revenue before it also collapses. After all, it is not yet clear that renewable 
energy can provide sufficient “energy return on energy invested” to become sustainable 
(self-perpetuating). There might be a more stable economic pursuit that would better 
serve as the basis of the tribal economy. Such reasoning is fair, but these worries can be 
relieved with proper planning. Just as the tribes should be diligent about not taking out 
more loans than they can repay, the energy production should be taken into account to 
ensure that proper cycles of decommissioning and replacement of solar modules are 
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conducted to retain continuity of power supply and revenue. Proper planning in this way 
also will contribute to appropriate job availability schedules so that tribes can plan for 
future training and know when other avenues for jobs will be needed. 
The job deficit is a second objection. Combining the pursuit of a solar economy 
with energy efficiency, storage, and site restoration will help to compensate for energy, 
revenue, and job deficits. This more expansive solar energy economy that includes 
additional energy services can also provide diversity to help outlast market fluctuations 
that make some energy forms less attractive for extended periods of time. Energy itself is 
a fundamental societal need that makes for a good economic foundation when properly 
managed. 
A third objection is that it might be argued to be best if the tribes did not associate 
with those who are not Native Americans and ought not to rely on communities outside 
of the reservations for revenue. This isolationist point of view might suffice if tribal 
members were willing to simplify their lives to rearrange their lifestyles so as not to need 
any resources imported or goods or services exported. Such a strategy seems radical. 
There are not clear animosities between the tribes and non-tribal individuals that would 
justify such a change in relations. There is plenty of opportunity to use the energy 
transition for mutually beneficial endeavors. None of these objections persuades me to 
change my conclusion that the pursuit of a solar economy seems appropriate for the 
tribes. 
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Conclusion 
 The Navajo and Hopi tribes could be significantly impacted by the closures of 
NGS and Kayenta Mine due to the dominant contribution the coal economy has made to 
their communities for generations. The abundance of solar energy potential on the 
reservations is a positive factor motivating a transition to a renewable energy economy, 
and the Navajo Nation has a long history with a variety of energy types. Still, there are 
economic, logistic, and ethical reasons for not pursuing a solar economy. However, in 
their current plans, the Navajo and Hopi tribes both seem to be pursuing solar as quickly 
as they can handle while not bankrupting themselves or sacrificing too much of their 
culture or self-determination in the process. Because the energy is also being used to help 
provide energy access and other necessary utilities (such as water, roads, and 
telecommunications), it seems that the tribes are being appropriately mindful of 
community members’ needs. Though the Navajo Nation has asked some of its members 
to give up grazing rights (even though solar should allow for animals to continue grazing 
beneath or around them), the herding families have given approval to the solar projects. 
The tribes also seem to be appropriately mindful of not desecrating their sacred lands or 
tourist attractions in the process. While more needs to be done to make up for the 
difference, the decision to pursue a solar economy is an ethical action to take as one 
component of their multi-initiative solution to move away from coal. As plans for further 
installations arise, product disposal management is becoming more significant and ought 
to be accounted to eliminate those ethical concerns. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
Recap 
This dissertation is part of a larger project to promote a more prominent role for 
ethics in both individual and societal decisions in order to enhance quality of life in 
ethical ways. In the preceding chapters, I proposed a new of definition of applied energy 
ethics to improve upon the previous definition which conflates ethics and morality and 
excludes the importance of a critical perspective for producing action prescriptions. I 
updated existing evaluation methods by formulating standardized frameworks for 
analyzing case studies for each of the three major, classical ethical theories (virtue ethics, 
deontology, and consequentialism). I later introduced additional frameworks from three 
Native American tribes (Lakota, Navajo, and Hopi). I justified the need for this new 
approach to energy ethics due to the prevalence of non-technical language within the 
existing literature which often approaches ethics in an informal, colloquial way but 
conceals the differences between ethical analysis and other research methods, such as 
energy morality, energy metaphysics, and energy justice. 
While energy ethics has been researched since the 1970s, it lacks a unifying, 
guiding framework and has not yet been adequately defined. It is disorganized because 
energy researchers fail to systematically integrate explicit ethical analysis into problem-
solving and decision-making, because there are no rules for selecting cases to discuss or 
reasons to justify arguments, and because the level of discussion can be so abstract that it 
is impractical. Although standardized methods can be found in some writings called 
energy ethics, they usually are of a discipline other than ethics, such as metaphysics, 
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anthropology, or technical science. Therefore, it is inaccurate to call them ‘energy ethics,’ 
and those methods would not serve as the standardized guide to applied energy ethics that 
I argue is missing. 
While energy justice uses a framework that is becoming popular, energy ethics is 
not the same as energy justice. Because something can be ethical without being just or 
just without being ethical, these conclusions should be more properly distinguished to 
determine whether the action is condemnable absolutely or simply needs to be performed 
in a different way. Ethics and justice conjure different normative cues, and more careful 
use of these terms can better communicate a speaker’s stance. 
Transitioning to standardized ethical analyses helps to build consistency between 
authors who already struggle with continuity because they focus on a multitude of energy 
sources and services. The standardized frameworks are meant to aggregate the literature 
into a more unified conversation, so that the action prescriptions and justifications for 
those actions are easier to identify and to debate. If energy ethicists are united in a single 
conversation, it is easier to map the literature and to gain a sense of whether they tend to 
favor or oppose certain energy practices or policies. As judgments become more explicit, 
various energy types would become favored for energy transitions, which facilitates 
economies of scale. Standardization also strengthens the applied ethics field as a formal 
discipline of study that could be potentially useful for energy decisionmakers. Energy 
ethicists can prescribe action and influence energy decisions in a way that makes it 
practically useful researchers, policymakers, and decisionmakers. 
The applied energy ethics frameworks are standardized versions of the three 
major, classical ethical theories. Utilizing virtue ethics, the ethical analysis tests whether 
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the targeted action might be argued as extreme due to the impact it would have on 
character if done habitually. If an action impairs human flourishing, the action is 
unethical. Utilizing deontology or duty-based ethics, the ethical analysis consists of 
testing whether the targeted action is self-defeating or if it disrespects others by using 
them involuntarily for selfish gain. Utilizing consequentialism, the ethical analysis 
consists of testing whether more positive consequences result from the targeted action 
than negative consequences. Additionally, analysis utilizing Lakota ethics tests whether 
the action creates a perpetuating cycle of good or evil actions, which are justified by 
duties to the land. Navajo ethical analysis tests whether the action exhibits condemnable 
behaviors, such as killing, stealing, and adultery. Hopi ethical analysis tests for actions 
that impair life. This dissertation assumed that the agent performing the action would not 
perform an action unless all reasons from any of these ethical theories that determine an 
action is unethical were addressed or otherwise avoided. The reasoning of each theory 
can be accumulated as a list of conditions for ethical merit, including the following: 
• If the action can be demonstrated as extreme or deficient in some regard,  
• if the action can be objected for reflecting bad character,  
• if the action does not demonstrate role model behavior, a model of 
excellence, or promote human flourishing, 
• if the action is associated with ill intentions, 
• if the action is not one that can be done universally or is self-defeating, 
• if someone involved in the performance of the action is not participating 
voluntarily, 
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• if the net good of the action is not the highest achievable among 
alternative options, 
• if significant negative consequences of the action are avoidable, 
• if a significantly large population is negatively impacted by the action in 
avoidable ways, 
• if the action is feared to perpetuate negativity, 
• if the action neglects to treat all of beings and nature as relatives or neglect 
duties to the land, 
• if the action has an overall negative social impact, 
• if the action does not demonstrate bravery, generosity, fortitude, or 
wisdom, 
• if the action requires condemnable actions that make life impossible, such 
as rape, murder, stealing, lying, etc., 
• if the action neglects duties to one’s kin group, upsets natural balance 
(hózhó), or fails to treat others as relatives, 
• if the action does not demonstrate imitate the Katsinam, 
• if the action does not adhere to communal values or displays mental-
emotional imbalance, 
• if the action does not respect all forms of life as of the highest value, then 
the agent must act in such a way so as to avoid this objection. 
 Case studies from Native American communities demonstrated the standardized 
frameworks in real-world situations. Communities making energy decisions are not the 
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only groups impacted since energy grids often interconnect communities. In this sense, 
we are all connected, and decisions go beyond these tribes. Furthermore, there are usually 
a variety of stakeholders from different backgrounds; so, understanding the ethical 
perspective of other stakeholder groups should better enable cooperative negotiations. 
The Great Sioux Nation, Navajo Nation, and Hopi were influenced by recent 
decisions related to energy transitions with ethical implications. Their cases also provide 
alternative ethical theories from each of their cultures that demonstrate further methods 
that can be utilized in applied energy ethics. While both the Dakota Access Pipeline and 
Navajo Nation cases had portions of the tribes that supported the decisions, other portions 
of the tribe condemn the decisions. So, an analyst cannot merely say that one ought to do 
what the tribe values, since tribes are not homogenous. There can be four sets of 
potentially competing values belonging to the youth, the elderly, tribal tradition, and 
those members who have authority in the tribe, and these are sometimes different groups 
of people who could have different values. While the analysis tended to condemn the 
construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline for perpetuating climate change threats, 
neglecting to properly prevent or plan a response to address spills, and employing in 
exploitative ways, the pursuits of solar economies by the Navajo Nation and Hopi have 
more reasons to support the ethical merit of their energy choices. While the Great Sioux 
Nation was able to attract support from nontribal members across the nation, the state and 
federal governments were not persuaded. What is needed are ways to incorporate ethical 
evaluations into policymaking without necessarily dictating values to citizens. As activist 
ethicists establish themselves as authorities on these matters and begin to assist the public 
in appreciating ethical action and being intolerant of unethical action, they can earn 
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greater influence in institutional decisions. For example, Bill McKibben’s campaign to 
divest from fossil fuel has led him to prominent roles, working in advisory positions in 
recent presidential candidates’ campaigns. 
 
Key Insights for Ethical Energy Transitions 
 Though two cases provide a small sample size, the insights they contain serve as a 
stepping stone for further research. Now, in other transitions from coal to solar or the 
next pipeline project, researchers have a foundation from which to build their arguments 
and decisionmakers have analysis already prepared which shows some significant aspects 
of the particular cases I studied, which might more generally also be applicable to their 
case. Instead of relying merely on their intuitions or searching for parallels in other 
applied ethics disciplines, such as medical, business, or environmental ethics, this 
research is more closely affiliated with their work in the energy sector. From the case 
studies within this dissertation, some reasoning can be extrapolated for other energy 
cases. 
First, when energy decisions affect water access and potability or impact 
employment, it can be particularly controversial due to the importance of water and 
employment on human well-being. Virtue ethics evaluates these decisions based on 
impact to character. Deontology evaluates these decisions testing whether someone is 
being used for another’s gain. Consequentialism evaluates to ensure that there are enough 
benefits produced to offset harms. Lakota ethics seeks to break hoops of recurring harms, 
turning them to perpetuating positive cycles. Navajo and Hopi ethics take issue with these 
attacks on life. In the DAPL case, risks related to well-being condemn the pipeline 
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construction, while in the NGS case, fostering the needs of the tribe members supports 
the transition to solar as ethical. 
 Second, not all jobs are equivalent due to the hours they provide, wages, 
knowledge and skills required, training provided, and length of contract, among other 
aspects. There could be cultural or societal reasons that justify employment distribution 
to particular groups so as to better serve the community’s needs. One avenue of further 
research could involve expanding on how these particulars manifest when choosing new 
development projects, in a similar way to how the growing literature of “just transitions” 
explores downsizing at the end of an organization’s life. In the DAPL case, temporary 
and non-local workers portray the construction as unethical, while in the NGS case, jobs 
that allow employees to continue working from one solar installation to the next provide 
job security, for positive ethical merit. 
 Third, while climate ethics is an established field of research, more can be said 
about when emissions are ethical, if ever. In the DAPL case, global warming impacts are 
a reason to object to pipeline construction. In the NGS case, emissions are partially 
responsible for the power plant and mine closures. Atmospheric impacts are becoming a 
more salient feature of ethical evaluation. Emissions can be objectionable due to duties to 
the land and community in various Native Americans’ views, show poor character using 
virtue theory, or are self-defeating and disrespectful using deontological reasoning, 
beyond being a negative consequence. 
 Fourth, in similar fashion to temporality of jobs, ethicists must inspect long-term 
impacts of infrastructures. While a pipeline may be built to the best practices currently 
available, those specifications might still not be enough to prevent all leaks over time and 
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still might not be sufficient to give nearby communities a sense of peace. Similarly, for 
all the benefits of renewable energy, end of life disposal can still cause issues of waste 
management. Planning ahead by selecting equipment that avoids toxic components and 
having a plan for recovering the material components once the product is no longer 
serviceable are ways to maintain ethical merit. Acknowledging that renewable energy 
technology is still not yet assured to produce as much energy as required to manufacture 
it (energy returned on energy invested), these technical shortcomings need to be properly 
managed in planning so that short-term benefits do not blind us to long-term 
unsustainable systems. These aspects are some of the shared salient features of the cases 
that can be prescribed more generally to other cases. 
 
New Directions for Research 
 Beyond the cases presented here, any form of energy generation, energy service, 
or aspect of energy systems can potentially be evaluated for ethical merit in the methods 
used in this dissertation. Some examples could investigate the ethical merit of building 
hydroelectric dams (controversial due to displacement of humans and nonhumans), 
humans rights abuses, such as child labor used in mining for lithium battery components, 
fracking, offshore wind farms, uranium mining, geoengineering, autonomous electric 
vehicles, SMART technologies, net metering policies, demand response contracts, a 
carbon tax, direct current (DC) transmission, mandatory rooftop solar photovoltaic laws, 
renewable portfolio standards, electric vehicle tax credits, subsidies to any energy type, 
energy export, public, utility-scale energy storage installations, markets, pricing, or 
lending, among many others. Furthermore, additional ethical theories can be introduced 
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to evaluate cases to further support or to object in new ways to these or other actions, 
such as African philosophies, Asian philosophies, and other indigenous perspectives.  
This dissertation can hopefully serve as a stepping stone to future work with 
Native American tribes. Beyond energy, disputes between tribes and nontribal members 
continue. The ethical perspectives presented here can be expanded to more tribes and to 
new cases. The prescriptions in these cases might begin a conversation about remediating 
DAPL and to designing further plans for the new Navajo and Hopi economies. 
I am also interested in researching how these formal methods of analysis can be 
integrated into formal policymaking decisions for even greater impact. Local and state 
governments are already involved in energy decisions, such as utility policy, siting of 
energy infrastructure, community solar energy installations and tax credits, electric 
vehicle charging station siting, road and public transit planning, biking infrastructure, and 
decisions which greatly impact energy consumption including green space, healthcare, 
and emergency management services. Government officials cannot be assumed to always 
take ethical action or to always use ethical reasoning when deliberating. Furthermore, 
popular opinion regarding any particular energy type does not necessarily make that 
energy type ethical. There is an abundant field of inquiry related to public perception and 
its role in influencing politics. When there are conflicts between public attitude, a 
policymaker’s conscience, and what is ethical, there is room for research to determine 
what is the best course of action. Applied ethics decision-making can be incorporated into 
existing government employee training at all levels. Determining where and how to 
integrate ethics into the process is beyond the scope of this dissertation but among the 
  160 
most important avenues for future research. In these ways, energy ethics can hopefully 
grow to become a more prominent influence in energy decisions. 
The energy transitions we need are some of the most complex, transformative 
endeavors we have to perform to maintain the ability to survive on this planet. Native 
American lands are often abundant in energy; so, in many ways, the transition can impact 
them the greatest. We need to cooperate so that no one is left behind. The transition also 
presents a window of opportunity to right historic wrongs done to these communities. 
When we also consider that we will also be trying to simultaneously transition to Industry 
4.0 with a zero-waste, circular economy that is not just more efficient but one that 
realigns the food-energy-water nexus of society toward a well-being economy, we are 
considering reorganizing most of society. With that level of disruption to how we 
currently live, knowing how often we take ethics for granted, we cannot continue to take 
these ideas lightly because people would continue to suffer, even if we choose what is 
better in the long-run. The value of life is too precious. 
Ethics is powerful, because with it, someone can backward engineer from its rules 
and conditions to construct “the good life,” but we need to harness this power not just for 
ourselves (as an individual) but for a better society for all forms of life. So, in terms of 
where I am hoping to take this research, I want to continue to research to determine how 
to integrate these new philosophies not just to change business models, metrics of 
economic analyses, and decision processes with a few new checklists to scratch off but 
how to integrate the value of life into these fundamental questions of what it means to 
live with a purpose and how we structure our society for a better, more sustainable future. 
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